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Samaani va aakoothiha samana: hrudayaani va: | Samaanamasthu vo mano yadha 
va: susahasti  
(As the harmony in the Universe, single be your purpose, united be your hearts, 
and together be your mind) 
        Rig Veda (Final Sukta, Verse 4)  
 
 
 
 
The inward eye that recognises the attraction of the ideal is a single eye shared by 
all human minds. The soul of each human being recognises itself in the souls of all 
other human beings. 
 
Time has come for the single eye of the human species to see the universal idea of 
human happiness 
   
Musings of Edmund Jennings in, 
Philip Allott, Invisible Power 2: A 
Metaphysical Adventure Story 
(Bloomington: Xlibris, 2008), p.115.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
I 
 
Because law is believed to be a science, legal reasoning is a scientific process. 
Legal materials are products of scientific skill. Observation, justification, ratiocination, 
interpretation, and quantification are a few examples of “legal skills”. A professional 
academic work in the field of law is recognized only if it reflects these skills; it 
qualifies as a scientific endeavor. A legal/judicial opinion is sound only if it has the 
niceties of juridico-scientific—Kelsinian or Posnerian—reasoning. Without the 
elements of science, any legal discourse is sheer rhetoric.  
This intellectual state of affairs is not any surprise, for the prevailing belief is that 
science is what gives meaning to our existence; science is the only method of inquiring 
into our reality; science is the only religion whose teachings we believe 
unquestioningly. No matter one has travelled the mathematical path set by theoretical 
physics, because theoretical physics is a science, we believe that its findings are true. 
One reason why scientific findings are deemed to be the ultimate truth is that there is 
no non-science or meta-science to evaluate science. What is on hand is metaphysics or 
artful philosophy. However, given that they are deemed to be the most abominable 
[un]intellectual methods, we follow science for itself. Thus, science is absolute, but 
what renders it absolute is the absence—if not rejection—of non-sciences; science 
represents the Kantian “logical egoism”, according to which a sole intellectual 
position, irrespective of its truth-value, provides the criterion of truth.   
That said, I do not mean to take the opposing side vis-à-vis science here; I take 
the salience attributed to science for granted. But I am sceptical: In what sense is law a 
science? Is it because law has the same methods as science has? If yes, then does law 
have the same role as science, the same subject-matter as science, the same philosophy 
as science? Science is a method humanity has invented to inquire into matter and its 
various states; law serves as guidance to good conduct for human beings in their social 
interaction. Science provides visions of the material existence of humanity; law 
provides visions of the inherent oneness of humanity. Science deals with gross matter; 
law deals with subtle matter (mind).  
There is, however, a lingering scepticism regarding the epistemological duality—
Cartesian as well as Kantian—in the subject of analysis in law and science—mind and 
matter, respectively. But such scepticism neither has proper articulations nor can it 
proffer convincing results.     
Nevertheless, law has marked its own distinctiveness from science. According to 
legal theorists (of even the extremist scientific school, i.e., Scandinavian realism), the 
difference between science and law exists mainly in the existential states of the 
subject- matter of both. Moreover, law is not a science in a proper scientific sense but 
in a phenomenological sense. In this light, that is seen as the phenomenological base of 
human thought, science undeniably becomes the dominant intellectualism of the 
world. If so, it could be said that more than any methodological attributes of science, 
law possesses phenomenological attributes such as objectivity, intelligibility, and a 
discursive aesthetic. This view makes more sense if one conceptually tracks the 
growth of law throughout nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for what one observes is 
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a proclivity on the part of scholars to provide law such a structure—a “doctrinal 
complex”—ensuring that all the aforesaid phenomenological attributes of science are 
present in law. It is through this structure that law reflects the behavioral properties of 
science. The existence of such a structure then affirms that law is a science, legal 
reasoning is scientific reasoning, and the legal mindset is a scientific one.  
The scientific mindset is objective, coherent, and powerful. But at the same time 
it is also impervious to human sentiments and values. Given that law is tasked to 
reconcile and constructively channel conflicting human sentiments and values in 
society, a scientific mindset cannot be constructive for society. Moreover, the social 
system in which law functions is one of relative ideals, determination of its true values 
is easier said than done. Yet, with its objective scientific mindset, law performs its 
social functions, for example, the objective determination of truth (or falsity) of 
subjective values, making value judgements by way of justification, and maintaining 
value-coherence by way of both assertion and justification.  
Thus humanity is held together by law, which objectifies all subjective human 
values by way of legal/scientific acts. Like the broader universal visions of science, 
law also has broader perspectives—historical, normative, situational, and linguistic 
from which it views society. Owing to that scientific-social perspective, however, law 
only does no more than reflect the scientifically determined values and a materially 
determined reality. 
From this we can deduce that existentially “science is social” and “social is 
scientific”. That is to say, science has social needs to fulfil; hence it is social. And 
society is a scientifically conceived and sustained structure; hence social is scientific. 
But ontologically this is not the case: “science is not social” and “social is not 
scientific”. Science is not social since science emerged out of human inquisitiveness—
independent of any conceptions such as the society born out of science itself—to know 
their physical world, their reality, so to speak. And, social is not scientific because an 
inquiry such as science, which is qualitatively independent of any social structures it 
has conceived, cannot encompass society in it.  
In this light, law—a constituent of the social—is existentially scientific but 
ontologically non-scientific. The ontologically non-scientific nature of law is buried by 
the rationalist schools of thought by imposing a phenomenological relationship 
between science and law.  
In this book, I take this imperfect scientificism of law seriously and discuss the 
scientificism of law as reflected in international law. However, contrary to what we 
generally hear from the mainstream (and its neo-rationalist redeemers) in the field 
international law is not understood simply as a legal normativity providing peaceful 
coexistence of states in an otherwise self-interested world. Rather, international law is 
understood as a universal medium—a communitarian language—that has the 
underpinning of an exotic idea-complex capable of mobilizing humanity into a “social 
universe”. Yet, my intention is not to provide an ideological discourse asserting that 
the universalist enterprise of international law has failed to fulfil its promises; such a 
stance has the risk of supporting those claims that international law is an 
ideological/ideational promise to humanity. Not heeding the critical and revolutionary 
appeal such an approach has, I have chosen to conceptually invade the architectonics 
of international law using pre-scientific, pre-social knowledge on the human condition 
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and the methods of inquiry into human reality created by the pre-scientific traditions of 
antiquity and the Middle Ages. In this endeavor, I have mainly drawn on the Vedic 
philosophy of the Sanskrit tradition. However, I do not limit my efforts to simply 
critiquing the grand intellectual schemes—both science and law—that through many 
historical epochs have grown out of the aspirations of humanity, but provide a 
thumbnail view of alternative ways of thinking and living which have the intellectual 
potential to invoke a sense of oneness in humanity.  
 
II 
 
If scientifically revealed truths are not the ultimate truth and if scientific 
conceptions are superimpositions on the ultimate truth, then we need a non-scientific 
vantage point to view the world, view humanity, and view all human socio-scientific 
conceptions. This is the reason why I have chosen Vedic philosophy as a source of 
insights for assaying the design and structure of international law.  
At first blush, Vedic philosophy does not seem to be a font of potentially society-
forming ideas, let alone have the potential of being a methodological base for 
postmodern research, even where that inquiry focuses on a discipline desperately 
reduced (of late) to an unsophisticated economics and a non-jurisprudential 
pragmatism. The structural antiquity, metaphysical anchoring, transcendentalism, and 
enlightenment-centered thought of Vedic philosophy might appear uninspiring for 
both ideological/doctrinal reformists and global campaigner/activist groups alike. 
Moreover, Vedic philosophy is often geographically marked as reflecting a given 
region’s epistemic beliefs and thus not qualifying for any disciplinary titles, save 
“Eastern exoticism”.  
However, in choosing Vedic philosophy I was encouraged by the very fact that it 
provides methods for a truth-oriented inquiry, unblemished by any ideological or 
impositionist ambitions. That is to say, the entire body of Vedic knowledge is the 
result of a self-inquiry—the question “Who am I?”—and does not entail anything 
beyond that question. Scholars of that tradition maintained unassuming modesty 
before the knowledge they gained from their inquiry: it was never used for creating an 
empire or with any motives of domination. To be sure, many socio-cultural concepts 
and models have emerged on the basis of Vedic philosophy, both in its pure and 
altered forms, but such models have barely influenced this work.    
On balance, when I built an analytical framework on the basis of Vedic 
philosophy, the book found a pre-social and pre-scientific vantage point to examine 
science and scientific constructs, including law. That vantage point helped me ask the 
questions: Have we understood the world as it ought to be understood? If we did, why 
have we felt the shadow of an impending doom, the ultimate darkness (poeticized by 
Byron), ever since organizing the world? Why do our sanguine self-assurances leave 
trail of an abject cynicism? The Vedic perspective and the analytical framework I have 
drawn from Vedic epistemology provided answers to these questions.   
The picture that appeared was not one of promise; each modernist idea, each 
intellectual method, each project guaranteeing a better world which I subjected to 
analysis proved to have the pall of egocentrism. And law appeared to be a concept 
fraught with manifold outlooks: if it is a naïve faith in doctrines one sees on one side, 
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then on the other side one encounters a normative agnosticism, and on a third an effort 
to establish law as an egoistic rationality. But, I could not have left the work in despair 
by concluding that law is a damned enterprise that nurtures an egocentric humanity. If 
I choose not to live in the sadistic pride of having laid waste a project on which rests 
the hopes (though naïve) of hundreds of millions of people, I have to tender alternative 
visions—ways of thinking and living—and instil confidence in the minds of people.  
However, the task of providing an alternative way of looking at the world was not 
simple. One option (which is a stance generally taken by many critical scholars) was to 
make a phenomenal “apologetic return” to the dismantled structure and declare that 
my critique fits well into “law as it is”—as a meta-discourse or as a safety-valve and 
mechanism for combating against all the odds of time. Though such a stance might 
fetch applause from many quarters, I would stand guilty before my conscience—guilt 
for having been disloyal to that knowledge which helped me to realize the 
misguidance of humanity. The guilt would have been particularly agonizing given that 
the knowledge I would have betrayed pertains to the intellectual potential to bind 
humanity in the thread of love and oneness. Another option was to carry on the 
Vedic/transcendental project and articulate new visions. Such a step entails providing a 
non-scientific base for law and society as well as setting new goals for life itself. When 
it comes to a non-scientific base for law, my chosen approach entails a new logic, new 
reasoning, and new intellectual methods.  
A Vedic project is, however, challenging, in that it requires every individual born 
in the world to realize his/her high intellectual potential. That is to say, human beings 
are not born free; they are born into the tragic prison of ignorance, ignorant of their 
own self, ignorant that the world exists only through them and that they are (each) the 
ultimate good and happiness in the world. Society and its scientific materialism only 
perpetuate this ignorance, instructing minds that the world comprises opposites 
(dualities)—economic richness and poorness, social bigs and smalls (“very important 
persons” and “less important masses”), imposers and bearers, and so on and so forth. 
The Vedic project aims to shatter all these material dualities by informing individuals 
of their oneness and showing them the path to reach that intellectual state where one 
attains a singular consciousness, the true human condition.   
It may seem that asking humanity to intellectually transcend its basic egoistic 
nature is expecting too much. It is, however, the case that humanity grows 
intellectually every day to keep pace with the dynamics of society. This does not mean 
that we are engaged in a systematic study of social phenomena and structures, but only 
that every day we learn to live socially. This learning is an expansion of our social 
consciousness, a walk-along with the changes of the society, and a process of 
internalizing those changes or critically attempting to resist the changes which we 
deem as bad for the society. The transcendental program maintains this inquiry-
oriented pattern of life. It only urges individuals to shift their focus from society to 
their inner selves and to ask more ontological questions on the basis of the knowledge 
of their transcendental reality.  
In aiming to provide a description of humanity’s transcendental reality, and a 
reading of the society and organization of social knowledge on the strength of that 
description, this book has drawn heavily on Vedic philosophy. In many instances, 
original Sanskrit materials provided me the inputs to write; bearing in mind the multi-
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regional, multi-linguistic audience the book targets, Vedic scholarship in English, of 
both Occidental and Oriental scholars, is cited as the authority. In certain special cases, 
Sanskrit verses are quoted (with English translation).  
Employing Vedic knowledge to sketch a world order project does not signify my 
desire to create a new school or theory. Moreover, it is not to be taken as an indication 
of my commitment to any resistance movements or any faith-systems with which 
Vedic knowledge is often associated. In other words, this project is neither resistance 
to the West—it is not a voice of a subaltern or “the other”—nor an engagement with 
“law and religion”. It belongs neither to the “right” nor to the “left”. And it is not a 
view from “below” or from “above”.  
  
III 
 
This book comprises four chapters, each designed as an article, with its own 
thesis, analytical structure, and argumentative pattern. The chapters were not written in 
the order in which they are arranged here; chapter III was written first, followed by 
chapter IV, chapter II, and chapter I. This seemingly jumbled sequence owes much to 
the way I have designed my research.   
The idea for this book was conceived at a time that saw increasing discussion of 
the “linkage” of the trade regime with other branches of international law. Most of 
these discussions were centered on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
jurisdictional expansionism. It was interesting to observe how scholars of the 
respective branches of international law had contained the interventionism of the 
WTO—often by doctrinal adaptations, often by setting off a socio-political discourse, 
and often, but most paradoxically, by way of a resistance-oriented discourse and 
action. In all those scholarly endeavors, what was apparent was an eagerness—a 
professional concern, so to speak—to safeguard the structural integrity of their 
respective branches from being cannibalized by the trade regime. More than these 
conciliatory scholarly efforts, however, what aroused my curiosity was the incredible 
normative influence of the trade regime and the institutional power of the WTO, I 
asked, “What is so profound inside this grand ‘Cathedral’ (as it appears to Joel P. 
Trachtman when articulating the ‘economics’ of the sanctions of the WTO) that the 
normative language of international law yearns for a WTO dialectic”? To formally ask 
this question, while not sounding too naïve and poorly informed, I decided to create an 
analytical framework, of at least the minimum intellectual standard expected of a law 
review article, to examine the existential logic of the WTO. Below I tell the tale of that 
article, Public International Law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal Positivism and 
Neoliberalism.  
First, I asked the clichéd, foundational, post-ontological (as Thomas Franck says) 
question: “Is international law real law?”—a question all international law primers and 
all teachers of graduate law classes ask (with their characteristic artificial scepticism), 
only to answer in the affirmative. Whereas they ask this question as part of an 
elementary instruction, I asked it to show the reader the hostility of legal positivism 
towards international law, especially the positivists’ dismissal of international law for 
want of certain attributes—sovereignty, command, obligations, and sanctions—which 
they deemed essential to real law. I also wanted to draw the reader’s attention to the 
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sanguinity among international lawyers in the wake of the WTO in their finding the 
“missing elements” of real law and rendering their discipline normatively more robust, 
a positive law.  
Asking “If this is in fact the case?” seemed to be the most exciting and serious of 
all the tasks I had performed till then in that article. The subsequent section of the 
article became a “talking board” to record the views of three prominent positivists—
Bentham, Austin, and Hart—as to whether they would have sanctioned international 
law had the WTO existed in their day. That endeavor revealed that their views on the 
status of international law would not have been any different. Having thus shown the 
satisfaction and sanguinity of international lawyers to be ill-founded, I proceeded to 
ascertain what force, if not positivism, has brought about the changes that international 
lawyers have witnessed. What has conferred power on the WTO and thereby endowed 
international law with a hard normativity?  
I began to sense that no answers would be forthcoming from positivism in the 
way the theory is described in the Victorian tradition; nor could answers be had from 
positivism’s twentieth century English refinements or the revisions of the predecessors 
of modern day constitutionalism. Yet, by then, I had fallen in love with positivism 
such that I started to idealize many positivists (their biographies became my favourite 
reading). Call it my naiveté or a positivistically induced obsession for formalism, I 
simply reveled in the simplicity and comfort of talking about law as rules, as super-
rules, and as the sacrosanct inscriptions of ultimate good and bad (the “principles”). 
That liking, however, was challenged by a mystery I sensed in the tabooed social 
frontiers of law. Hence, I returned to the three positivists, came back, and again 
returned, only to come back to the mystery. Finally, having been informed by the lives 
and work of the three positivists, I retold the positivist tale as a socially-oriented 
theory—one with a non-legal, social ontology—as against the power-oriented one. Yet 
I did not get an answer as to what the force is which propels the WTO.  
I directed my quest across the Atlantic (not bodily). There, as everyone in Rome, 
I became a Roman, speaking the language of ideology, politics, and power. In that 
phase of infidelity to positivism I rigorously engaged with political and social theories. 
I became aware that the grand ideology of globalization—neoliberalism—has spread a 
unique, unconventional “market interest” (egoism) and market culture among global 
actors such that every market institution is highly revered and respected in the world. 
Further research revealed that the WTO is a market institution whose structure and 
strategies are dictated by the needs of the neoliberal agenda.  
When international lawyers embraced the WTO and brought it into the structural 
framework of international law, it also benefited from the institutional strength of the 
WTO provided by neoliberalism. That is, the thickened normativity of international 
law is a reflection of the robustness of the socio-political order driven by 
neoliberalism.  The power and normativity witnessed by international lawyers in 
international law is a “seeming reality”.   
However, my love for positivism was not lost even then. Moreover the revelation 
that positivism is a socially-oriented theory with great potential for explaining social 
phenomena prompted me not to give up on positivism. To my surprise, a rereading of 
my social version of legal positivism in the light of neoliberalism revealed that 
positivism is a discourse of a given intellectual context and tradition just as 
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neoliberalism is in the intellectual context of the market tradition today. This does not 
mean that positivism is history; positivism exists even today in an ironical relationship 
with neoliberalism in that it is positivism that provides a sense of “legalism” and 
applies the rule of law to enforce and reinforce neoliberal ideals in the world.  
This conclusion is revealing in a broader sense than it appears to be. It does not 
simply convey the existential logic of the WTO, the social orientation of positivism or 
the harmony between positivism and neoliberalism; it also shows that the renewed 
normativity in international law comes from a market culture and market practices. 
What is more, it tells that the legalism, or rule of law, about which humanity is so 
proud, is a rule of the market. Finally, positivism, my erstwhile passion, proved to be a 
theory that has no structural credibility, but only has an uncritical receptiveness to any 
social forces that come its way.  
This state of affairs seemed serious to me, given that the concept of the market as 
it applies to the modern world (and is talked about throughout my research) is a 
mindset where one has to be optimal in his/her preferences in order to be better off 
than another—an egoistic mindset, the supposed true human nature.  
However, international law as I have been taught it in law school hails from a 
communitarian tradition, which, although state centric, is humanistic, “Grotian” in a 
manner of speaking. I have understood it as a legal structure that stands for humanity 
and its common interest. It boasts the United Nations “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war”, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which recognizes the 
“common interest of mankind” in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which declares “the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof” as the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM), and 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which recognizes the “inherent 
dignity and equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family”. But having 
seen the malleability and “softness” of legal positivism through which these 
communitarian ideals are to be realized and the sway of neoliberalism over positivism, 
I had sufficient reason to be sceptical about conventional international law and the 
realization of the altruistic ideals it stands for: What after all is international law other 
than a particular language-structure that has a subjective grammar, a grammar which 
helps its speakers construct subjective meanings in a seemingly legitimate fashion?   
The two questions—first, “Is international law a communitarian project?” and 
second “Is it a subjective discourse?”—prompted me to undertake a study of the 
intellectual sensibilities of mainstream international law. Since market interest 
(egoism) appeared to be the current state of international law and trade regime to be 
the representation of that interest, any examination of a legal regime that is 
communitarian in outlook and that stands to secure the common interest of humanity 
seemed to necessitate a juxtaposition of market interest and common interest. Such a 
juxtaposition would be needed if I was to understand and appraise the “trade-and-the-
other” linkages and the doctrinal adaptations through which other branches of 
international law have contained the trade regime and the market interest it promotes.   
In that endeavor I chose the law of outer space (space law) to represent 
mainstream international law, for the reason that among all the braches of international 
law I found space law to best represent the communitarian aspirations of humanity. 
Moreover, space law is a discipline that has the communitarian character of 
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international law embedded in its theoretical and doctrinal structure; e.g., space law 
has the concept of “common interest of mankind” and recognized it as the governing 
doctrine of all space activities; space law codified the CHM principle (before the law 
of the sea claimed it); it restricted national claims of sovereignty in outer space; and it 
affirmed the peaceful use of outer space. Space law also has introduced for the first 
time procedural specialties that uphold the communitarian interests, e.g., voting by 
consensus which guarantees that the interests of all states and its peoples are fully 
represented.   
I designed my inquiry in the form of yet another article—Whither International 
Law, Thither Space Law: A Discpline in Transition—which deals with the 
epistemological foundations and functional attributes of space law. I first provided a 
detailed assessment and critique of the professional and intellectual history and the 
prevailing epistemic culture of space law. This analysis helped me confirm an apparent 
tendency of space law to sever its ties to its parent discipline, international law. From 
that analysis, I derived two opposing hypotheses: 1) space law ought to remain 
separated from international law as a unique jurisprudence, and 2) although has its 
particular characteristics, space law is not a branch of law distinct from international 
law and there is an imbalance in the pattern of thinking in space law that prompts one 
to believe that it is separate from international law. I then framed a debate along the 
lines of epistemology (drawing on Foundationalism and Coherentism, in particular), 
wherein I defended the first and second hypotheses on behalf of space law and 
international law, respectively. While defending each side, arguments drew on the 
scholarship in space law and international law so as to avoid the risk of solipsism and 
prejudice.   
In articulating the arguments for space law, it became obvious that the discipline 
has adapted itself so as to accommodate the growing commercialization of space 
activities into its regulatory sphere. Space law has taken up a new professional posture 
and reorganized its academic and professional vocabulary in order to meet the growing 
demands of the market. However, although this trend marked a substantial departure 
from the discipline’s conventional doctrinal base, it was a sign of its “progressive 
sensibility”. In the sprit of this sensibility, space law adjusted its theoretical bases to 
the market, installed the market culture in its structure and set safeguarding the 
interests of the market as its functional goal.   
Arguing for international law, this stance of space law should have met with a 
theoretical opposition from international law. However, my research in this regard 
revealed that the right of space law to modify its perspective is part of a larger program 
to renew international law. International law was seen to be functioning like a 
discourse—that is, “a linear operation of texts, discursive practices and social 
practices” (Chapter IV, p.401)—that assigned space law and other special braches a 
right to reorganize. This function of international law served to maintain structural and 
“axiological harmony”.  Given that discourse is influenced by the social practices of a 
given time, it is certain that the legal discourse is prejudiced by the character of the 
neoliberal market culture. It is such an influence on the nature and functioning of 
international law that has prompted space law to promote the interests of the market.  
Upon completing these two articles, I achieved a better grasp of the linkage issue. 
I saw in an insightful manner the doctrinal adaptations made in order to overcome the 
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conflict of regimes and the theoretical explanations to legitimize the linkage between 
trade and other regimes. I understood that the source of all conflict was the coming 
together of the market interest (as seen in the trade regime) and the common interest 
(as seen in conventional international law and its special branches). Neither the 
eclipsing effect of the trade regime over other regimes nor the radical rewriting of 
international legal discourses remained a mystery for me. International law seemed to 
be the most wondrous intellectual enterprise with its survival mechanisms, receptivity 
to changes, doctrinal malleability, rhetorical power; I was left thoroughly impressed by 
the entire doctrinal complex of international law.  
However, my interest in philosophy, particularly Oriental philosophy, triggered a 
curiosity about the two mindsets apparent in the conflict of regimes—common interest 
and market interest. I was led by an awareness that these mindsets are socially 
systematized forms of altruism and egoism, respectively. At a deep phenomenological 
level, any sociality associated with altruism and egoism would collapse and they 
would emerge as the two poles of human thought—egoism the natural state of 
consciousness and altruism the ultimate state of consciousness. This Vedic (of Vedanta 
in particular) and Husserlian phenomenology became a heuristic to organize a rigorous 
inquiry into the philosophical design of international law. That inquiry was to become 
the nucleus of this book.  
I worked the next few months to design an analytical framework which could 
juxtapose common interest and market interest. Designing one such framework does 
not seem a difficult task; however, what I required was an analytical framework that 
could encompass the philosophical design of international law. In addition, I wanted to 
highlight that the pairing of common interest (altruism) and market interest (egoism) is 
deleterious at the deep philosophical level (that is, when perceived beyond any social 
framework); the splendour of the doctrinal complex did not dispel this scepticism. 
That proved to be hard task. Every day I sat amid a heap of multidisciplinary pieces 
gathered from over a dozen databases and numerous shelves, read the works, and 
prepared notes. Long evening walks into the woods provided space for self-dialogue, 
which systematized the scattered thoughts accumulated over the day. Nearly six 
months elapsed as I built a mental scaffold to begin with, I wrote in my diary:   
 
First, study the design of common interest in a two-fold perspective: 
(a) common interest as philosophy, wherein the ethical and moral base 
on which the concept rests has to be examined, and (b) common 
interest as doctrines, wherein analyse the doctrinal and political 
mould provided for common interest in the ideas underpinning 
international law and politics. Then juxtapose the philosophical and 
doctrinal designs to ascertain the conceptual reality of common 
interest. Second, follow a similar approach for examining market 
interest. However, the market should be viewed first as ideology and 
then as doctrine. Third, set up a dialogue between the rationalities of 
common interest and market interest. The interaction should take 
place at two levels. On the first level, the reality of both concepts will 
interact. On the second level, common interest, as it appears in 
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doctrines, will interact with market interest, as this is reflected in 
doctrine.  
 
Before I started doing any serious research to develop this frame (which was to 
last for another year and a half), I put the features of the enigmatic doctrinal complex 
of international law and its functional specialties in writing, with an allusion to the fact 
that it is this complex which has reconciled the disparate parings of common interest 
and market interest.   
As suggested by the sketch I made, I pondered the concept of common interest as 
it has featured in philosophy. However, nothing of a concept called common interest 
appeared before me, although I found comparable concepts such as “common good”, 
“public interest”, and “collective will” in certain traditions in politics, legal dogmatics, 
and theology, respectively. I also came across many knowledge communities that 
shared a kind of common philosophical interest. None of those loose representations of 
common interest could have helped me in ascertaining the true essence of the concept, 
but a concept of the common interest of humanity at large. The practice of discussing 
the common interest as the interest of the humanity was found only in Vedic 
philosophy, a philosophy that holds that the common interest of humanity lies in a 
self-oriented inquiry into human existence. Although the common inquiry engenders a 
common interest, humanity actualizes its common interest by arriving at an intellectual 
state in which one acquires a singular, non-dual consciousness, this being the outcome 
of such an inquiry. That state of intelligence is altruism.    
Inquiry into the concept of common interest as it is manifested in the doctrines in 
law and politics met with the same problem I had with the inquiry into the concept as 
seen in philosophy: I felt the same vastness, looseness, and mistiness of the concept in 
legal and political discourses. The few common interest doctrines that are in 
international law are too narrow in ambit and represent only a particular regime rather 
than international law in general. Given that my intention was to inquire into a 
collective common interest that has undergone a compromise with market interest in 
the many instances of regime conflict, an inquiry into particular doctrines or particular 
regimes would not have helped. Hence, drawing on some of the critical, radical, and 
reformist scholarship in international law, as well as on the theory and methods of 
Vedic philosophy, I decided to expand the concept of doctrine to include those streams 
of thought in international law which aim at securing a common interest. This 
intellectual posture elevated the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) and “global governance”—movements supposedly standing for a certain 
common interest and extending over the entire doctrinal complex of international 
law—to the level of doctrine.  
My analysis of TWAIL and global governance revealed that the common interest 
claimed to have been pursued by these streams of thought is egoism camouflaged as 
shared rationalities.  
Thus, the concept of common interest as it is understood in philosophy turned out 
to have altruism at its core, whereas common interest as it is seen in doctrines was 
found to be engendering egoism. And when I juxtaposed common interest as the 
concept is reflected in philosophy and in doctrines, the philosophical version was seen 
as eclipsing the doctrinal one: a common interest is that which entails a mindset of 
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altruism. Through this juxtaposition I was also able to refine the concept of doctrine 
and conceptualize philosophy.   
Examining market interest was not as tedious as investigating common interest. 
Even though the same pattern of analysis was followed, I deemed market interest to be 
an ideology instead of philosophy. This was because the juxtaposition between 
common interest as philosophy and as doctrine helped conceptualize philosophy as an 
intellectual discursivity for actualizing human reality. Given the dependence the 
market has on socially constructed reality as against human reality, market interest 
could not have found a place in philosophy. That analysis informed that markets 
promote egoism.   
When it came to the question of analyzing market interest as doctrine, once again 
the juxtaposition that helped to refine the concept of doctrine helped me to choose Law 
and Economics (L&E), in particular economic analysis of international law, as a 
doctrine. Examining L&E as doctrine was a protracted affair, especially since I had to 
gather all models of economic behavior of states built by scholars of international law, 
organize them in a consistent fashion, and conduct a review of them to obtain a 
coherent perspective on the intellectual stance of L&E as it applies to international 
law. However, there was nothing by way of a conclusion of that review to say that 
L&E (and the market interest it represents) promotes egoism, since the fundamental 
claim of L&E is that egoism (i.e. maximizing one’s preferences) is the true nature of 
human beings and all human entities. However, I was sceptical about this claim. At the 
same time I was aware of the intellectual strength of L&E. Hence, to proceed with my 
scepticism I once again employed Vedic philosophy and its theories about human 
nature. That step and the insights drawn from Vedic Philosophy facilitated my effort to 
provide a critique of L&E. That critique showed that the doctrinal form of market 
interest that L&E embodies reinforces egoism.  
Once market interest had been studied as ideology and doctrine I juxtaposed 
market interest as reflected in both ideology and doctrine and sought the reality of 
market interest. However, unlike in the case of common interest there was no 
dichotomy between the ideological and doctrinal versions of market interest, for the 
latter was found to be reinforcing the former. Thus, I concluded that the reality of 
market interest as it is reflected in ideology and its doctrinal version only lays a 
theoretical and methodological foundation for the egoism being spread by the market.  
That common interest represents altruism and market interest represents egoism 
was an interesting revelation. It was interesting, because it proved my initial doubt 
true, that is, that at a deep phenomenological level common interest and market 
interest are social representations of altruism and egoism. At that point I no longer 
needed any explanation for the regime conflicts.  
However, these findings prompted another question; that is, if the common 
interest and market interest are representations of two opposite rationalities—altruism 
and egoism—can the doctrinal reconciliation of conflicting regimes (and subsequent 
validations) by the doctrinal complex of international law be justified?  
To clear this scepticism I went on to create a juxtaposition for a third time. This 
time I built the juxtaposition on two levels: first between the reality of common 
interest and market interest, that is between philosophy and ideology and then between 
the doctrinal versions of common interest and market interest. At the first level, I 
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decided that instead of juxtaposing common interest and market interest, I would 
juxtapose altruism and egoism, their core rationalities. That analysis showed that 
altruism and egoism are the perennial poles of human thought and that the true 
meaning of life is in transcending egoism and realizing altruism. Any intellectual 
positions or thought-structures that bring together these rationalities have the effect of 
thwarting the true intellectual progress of humanity. At the second level, I examined 
how the doctrinal complex of international law has reconciled the clash between 
common interest and market interest. It was found that such reconciliation has been 
accomplished by way of hermeneutical invasions into law, and that a set of discourses 
has been set forth to legitimize such invasions. TWAIL, global governance, and L&E 
were found to be serving such a legitimizing function.  
Nearly two years after I conceived this article, I concluded it by pointing out that 
it is sort of a scholarly obsession with science that has cast law into a doctrinal mould. 
As doctrines became the working modules of lawyers and scholars of law, a “doctrinal 
fetishism” came to exist such that philosophy—the true art of thinking and living—
was restricted to a set of doctrine-centered, deontological reasoning called 
“jurisprudence” (informally, “legal philosophy and theory”). This scientifically 
conceived philosophy of law renders legal judgements devoid of the spirit and purpose 
of philosophy. It was with such an intellectual outlook that the doctrinal complex of 
international law grappled with regime conflicts and reconciled the disparate pairing of 
common interest and market interest.  
Humanity in effect has a social system that has egoism as the conceptual surface 
to realize altruism. For international law, this intellectual state of affairs is nothing less 
than a tragedy, and thus I titled the article The Tragedy of the Philosophy of 
International Law.  
By then, I had a critical reading of the philosophy of international law. Yet, I felt 
the need to write one more article in order to appropriately frame the research I did for 
the book. Therefore, I tried to recollect the advancement of my research thus far.  
When I began the book, I had before me a regime conflict in international law as 
a problematique (the hallmark of a scientific academic work). As I advanced, the 
regime conflict expanded to include the structural deficiencies of international law. 
Structural deficiencies expanded to include structural errors. And structural errors 
extended to encompass social mistakes. In the same vein, the topics of the research 
qualitatively and quantitatively broadened from linkage issues to the existential reality 
of the WTO, from the WTO to the postmodern ontology of space law, from space law 
to the philosophy of international law; it came to embrace the discursivity of TWAIL, 
the spirituality of global governance, quantum physics as a transcendental revelation, 
Vedanta on the human condition, the structure of legal thought, and the misguidance 
of L&E. However, more than the expanding scope of the analytical framework or the 
increasing rigor of analysis with every new topic and every new article, there was an 
overall broadening of my social and individual consciousness.  
I decided to appraise my research in the light of my broadened consciousness. I 
was able to ask bigger questions by then: What could be the reason why a social 
conception like international law stands misguided? Does the problem lie in the 
structure or in the function of international law? Although the poorly adapted 
scientificism of doctrine was found to be misleading, that cannot be the sole cause, 
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since I was able to find flawed thought-patterns beyond the doctrinal dialectic, in the 
philosophical configuration of the doctrinal complex of international law. Yet, 
regardless of such serious problems, the discipline is functional. International law lives 
in society (we hear about it every day), in law schools (we speak about it every day), 
and in international offices (they do it every day). No one but a few scattered sets of 
scholars has any concern for the intellectual health of international law. For the 
majority, international law is a robust regime and a dynamic social enterprise; whereas 
my pre-social analyses tell a different story. In that case, it is likely that there is a 
major phenomenological error related to international law. That idea prompted a fourth 
article Misguided Sociality, Lost Humanity: International Law as Phenomenology, and 
Beyond.  
The first lesson of phenomenology is that consciousness is the foundation of all 
existence, be it law, the society, the world or the universe. This view implies that 
reality is what consciousness constructs. In that vein, any phenomenological error is an 
error in human consciousness.  
If international law bears a phenomenological error, it is definite that society also 
bears that error, for it is from social consciousness that legal consciousness emerges. 
To find out if there is a phenomenological error in conceiving society (or, for that 
matter, in conceiving international law) I formulated a phenomenological discourse 
which illuminated the view that consciousness is only a material truth and that 
outside/within consciousness there is a super-consciousness—the ultimate truth—
which is veiled by a “human ignorance”.  
First, I developed the concept of the super-consciousness—transcendental 
reality—by drawing on Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, commentaries on various 
Upanishads, and Vedic exegesis. That exercise helped me to comprehend 
transcendence, conceptualize the super-consciousness, and provide the means to 
realize the super-consciousness. Then I rationally situated the super-consciousness. 
However, putting the findings of that research in paper I went on to explore the 
characteristics parallel to the super-consciousness in the constructs of consciousness 
such as society and law. That analysis informed that society is an ersatz transcendence. 
This condition of society is self-evident given that consciousness, being clouded in a 
haze of ignorance, cannot fully recognize the super-consciousness, except for certain 
noetic flashes in the mind. That finding was followed by an account of the 
phenomenological philosophy of international law. In that account, too, I explored 
transcendental parallels, in concepts like sovereignty. I concluded that analysis with 
the finding that international law is only a functional aesthetic that exists in the minds 
of international lawyers and that international law is founded on social consciousness 
with the aim of sustaining the social reality.  
Thus, I demonstrated that sociality is a “seeming reality” and that the true human 
state of consciousness is the super-consciousness. I also brought back to the article the 
text on the concept of the super-consciousness that I had temporarily withheld. It was 
then time to answer a polemical question: If true human reality is the transcendence 
and not the social reality perceived by consciousness, what might be the nature, 
purpose, and meaning of law/international law?    
This is a question I ought to have answered in the conclusion of the book. 
However, the deconstructive spirit of the article (Misguided Sociality, Lost Humanity) 
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would have had the shadow of cynicism and distrust had I left it with a transcendental 
revelation and without showing the prospects of enlightenment. Hence I decided to 
envisage a transcendental foundation of law in the last part of that article.  
In this regard, my first insight was that even though super-consciousness is a new 
reality, it is not antithetical to consciousness per se; rather, super-consciousness is a 
higher state of consciousness. In that case, law would require an intellectual 
refinement from a social concept to a concept that entails the higher level of reasoning 
distinctive of transcendental reality. Even if certain elements of society’s law could be 
retained, the new concept of law would require a rejection of all prejudices, beliefs, 
and judgments of both the society and law. However, even amid such retentions and 
rejections, the purpose of law, that is, to show “right ways” to humanity, would remain 
unchanged.  
My task was to see if law needed a canonical form to provide the right ways. That 
quest revealed that the super-consciousness is an intellectual state of perfection—a 
singularity—that itself is the ideal, the right way. However, to reach the ideal state of 
singularity it is necessary for humanity to acquire the knowledge of its self-becoming. 
That knowledge is law. Thus law is both an ideal state of mind as well the knowledge 
to realize that state. I called the latter “Ultimate law” and the former “Law”. Finally, I 
went on to provide a thumbnail view of the discipline Law that embodies a logic and 
reasoning corresponding qualitatively to the super-consciousness. In providing such a 
foundation for the discipline, I drew on Vedic epistemology and focused on grammar, 
language-use, and relevant intellectual skills.  
Thus, when transcending jurisprudence, law is a highly profound knowledge and 
set of intellectual techniques; and when jurisprudence is transcended, law becomes the 
ideal state of mind, the enlightenment.   
 
IV 
 
This book was written over a period of five years. It is rather unlikely that any 
work extending over such a long period of time is without any variations, especially 
when the author is in a formative phase of learning (i.e., a phase for learning the “art of 
learning” that has to be practised for the rest of one’s life). This work has experienced 
the ebb and flow of time and reflects this, among other things, in its language, 
narration, and the overall writing and intellectual standards.  
It is true that the book reflects my changing linguistic skills. However, there is 
also a conscious choice of language for each article/chapter depending on the theme 
and the message each chapter has set out to convey. Chapter I, which contextualizes 
the book, is also the sketch of a proposed transcendental project. Hence, it has a 
somewhat poised pitch and confident tone. Its sentences have a fragmentary brevity, 
for each sentence, more often than not, pithily brings in context and systematically 
arranges the ideas expressed elsewhere in this book (in its original context, an idea 
might have seemed only applicable to the situation in which it was discussed in the 
relevant chapter). However, that does not imply that the chapter is a summary of the 
book; the chapter provides a rereading of many socio-intellectual schemes, my 
interpretation of many transcendental positions, applications of transcendental logic to 
many social perspectives and, most of all, an outline of a transcendental project (the 
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chapter also seriously discusses certain intellectual positions in Vedic philosophy). 
Another reason for the sentential brevity is the theme of the discourse, transcendental 
philosophy. Transcendental discourses of Kant and Plato (and many modern-day 
scholars of their genre such as Philip Allott) have this brevity in their sentences and a 
rhythm induced by that brevity. However, apart from their influence, I might have 
been predisposed towards the Sanskrit tradition and its scholarship—in the form of 
mantras, which have a similar brevity and rhythm—that I have consulted in writing 
this chapter.  
This style of the transcendental philosophers has been criticized as an attempt to 
obscure social reality. The main criticism is that there is a transcendental flamboyance 
which is created by verbal juggling (often by repeating or alternating words) and other 
“stylistic moves” such that the narrator, the referent, and the prose roll into a 
mellifluous sonata from which a pragmatic person gains nothing but a momentary 
aesthetics. In chapter I, I have resorted to many such “moves”, e.g. the expression 
“consciousness” and “super-consciousness” are more often than not seen to be striking 
a beat. Such a style of writing owes to the fact that the subject matter of transcendental 
philosophy is not transcendence in isolation; rather the transcendence appears as a 
superlative state of material reality. In other words, the relationship between material 
and transcendental reality is that of manifest and unmanifest reality, respectively. 
Hence, any reference to the unmanifest transcendence is preceded or followed by the 
manifest version of the transcendence. Regarding specific concepts, even the qualities 
of such concepts as reflected in manifest and unmanifest states accompany the 
discussion. The cumulative effect of a conceptualization of all these elements renders 
the narration to have a rhythm. Therefore, the criticism that this style is a stylistic 
mask misses the point.  
The sentential brevity in transcendental discourses has also been subjected to 
criticism. Here the first point to be noted is that the earliest elements of transcendental 
knowledge were sounds, stored in the mind as memories. The thought-sentences of 
those memories had a unique aesthetic structuring. That is, knowledge about the 
manifest reality was designed as full-blown sentences, whereas knowledge about the 
unmanifest reality was designed as thoughts about the manifest reality collapsed, 
which comprise short sentences with words arranged in a phonetical order appealing to 
mind. Raffaele Torella concisely captures the purpose of such a linguistic structuring: 
 
Language [in the Sanskrit tradition] is precisely the device by means of 
which succession (krama) is introduced into consciousness so that 
consciousness can dissolve it into pure reflective awareness.1  
  
Thoughts in the form of developed sentences were employed for the earlier stages of 
the inquiry into reality, and thoughts in the form of brief and rhyming sentences 
(mantras) were employed for articulating the transcendental reality. It is the latter type 
of language-structures that has to be the means of communication for humanity which 
has realized the cosmic consciousness, an intellectual oneness.   
                                                 
1 Torella (2004), p.179.  
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On balance, deeming the discourses of transcendental philosophers to have an 
undesirable aesthetics is at the cost of a rejection, if not ignorance, of the discursivity 
of transcendental philosophy.  
The language of chapter II is more assertive, since that chapter is an effort to 
demonstrate the misguided dialectic of doctrines in international law; the assertions 
made therein are supported by a host of sources. In the same chapter, in those 
instances where I have highlighted the role played by contemporary legal and political 
thought in undermining human potential, the narration conveys a certain pathos.  
There is also substantial variation in the storylines of each chapter and in my way 
of carrying the arguments forward therein. Chapter I, despite being an assortment of 
Occidental and Oriental philosophy, social theory, international law, and Vedic 
cosmology, has a rather uncomplicated storyline. Chapter II has a much more complex 
structure because of its analytical ambition. The chapter is also conceptually dense, 
given that I had to first situate and then juxtapose many legal and political schools of 
thought. The style of Chapter III is “presentism”; i.e., it makes a modern institution 
return to the intellectual positions of three succeeding philosophers of the past and to 
re-appear in the present to tell that it is on a flawed foundation. The chapter then goes 
on to determine the existential logic of that institution in the present, which is but the 
past transformed. The plot is somewhat fantastical yet has the seriousness of a 
professional academic work. Chapter IV starts with an account of the professional and 
intellectual history of a discipline and later provides a plot for two opposing 
hypotheses to compete with each other. That plot has a certain artificially about it in 
that I (the narrator) take on the responsibility to speak on behalf of each hypothesis. 
There is every chance of my being prejudiced in favour of one position. However, my 
prejudice (if there were any) would make no difference there; the reader gets to see the 
possible extent of the intellectual positions one can take in postmodernity, the milieu 
in which the article’s plot is set.  
  
V 
 
Readers can approach this book in many ways. First, for an ambitious reader, that 
is one who is sceptical about the present pattern in which contemporary legal and 
political thought are elaborated and one who is serious about transcending 
scientifically structured jurisprudence, I recommend a cover-to-cover reading in the 
order in which the chapters are arranged. The same is recommended for readers who 
believe that law is kept alive by human intentionality that works in a social cause-
effect network or who believe that systematicity of mind can only be obtained from a 
formal legal or political mindset. The latter type of reader would have quite much to 
do in maintaining the opposite point of view and critically contributing to the 
discussion.  
Second, other readers might read in the reverse order, that is, start with the 
scholarly and professional sensibilities of a common interest regime (Ch.IV) and how 
that regime has yielded to the normative influence of a market regime to make a 
regime-pair (Ch.III). Then, they could see why such a pairing is a philosophical 
tragedy for humanity (Ch.II), and finally, how humanity can intellectually transcend 
that tragedy.   
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Third, readers could follow my progression down the chapters when writing this 
work (described above).  
Fourth, readers might read the design of the philosophy of international law that 
embodies the disparate pairing of common interest and market interest and learn that 
such a pairing is deleterious for humanity (Ch.II). They could then proceed to 
familiarize themselves with the epistemological and ontological aspects of a common 
interest regime and a market interest regime (Ch. III and Ch. IV or Ch. IV and Ch. III). 
Finally, they might read about the alternative ways to make human existence 
meaningful (Ch.I).  
In spite of all the four ways to approach the book, for those readers interested 
only in a given chapter or certain chapters, each can be read on its own without 
consulting the others. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
MISGUIDED SOCIALITY, LOST HUMANITY: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS PHENOMENOLOGY, AND BEYOND  
 
 
Conventionally, sociality is deemed the true human condition; it is the reality cast 
before humanity by the collective social self-conscious of its members. International 
law is a legal consciousness, a vital constituent of sociality. In a challenge to this 
position, this article argues that the true human condition is not sociality but a 
transcendental super-consciousness, upon which a social consciousness is 
superimposed. The super-consciousness is an intellectual fullness of mind, a 
transcendental state into which all constructs created by consciousness collapse. This 
collapse also brings about the collapse of sociality and international law. Drawing on 
perennial philosophy of the East—Advaita Vedanta in particular—the article 
envisages a transcendental foundation of law that embodies the deeper logic and 
higher level of reasoning distinctive of the super-consciousness. What is international 
law in sociality becomes a profound intellectual discursivity in the transcendental 
scheme.   
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Visudham antahkaranam svarupe Nivesya sakshinyava bodhamatre | Sanaiha 
sanair nischalatam upanayana Purnam svamevanu vilokayet tatah | 
(Focusing one’s purified mind—the witness—on absolute knowledge, and 
slowly bringing mind to calmness, one attains the reality).1  
                             Sankara, Vivekachudamani  
 
[E]nlightenment for everyone? It sounds like too grandiose a Utopia, 
especially when we consider how inept human beings seem to be in the face 
of the harsh realities which confront the planet today. At best, one might hope 
for a broader secular base in general, for a greater percentage of fully 
enlightened persons and certainly for authentic leaders whose inspiration 
could light the way. Yet the human species has long shown a second 
surprising aptitude for improving itself. The process is called cultural 
evolution.2    
                                           James H. Austin, Zen and the Meditation 
 
The meaning and the measure of human progress are difficult to establish. A 
fair general judgment might be that material progress has not been matched 
by spiritual progress.3    
                                                Philip Allott, The Health of Nations  
 
As the moving hands of history is poised to write a new chapter in the story of 
humanity, we are being given a renewed—and perhaps a final—opportunity 
to transform into reality the fondest visions of the ages. 4 
 
                      C.G. Weeramantry, The Lord’s Prayer 
                                                 
1 See SWAMI MADHAVANANDA, VIVEKACHUDAMANI OF SRI SANKARACHARYA 1926 168, 169 (1926) 
(hereinafter Vivekachudamani). My translation.  
2 JAMES H. AUSTIN, ZEN AND THE MEDITATION: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MEDITATION AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS 710 (1998).  
3 PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 314 (2002). 
4 C.G. WEERAMANTRY, THE LORDS PRAYER: BRIDGE TO A BETTER WORLD 260 (1998).  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Humanity is proud of its intellectual abilities—its ability to think rationally, make 
judgments, organize life in the world, and above all, to understand its own ontology. 
Humanity evolved into its present state of salience through many intellectual projects 
such as religion, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, science, the Industrial 
Revolution, liberalism, modernism, and postmodernism. It is through these intellectual 
projects that humanity became conscious of its human condition.  
All theoretical abstractions of the human condition bear heavy traces of the 
intellectual projects that cradled such abstractions. It is from such theoretical 
abstractions that humanity found universalizing themes for coming together, for its 
social self-becoming.5 The most significant among all the themes which have helped 
humanity in that process is “peace”. The most significant means to secure peace is 
international law.6  
Thus, international law sustains humanity; a collective social self-
consciousness—a striving for peace and happiness—sustains international law; and the 
collective social self-consciousness is a product of human intellectual projects. That is 
to say, for humanity, a social consciousness is the human condition, human reality. 
Human reality is therefore sociality in which international law is a vital enterprise.  
This article is an inquiry into human reality and the philosophy of international 
law as it pertains thereto.7 Accordingly it poses the question: Is reality that which is 
observable and perceivable as the prevailing sociality in international society 
(hereinafter “the society”8)? In Part II, the article tentatively answers the question in 
the affirmative, and in Part III it posits that since international law is an enterprise 
which constitutes the society and upholds sociality, the philosophy of international law 
is one conditioned by sociality. The article then goes on to ask: What if reality lies 
beyond the materially based sociality? What in that case would be the nature, purpose 
and meaning of international law? In Part IV, drawing on perennial philosophy, the 
article postulates that reality is a transcendental singularity and that sociality as it 
stands is a mistaken perception of a philosophical duality. In so doing the article shows 
that humanity is on a misguided intellectual course and that the concept of 
international law is flawed. The article also suggests that international law has to be 
reordered (even renamed) if it is to accommodate the deeper logic and higher level of 
                                                 
5 For the view that the self-becoming of humanity is a social process, see Philip Allott, Reconstituting Humanity: 
New International Law, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219, 251 (1992).  
6 See C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 408-2 (2004).   
7 This article does not draw on any specific genre of source materials. Having said that, many of the ideas 
expressed in this article, even the words its sentences contain, might have been identified and celebrated in one 
or another epistemic form by one or another epistemic tradition. However, what makes the article novel 
research is its scepticism towards the intellectual progress claimed to have been achieved by humanity. That 
scepticism has prompted me to re-conceive humanity (in a pantheistic perspective) not as a social whole but as 
a cosmic whole. This endeavour is informed by numerous scriptures, books, articles, correspondence, and 
conversations with several learned and intellectually enlightened people; each authority has mutually 
influenced and conditioned the other, and no one in particular can take credit for having cultivated my views. 
8 The concept of society in this article is mostly one of a politically structured international social order which I 
consider a universal collective consciousness. However micro societies or social clusters also feature 
occasionally in the discussion. To avoid confusion, I refer to international society as “the society” and other 
micro forms of social organization as “society”.    
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reasoning distinctive of reality. In Part V, the article provides theoretical guidance to 
this end.   
 
II. SOCIALITY AS HUMAN REALITY  
 
The society is the looking-glass through which humanity visualizes and 
conceives its reality.9 Therefore we often posit that humanity has an intellectual 
relationship with the society. Modern society is an essentialistically ordered self-
sustaining entity with its own functional patterns and dynamics.10 Individuals, having 
been born into the society, pursue knowledge about the society’s structural designs and 
functional dynamics through learning and lived experience. The more effectively they 
learn and the more deeply they live, the more socially enlightened they become. Social 
enlightenment equips them to live meaningfully in the society and to take part in its 
processes. It is from the society that individuals attain meaning and purpose of life.11   
Since gaining knowledge about the society and social organization is the goal of 
the members of the society, human beings are in relentless pursuit of understanding the 
society. They strive for social knowledge by delineating themselves into epistemic 
communities,12 either in isolation or in perpetual interaction with other neighbouring 
communities. Each epistemic community has its own functional milieu, patterns of 
thought, and conceptual arsenal. Each such community also has a sense of superiority 
regarding its way of seeing the society. And it views those perceptions as the ideal way 
to understand the society.   
Yet, epistemic communities mostly function in concert by positing a common 
social goal for humanity. When functioning in concert, each epistemic community 
gains an authoritative right to speak within its chosen, self-defined tradition. Once an 
epistemic community gains the authority to speak on a given area of human life, as 
well as on the various epistemic dimensions of the community’s knowledge, such as 
its beliefs, its values, its claims and methods, there comes to exist empathetically 
united collectivities called “disciplines”.13   
Individuals become part of a society through the disciplines they have chosen for 
knowing that society. The disciplines teach them how lives were lived, are being lived, 
and shall be lived; how thoughts were thought, are being thought, and shall be thought; 
and how things were known, are being known, and shall be known. These three 
themes—human lives, human thought, and human world—and the pattern of inquiring 
about the three themes—how was, how is being, and how shall be—are pursued as 
                                                 
9 See generally PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: A NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 1-119 (1990).  
10 This generalization can be proven in its entirety by social systems theory and its variants and adaptations.  
11 See ALLOTT, supra note 9 at 39-41.   
12 The epistemic communities discussed herein are those holding views about social organization. The scientific 
community or groups pursuing a given area of material inquiry are not to be confused with epistemic 
communities.  
13 McCulloch describes a discipline as:   
[A] community of scholars who share a domain of intellectual inquiry or discourse. This 
commonly involves a shared heritage and tradition, a specialized language or other systems of 
shared symbols, a set of shared concepts, an infrastructure of books, articles and research 
reports, a system of communication among the membership, and a means of instruction and 
initiation.  
Gary McCulloch, Disciplines Contributing to Education? Educational Studies and the Disciplines, 50 BRIT. J. 
EDUC. STUD. 100, 102 (2002). 
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micro-modules of “theory and practice” within the disciplines.14 The micro approach 
renders the resulting social awareness of individuals narrow in that it limits the 
awareness to a level defined by the materials and methods of one or the other 
discipline.   
However, the epistemic communities acting through the disciplines are conscious 
that if the disciplines are left as islands, no social reality can be conceived. Hence they 
urge disciplines to interact by swapping methodologies, by drawing on one another’s 
findings, or by occasionally situating a set of beliefs of one discipline in another’s 
domain. 
The robustness and credibility of these disciplines are evaluated against natural 
science. That evaluation is also the basis of determining the prominence of the 
disciplines: the more characteristics of science a discipline has the more salient that 
discipline is. The more effective a discipline is in this light the more authority it gains 
to provide knowledge in designing and regulating the society. This prominence and the 
directive role held by certain disciplines cannot be constant; they are subject to rising 
and falling cycles like anything in the social process.   
In a society designed and directed by disciplines, there are a few disciplines 
which inherently have a pivotal role in the social process, for example “law” and its 
satellite discipline, “politics”.15 But there is ambiguity as to whether law and politics 
are [mere] disciplines in the strict sense of the term; they not only are theoretical 
embeddings of the society and its functioning, as other disciplines, but also are 
functionally directive and causative of the social course. This seeming ambiguity has 
rendered law and politics special in the society.16  
The dyad of law and politics—when in a social discourse—has an internal 
determinant, that is “ideology”. Ideology is related to law in that it determines the 
attitude of law. Ideology is related to politics in that it determines the nature of 
politics. Thus law, politics, and ideology collectively pull humanity to the society and 
regulate human life within the society; this force may be called “social gravity”.17    
Social gravity generates “social karma” which is a cause-effect relationship that 
comes to exist in the society between humanity and the society, humanity and various 
social entities, and social entities and the society. The social karma determines the 
rights and wrongs and the oughts and ought-nots of the society and thereby lays down 
social norms. Norms create social awareness. Social awareness coalesces with the 
natural human state of consciousness to form an essentially meaningful existence, the 
“social consciousness”.18 That means the society is an abstractum, a state of 
                                                 
14 The importance of reducing disciplines to micro-modules of “theory and practice” is highlighted in PIOTR 
SZTOMPKA, SOCIETY IN ACTION: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BECOMING 101, 102 (1991).   
15 By deeming politics a satellite of law, I only mean that if law is a discipline, politics has to be its satellite. 
Politics, in this context, is not equivalent to “political science”; rather, it is a discourse-oriented action of 
superimposing on a socio-legal discourse the prejudices and preferences shared by a group as if they are in the 
common interest of humanity at large.  
16 References to law, either as a discipline or as a given force, in this article are to international law, which 
however, is conceived as a superior manifestation of “law”; this is an ontological postulate instrumental in 
securing the shared aspirations of humanity. In taking this stance, I have been inspired by Allott. See ALLOTT, 
supra note 9 at 1, 2.  
17 This process explains the phenomenon Allott put forward as the “self-constituting of a society”, of which law 
is a part. See Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 32 (1999).  
18 This view denotes that individuals are born into the society with a bare consciousness on which a social reality 
is superimposed.  
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consciousness. It is the social consciousness which renders individuals to have an 
intellectual relationship with the society. Philip Allott conveys this fact persuasively:  
 
Society exists nowhere else than in the human mind. And the 
constitution of a given society exists in and of human consciousness, the 
consciousness of those conceived as its members and its non-members, 
past and present. Wherever and whenever a structure-system of human 
socializing is so conceived in consciousness, there and then a society is 
conceived.19    
 
Since the society is a state of consciousness, it is very much personal and 
subjective. What is the society then would be contingent on what is the nature of 
consciousness. What is the nature of consciousness would in turn be contingent on 
what social awareness individuals have gained through the disciplines by which they 
have chosen to learn the society. In a sense, consciousness and the society are mutually 
conditioned; i.e., the society contributes to the creation of social consciousness and 
consciousness creates society. This mutuality, however, has the drawback of fuelling 
indeterminacy as to the foundation of both the society and consciousness. Moreover 
that indeterminacy foils the scope for any universal truth. Using as a foundation a 
philosophical/logical strong-point any discipline might propound would render the 
discipline a bad science, as has been the case with metaphysics.  
In the absence of any foundation or universal truth, the society self-validates 
itself as a self-referential, self-existential phenomenon—a reality—by means of an 
internal coherence.20 Internal coherence is an intellectual position which is a 
consolidated subjectivity. Securing that coherence is an intellectual act performed 
through discourses informed by disciplines.21 This method of obtaining coherence has 
intellectuality attributed to it for the very reason that it is a hermeneutical act.      
The society thus becomes an intellectual entity which has immanent theoretical 
intelligibility and coherence. The society is the intelligence of the highest order for 
humanity. Its intelligibility and coherence is seen in social institutions such as law.22 
Since it is these institutions which determine and shape the patterns of human thought, 
human beings also strive to acquire the same level of intelligibility and coherence in 
order to adhere to the dynamics of the society.            
An intellectual construct such as the society remains in a state of salience only if 
it self-evaluates its intelligence and the effect of its intelligence on humanity at large.23 
The society has its own means of self-evaluation. Such means of societal self-
evaluation are provided by the disciplines which possess the elements constituting the 
society and which engenders a social reality in the society. In self-evaluation, the 
                                                 
19 Allott, supra note 5 at 223.  
20 This is a Durkheimian position on societies. See TOM CAMPBELL, SEVEN THEORIES OF HUMAN SOCIETY 9-11 
(1981).  
21 According to Allott, theories perform this role. See Allott, supra note 17 at 224, 225.   
22  Law as a social institution is no different than law as a functional directive in the advance of the society. On 
law as having an immanent intelligibility, which is what provides form as well as substance to law, see 
generally Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 949-1016 
(1988).  
23 See SZTOMPKA, supra note 14 at 102.  
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society reassesses the timeliness of its structures, the logic of its internal organization, 
the appositeness of its dominant discourse, the effects of interactions among various 
actors, and the voices of dissent. Findings of the self-evaluation are marked as 
research-findings by each of the disciplines through which the self-evaluation process 
is performed. Any societal renewals subsequent to self-evaluation are carried out as 
disciplinary renewals. Disciplinary renewals modify social consciousness given that it 
is disciplines which contribute to social consciousness.  
In addition to the societal self-evaluation through the disciplines, society and 
social consciousness are often subject to evaluation by the mystic and metaphysical 
techniques of “religious epistemes”.24 In evaluating the society, religious epistemes 
take larger cosmic perspectives; indulge in hyper-ontological discourses on mind-
body, time-space, and cause-effect; highlight through a spiritual dialectic the cosmic 
forces urging change in human behavior; and put forward majestic schemes for 
transcending social consciousness. However, these religious epistemes are deprived of 
any disciplinary status because of their metaphysical anchoring and their being far 
removed from the characteristics of science. Thus religious epistemes not being in the 
class of disciplines, the findings and revelations of the epistemes, regardless of how 
socially constructive they are, often fail to fall within the scope of what is deemed 
socially constructive knowledge.25   
Yet, religion is deeply embedded in social consciousness,26 as faith-systems, 
around which have accrued diverse viewpoints regarding organized living. These 
faith-systems aim to create societies on the basis of a view of the world informed by 
didactic scriptures.27 However, the stronghold of law and politics over the society and 
the pull of social gravity frustrate the faith-systems from persuading human 
consciousness to move in a desired direction. Given this disadvantage, faith-systems 
take part in the consciousness-forming process of law and politics in a rather passive 
way by being a determinant—much like ideology—shaping the attitude of law and 
nature of politics.28   
 In the middle of all these varied phenomena and active processes (narrated 
above), the society sets in as reality what may be called “sociality”.29 Since sociality is 
reality, social consciousness is what endows reality with meaning and appearance. 
Social consciousness is also the phenomenological surface on which reality is 
                                                 
24 As an episteme, religion resembles a discipline built on metaphysical and transcendental logic.  
25 See Cecelia Lynch, A Neo-Weberian Approach to Religion in International Politics, 1 INT’L THEORY 381, 387 
(2009) (shows how religion is situated in the present socio-political setting and offers a “neo-Weberian” model 
to remove the dogmatic bias of religious epistemes).  
26 See Allott supra note 9 at 94-96.  
27 Narratives of these scriptures are often taken too literally and factually, beyond the didacticism in scriptures, 
with the result that the lyrical fantasies in the narratives influence the viewpoints of faith-systems.    
28 See David Kennedy, Images of Religion in International Legal Theory, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans, eds., 1999), pp.145-153 at 146. (writes how the constitutive ambitions 
of religion turned into religion becoming a passive determinant in the society’s self-constituting: “Religion 
begins as a social force, is transformed into a ‘philosophy’ and survives only as a set of ‘principles’ guiding 
the practice of institutions”. Id.).  
29 Consciousness also has its non-social realities, such as nature and its phenomena. Even though such realities 
can be experienced and perceived through a frame beyond the social consciousness, cognizors, need the 
linguistic structures of society to narrate the experiences and a social identification to attribute meaning to 
their experiences and perceptions. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 17, 
18 (1948). I thank Markku Kiikeri for drawing my attention to non-social realities.   
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experienced. In this sociality and in its various forms of expression humanity discovers 
and re-discovers itself.30  
The role of law in constituting and sustaining the social reality is imperative. Its 
dual role—as a discipline embedding a theoretical foundation and as a force 
endangering social gravity and shaping social karma—is that of a variable determining 
the nature of social reality. Knowing more about the rationalities propelling that 
constitutive variable helps strengthen our understanding of sociality and the sociality-
forming process. Hence, the next part attempts to understand law vis-à-vis the social 
consciousness which constitutes sociality.    
 
III. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW31 
 
International law is a functional system for the continuance of the society. It is an 
abstraction of law and it stands for uniting humanity as a collective whole. The 
noumenon—law—from which international law is abstracted is an ontological 
postulate deemed immanent in logical properties.32 In this sense, international law is 
an inclusive manifestation of law, a logical quintessence—the nomos.33 International 
law has a form which is dogmatic (doctrines). International law has substance, which 
is subjectively accumulated in accordance with the social context in which it functions 
(theory).34 The form and substance of international law come together to make what 
we may call “legal consciousness”.35  
In that international law has a form, it is recognized as lying in various sources. 
In that it has socially cultivated substance, international law is normatively received. In 
that it has both recognizable form and normative substance—both of which make a 
                                                 
30 On the “forms of expression” of sociality, other than the politically couched rhetoric, through which humanity 
discovers and re-organizes itself, see Prabhakar Singh, Colonised’s Madness, Colonizer’s Modernity and 
International Law: Mythological Materialism in the East-West Telos, 3 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 67 (2010) 
(emphasizes, on a subaltern note, that a hostile semiotics has superimposed a sociality on what would have 
been a spontaneously evolved cultural reality).  
31 Regardless of my efforts to cut loose from the late-modernist (to a certain extent post-modernist) tradition in 
international law (of which Allott’s works in particular) and provide a narrative that maintains my own post-
modernist views regarding international law, this section relies on the oeuvres of Allott. The fine distinctions I 
maintain between late-modernism and post-modernism in this context are informed by Nicholas Onuf, The 
Constitution of International Society, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1994).  
32 The belief that an ontological postulate has immanent logic is also a postulation. Different schools of legal 
thought have overcome this paradox by providing (more often than not) a self-referential source to law, e.g., 
God, a sovereign, and ultimate rule. The self-referentiality of the source implants its logic in law.  However, 
the self-referentiality of these sources is viewed sceptically later in this article.          
33 I use the term “nomos” in the Greek mythological sense of nomos being the manifestation of law. It is not to 
be confused with “nomos” in the Schmittian sense of a spatially-oriented order and the concept of international 
law he conceives thereafter on that basis. Nomos in the latter sense is articulated in CARL SCHMITT, THE 
NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (2003).   
34 See Jonathan Mills, The Substance of Law, 27 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 47, 47(1991).  
35 Kennedy has provided a neatly cut definition of legal consciousness: Legal consciousness is a state of social 
consciousness wound together as a set of “legal rules, arguments, and theories, a great deal of information 
about the institutional workings of the legal process, and the constellation of ideas and goals current in the 
profession at a given moment”. Duncan Kennedy, Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 23 (1980) 
(with the aid of legal materials and legal practice, analyses the integration, disintegration, and re-composition 
of consciousness as a rather stable legal consciousness). Allott would describe legal consciousness as lawyers’ 
perceptions about the social cause and effect and their perceptions about the perceptions of others having 
similar perceptions. Legal dogmatics is part of this perception. See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 43, 44.    
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social identification possible—international law is deemed a social entity. Thus, 
international law being an amalgam of form and substance, is a given state of legal 
consciousness. To put it differently, legal consciousness being a particular form of 
social consciousness,36 and international law being that legal consciousness, 
international law is a social entity.  
Since legal consciousness is reliant on what the social consciousness is, legal 
consciousness is fundamentally an undefined aesthetics. Hence, legal consciousness is 
subject to subjective invasion by diverse social ideals; Allott calls this subjectivity of 
legal consciousness the “special relativistic reality” of the “strange inner world of the 
lawyer”.37 Given the evanescent nature of legal consciousness, the history of 
international law is riddled with multiple types of legal consciousness; 38 each state of 
legal consciousness, amid the claims of having triumphed over the other, bears traces 
of the previous one; e.g., the universalist morality of “naturalism” found rational 
adaptations under “positivism”.39 Positivism later adopted a functional and 
professional stance under realism, which was augmented by a rationalist approach that 
stripped international law of any normativity and restructured it on strategic 
behavior.40  
The main, perhaps forgotten,41 telos of international law is to unite humanity as 
one social unit. Humanity is united when what is deemed to be its common good is 
achieved.42 What is common good is ascertained by reckoning subjective individual 
interests and a certain ingrained set of values43—a process known as politics (to 
perform this process international law provides its artillery and logistics). The received 
set of values is the dominant one among all the society’s prevailing sets of values. The 
dominant set of values becomes the conception of “justice”.44 However, the values 
which compete with individual aspirations in the political process of determining 
common good are often ideologically cultured, as can be seen in the case with the 
present-day value-set, capitalism and its various forms. On balance, humanity is united 
in the name of justice which is ideologically determined and politically sought.45  
                                                 
36 See Kennedy, supra note 35 at 23.  
37 ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 45.  
38 See id. at 45-56.  
39 This uneven transition is finely presented in Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-
False Paradox of International Law, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 379, 380-82 (2007).  
40 See Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s International 
Law, 4 NO FOUNDATIONS 7, 8 (2007).  
41 I mean to say that regardless of the claims of international law that it attends to the concerns of humanity, the 
“state” is the best-established referent in the epistemological precincts of international law.         
42 See Philip Allott, The True Function of Law in the International Community, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
391, 399 (1998).   
43 See Philip Allott, Five Steps to a New World Order, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 99, 101 (2007) (views the reckoning 
of individual subjectivity and dominant values as a universalizing of “all the particulars of human behavior”).  
44 Cf. Philip Allott, The International Court and the Voice of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE 26 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds., 1996). Allott views “justice” as an 
intervening super-concept that aligns humanity within a social order by subtracting whatever is non-social:  
The capacity of human beings to recognize order—the order of the physical universe, of 
society, of morality, of law, of human personality, of human consciousness—is the capacity to 
recognize the order of all order. And the order of the order of law is called justice … The 
justice of a given society, the social justice embodied in its law, is a shadow, of the justice of 
all justice.  
Id.  
45 Cf. Jouannet, supra note 39 at 388.  
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Thus, international law causes humanity to unite by means of politics, whereby 
international law is a mere scheme for, as well as instrument of, the sociality-forming 
process and politics the most significant catalyst of the sociality forming process.  
The reckoning to determine the common good takes place in a conceptual field 
known as “sovereignty”. In meta-social discourses and ontological discourses on law, 
sovereignty is related to a “sovereign”.46 The relationship between the sovereign and 
sovereignty is that sovereignty is “sovereign-hood”. Philosophically, the sovereign is a 
neuter; it is deemed a social fullness existing on wider scales of social continuity and 
change.47 But, the fullness of the sovereign is a convenient assumption, one which 
bestows upon the sovereign logic and intelligibility. It is called a convenient 
assumption because the sovereign’s fullness is not abstracted from within the 
sovereign (i.e., the sovereign is not self-referential) but with reference to certain 
external social forces.48 This external referentiality creates a conceptual duality—
between the sovereign and what provides reference to the sovereign—which, in effect, 
argues against the fullness attributed to the sovereign. It is such doubts about the 
fullness of the sovereign which render the sovereign’s fullness a formulation of 
assumptive logic.  
Yet, in international law, a sovereign is a logical certainty and an ultimate infinite 
social reality.49 A sovereign is deified in the society through postulations to the effect 
that that sovereign organizes itself in the society through entities known as “states”. In 
fact, such postulations are intended to temper the general outlook that states are 
sociality writ large with the assumption that there is a logical fullness, such as the 
sovereign, which is immanent in states.50 As a result, the sovereign is the “Social God” 
which is the supreme reason and cause of life in the society.51  
A sovereign is thus what gives meaning to a state and its activities. The sovereign 
expresses itself as sovereignty that acts as a field of function for the state—the 
“sovereignty-field”. Functions of states such as politics and international law take 
place in the sovereignty-field. The operation of international law through politics in 
this sovereignty-field engenders social gravity, which in turn causes humanity to 
engage with social karma.52 
The cause and effect of social karma is experienced by everyone in the society. 
However, for lawyers, aside from being involved in the cause and effect of social 
karma like everyone in the society, knowledge about the theory and application of 
law—having studied law as a discipline, i.e., how to recognize the form and substance 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble, ed., 1995).  
47 This is position is what constitutes the rule-theory of Hart. See generally H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 
(1961).   
48 This position is apparent in the Benthamite search for a normative world beyond the sovereign; he holds that a 
powerful sovereign acquires its power from a “social situation”.  
49 At the more domestic level, a sovereign is a socio-legal superstructure reflecting the political power of a state. 
For a discussion in this vein, see Philip Allott, The Court and Parliament: Who Whom?, 38 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 
79, 102-05 (1979).  
50 For a taxonomy of sovereignty in terms of these two positions, see AARON FICHTELBERG, LAW AT THE 
VANISHING POINT: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2008). 
51 ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY 21 (2007). 
52 The sovereignty-field, and the process occurring therein, is probably what Allott means by the “structure of 
causation which determines the successive conjectures of the particular field of forces which is the law”. See 
ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 43, 44. This view implies that law is one of the forces generating social gravity.   
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of law—provides the acuity to observe social karma.53 This acuity is what gives rise to 
legal consciousness.  
In sum, international law is a state of consciousness which is intellectually 
derived (by way of one’s disciplinary knowledge) from sociality (which is the social 
consciousness). Those possessing the legal consciousness, unlike the rest of the 
members of the society, sense the influence of social karma. Their experience of 
international law and sociality is therefore an “informed experience”.54  
By having informed experience, international lawyers, or for that matter everyone 
who knows the philosophy of the functions of law and functions of the philosophy of 
law, are active participants as well as passive observers of the sociality-forming 
process.  
As active participants, international lawyers engage in a value-bargain and value-
integration whereby all competing values form part of a dominant value; in other 
words, international lawyers engage in politics. This trading in values takes place in 
the sovereignty-field.55 The fact that they are doing politics, however, remains 
unknown to international lawyers, for such is the pull of the “objectivity”56 and the 
seeming intellectual “intelligibility” in the doctrines of international law with which 
international lawyers perform their social role.57  
As passive observers, international lawyers indulge in meta-theoretical (rather, 
meta-doctrinal) discourses so that the trading in values has legitimacy with regard to 
the collective social self-image. However, having the ability to observe their own 
performance and to provide meta-discourses on such performance does not help 
international lawyers shed their doctrinal bias and fetishism. Yet, their dual existence 
as participants sustaining sociality and as actors sustaining that sociality-sustaining 
process is deemed to be the most meaningful existence one can have in the society.  
International lawyers’ participation in the sociality-forming process and their role 
as observers of their own participation has certain deep phenomenological 
ramifications. First, given that international law exists as a state of consciousness, 
especially as a consciousness ensuing from an informed experience, no one in the 
society other than international lawyers has this legal consciousness. That the rest of 
the society does not experience international law is not a social tragedy, however, 
since it possesses the social consciousness that is the basic state of consciousness for 
being adequately social in the society. Nonetheless, that segment of the society 
                                                 
53 See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 44.         
54 “Informed experience” is a concept in aesthetics, the subtleties of which I have accessed from accounts of the 
human “art viewing experience”. See generally Richard Lachapelle, Deborah Murray, & Sandy Neim, 
Aesthetic Understanding as Informed Experience: The Role of Knowledge in Our Art Viewing Experiences, 37 
J. AESTHETIC EDU. 78 (2003).  
55 Allott calls this field the “inter-public-realm” where all international interactions occur. See Philip Allott, 
European Foreign Policy: After-life of an Illusion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 216 (Martti Koskenniemi, ed., 1998).  
56 This much-acclaimed objectivity in doctrine is secured by reducing the form of a given concept or practice 
(the objectivity of which is in question) to a social form from all non-social forms that concept may have. This 
type of “phenomenological reduction” is introduced by Alfred Schutz. See Ion Copoeru, A Schutzian 
Perspective on the Phenomenology of Law in the Context of Positivistic Practices, 31 HUMAN STUD. 269, 273, 
274 (2008).                 
57 Doctrinal fetishism and bias are not anything typical of international lawyers, but are sentiments which are 
instilled by legal education. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the 
Law School Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1983). 
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remains naively subject to international law which is, for it, a mysterious, sacrosanct 
special consciousness that is superior to the social consciousness it has.58 Its members 
feel compliant with law and idealize it. Then again, if individuals fail to find their 
sociality (either due to bad education or defective social orientations) and thereby to 
obtain a social consciousness, they find certain organic cognitive reflexes that prompt 
ideal actions. In any case, since the bulk of the society does not have legal 
consciousness, the situation gives international lawyers a role as experts in conducting 
the social process through law and politics.  
Because of their special role in the society international lawyers acquire a sort of 
functional attitude which separates them from the rest of the society—the extrinsically 
ordered relationship between the inquirer and the object of inquiry. Thus, alienated 
from the object of inquiry, international lawyers assume the philosophical posture of 
the duality between the subject and the object. In other words, international lawyers 
separate their legal consciousness from their social consciousness, the former being 
only a micro state of the latter. Ignorance of this non-duality impinges on the 
functional attitudes of international lawyers in such a way that a sense of self (ego) 
separates them from the society and its problems. However, this deluded self-
image59—different from that of other individuals in the society—does not prompt a 
denial of responsibility, but rather a unique [deontological] sense of duty, its 
“uniqueness being a reflection of the esoteric and hermitic character of law”.60   
Thus ego has ingrained in the attitudes of international lawyers and with their 
attitudes being an expression of their legal consciousness, legal consciousness is an 
egoistic state of mind. That being the case, international law, which exists as the legal 
consciousness in international lawyers, is also an egoistic entity. However, given that 
what renders legal consciousness (and for that matter international law) egoistic is a 
phenomenological veil between legal consciousness and the social consciousness, 
cracking that veil would enable international lawyers to observe and sense the social 
consciousness from which their legal consciousness has emerged.61  
This phenomenological philosophy of international law throws light on the 
existentially unreal nature of international law.62 That is to say, there is no 
international law but rather a functional aesthetic that exists in the minds of 
international lawyers. What the society generally celebrates as international law is a 
set of uninternalized objective canons of the society, which is only a reflection of 
subjectively reckoned individual subjectivities. However, from the perspective of 
international lawyers, international law is what sustains the society, and from the 
perspective of the society, international law is an enterprise that matters as it is situated 
in the society. Irrespective of the contrast in these perspectives, they are related to a 
                                                 
58 See Allott, supra note 43 at 104 (identifies social consciousness without legal consciousness as a “non-legal 
social reality”).  
59 See Philip Allott, The International Lawyer in Government Service: Ontology and Deontology, 23 WIS. INT’L 
L. J. 13, 16 (2005).  
60 Id.  
61 See id. at 23. Need of a broader understanding of sociality through disciplines (humanities and social sciences) 
is in the post-modern project of law. See e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS (2005).   
62 See generally Philip Allott, New International Law: The First Lecture of the Academic Year 20—, in THEORY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 107 (Philip Allott et al., eds., 1991).  
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social reality which is the ultimate source of the society, international law, and 
humanity.  
In addition to its existence in the society, law exists in a given society or 
societies, i.e., social forms other than “the society” such as a nation-state, as source of 
guidance for social conduct of the individuals. In such societies, law is the “law of the 
land” or “municipal law”. Even in a national society, law is no different than it is in 
the [international] society; i.e., law for the lawyers is a specific discursivity and for the 
people an ultimate standard of truth and righteousness. Such a similarity in perception 
regarding law exists for the society and other societies because law is a “relativistic 
discursivity” which acquires meaning in accordance with a chosen social frame of 
reference; the frame of reference may be the society or a society (this view implies that 
the difference between international law and municipal law is a perceptual illusion).63  
However, prior to any disciplinary conception of the society and most other 
forms of societies, humanity had intellectually conceived their existence. That 
intellectual conception took root from humanity’s inherent quest for knowledge about 
its existence and the universe. Inquisitive individuals of a pre-societal era sceptically 
viewed everything their consciousness conveyed to them:64 “Who are we”? “Where 
did we come from”? “Why are we here”? What is the cause-effect system to which we 
are bound”? “Why does the body feel pain and pleasure, and correspondingly, the 
mind feel sorrow and happiness”? “Why beauty in life is ephemeral”?65 “Why do we 
have the urge to possess everything”? “Why does consciousness end with death”? To 
these questions they found the answer that perceptions of consciousness might be 
illusory and that there might be a higher realm of experiences beyond consciousness. If 
consciousness and its perceptions are not real, what then is reality? The next section 
first provides a theoretical view of human reality conceived long before humanity 
found socio-political means to cohabit in the world. Afterwards the section 
demonstrates the validity of that view. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Cf. ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 45. The frame of reference is mainly of relevance to those who meta-evaluate law 
from the perspective of a society (nation-state) or the society (international community of states). For such a 
meta-evaluation, see VEIJO HEISKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TOPICS 11-199 (1992).  
64 This inherent quest for transcendental knowledge by way of sceptical questioning is situated within the 
phenomenological tradition in Hans Köchler, Phenomenological Skepticism, 15 MAN & WORLD 247, 249, 250 
(1982) (articulates scepticism as a “system” and separates scepticism into a “formal ontology” (the inherent 
sense of a reality beyond consciousness) and “epistemological skepticism” (the systematic transcendental 
inquiry)).   
65 The most poignant musing on the evanescence of beauty in life is found in Shelly’s Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty (1816).  
“Spirit of Beauty, that dost consecrate  
With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon  
Of human thought or form, – where are thou gone?  
Why dost thou pass away and leave our state,  
This dim vast vale of tears, vacant and desolate?” 
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IV. REALITY IS A TRANSCENDENTAL SINGULARITY66 
  
Reality: “it is neither this, nor that”,67 but it is all this and all that. It is a physical 
“emptiness”,68 but an amazing “fullness”. The fullness is pure consciousness, an 
intelligence, but there is no mind to perceive it; it is the essence but without form to 
reveal it; it is bliss but without sense to experience it; it is luminous but there are no 
eyes to see it; it is sound but no ears to hear it; it is eternal but there is no time to 
measure it; and it is omnipresent but there is no space for it to manifest. It itself is 
empty of everything, but full of itself.69 Thus, reality exists, as an acosmic 
absoluteness, a self-existing, self-ordered supreme state of intelligence, a “super-
consciousness”, a noumenon—the ultimate infinite reality. It is imminently intelligible 
and fundamentally coherent.   
Immaterial monism—singularity—is the existential nature of reality. Any duality 
or plurality is absent given that there is no alterity, no foreignness; the fullness of 
reality is absolute in itself. Since there is no alterity to defy this transcendent 
absoluteness, it is the ultimate singular truth. Moreover, that truth is intransitive, for 
there is no external causation for any change.70   
Not having external causation does not render reality ever-dormant. Being a 
super-intelligence it has highly imaginative properties which engenders causes—
although the super-intelligence remains a non-cause—so that it is manifest beyond its 
absolute existence, and being reason in itself, rationalizes the causes it imagines. The 
imagination of reality, however, is not a product of chance, but the result of a self-
ordered self-guidance passing through a succession of imaginations and non-
imaginations lasting over infinity.71 The intellectual profundity of the process of 
imagination is such that reality itself becomes a super-intelligent matrix imagining 
matter. Matter thus becomes a newly manifested consciousness of the unmanifest 
super-consciousness—a micro consciousness of the macro consciousness.  
                                                 
66 The discussion in this section draws on Vedic discourses and exegesis, as well as perennial philosophy in 
general (including Buddhist philosophy); it does not adhere to any one Veda in particular but traverses the 
whole of perennial philosophy. Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, however, has an imperative influence. I have also 
drawn on various conflicting and competing schools of thought in the Vedic tradition to develop my argument, 
without embracing any particular epistemological opposition they have. However, I am motivated by the 
common theme of inquiry—human reality—that each school has, and take that as a good reason for a 
combined approach.  
67 Inquiry into human reality has to start with an apophasis like this deductive denial. Isa Upanishad helps 
commence that inquiry by describing reality: tadejati tannaijati taddure tadvantike | tadantarasya sarvasya 
tadu sarvasyasya bahyatah || (“It moves, it moves not; It is far and it is near; It is within this Universe and It is 
outside of all this”) (translation as provided in NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD’S RELIGIONS 2ND EDITION 74 
(1989).  
68 Reality as “emptiness” (sunyata) is a Buddhist conception. See MASAO ABE, ZEN AND WESTERN THOUGHT 
126-27 (1985) (“Emptiness as it is is Fullness and Fullness as it is is Emptiness”).   
69 This is an intellectual position in Tibetan thought by which the ultimate reality/truth is “emptiness”, as in 
Buddhism. However, emptiness has two forms, “self-emptiness” and “other-emptiness”. Self-emptiness is 
emptiness in term of its own essence, whereas other-emptiness is emptiness in terms of “something” external 
to it. The emptiness denoting the ultimate reality is other-emptiness. I have become aware of this delineation 
and how it is tempered by other schools within Tibetan philosophy in Douglas S. Duckworth, De/limiting 
Emptiness and the Boundaries of the Ineffable, 38 J. INDIAN PHIL. 97 (2010). 
70 Causation can, however, be internal to reality. That causation is an intellectual vibration, a flickering, which 
does not affect its absolute existence.  
71 Imagination is creativity and non-imagination is the cessation of imagining; the former results in creation, 
whereas the latter is a kind of destruction.   
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Consciousness and the super-consciousness stand in a manner that they are in a 
micro-macro relationship. Consciousness and matter are related such that 
consciousness is the medium through which matter is perceived. Accordingly, matter 
is a state of consciousness. Both matter and consciousness are imaginations of the 
super-consciousness, but for consciousness matter is absolute or a manifestation of the 
absolute. Recognizing this illusory existence of matter, George Santayana writes: “For 
my part, I agree that we are imagination all compact, and that our minds clothe or 
exhibit something else, that alone is active and lasting”.72  
The power of imagination of the super-consciousness of reality is beyond the 
imagination of consciousness, which itself is a figment of the imagination of the super-
consciousness. Hence, matter imagined by the super-consciousness appears to 
consciousness as if it is a spatial and temporal absolute—a spatiality lying in a 
vastness beyond the observational faculties of consciousness and temporality, barring 
many anti theses, as starting with the most determinately observable point of space.73 
The absoluteness of matter as it appears to consciousness leads to an intellectual state 
in which matter becomes the object of ontological pursuit for consciousness—an 
inherent passion for inquiry.   
In the spirit of such an inquiry, the matter imagined by the super-consciousness 
appears to consciousness as the “first cause” of everything.74 Consciousness feels this 
first cause to be inferable and verifiable from a sensually observable physical super-
complex—the universe—which is set in a pattern of regularity and rhythm. For 
consciousness, this regularity is manifested as the physical laws of the universe. 
Consciousness experiences such a regularity and rhythm as being present in matter 
because of the inherent intelligibility and coherence of the super-consciousness. To 
consciousness, matter appears to structure itself and stay in motion maintaining the 
regularity and rhythm. This perception helps consciousness to study the nature of 
matter and the influence of matter and its movements on consciousness itself. 
Inquiring into matter, consciousness embraces the regularity and rhythm as the perfect 
order for any ordering it may have to perform.  
Much like the gravitational pull on matter, at a functional level, in an active phase 
in the cosmic imagination, consciousness gets inextricably intertwined in a network of 
cause and effect. This network determines the processes of consciousness within the 
time-space framework which manifests before consciousness.75  
However, unlike the super-consciousness, which is beyond any spatial-
temporality, consciousness and matter exist in space and time. But this space-time 
framework is only a perception of consciousness. Moreover, consciousness 
experiences space and time through various phases of perceptions constricted 
                                                 
72 GEORGE SANTAYANA, LETTERS OF GEORGE SANTAYANA, VOLUME 5, BOOK 5: 1933-1936. THE WORKS OF 
GEORGE SANTAYANA 300 (2003). 
73 This falsity about reality is the crux of the doctrine of Maya. For a refined exposition on the doctrine, see 
Harry Oldmeadow, Shankara’s Doctrine of Maya, 2 ASIAN PHIL. 131 (1992).  
74 See and Contra Shvetashvatara Upanishad (I.2): Kaala: Swabhavo niyathiryadrichchaa Bhutani Yoni: 
purusha ithi chinthyaa | Snyoga esham na tvaatmabhaavaa daatmaapyanisha: sukhadu:Khaheto || (“Time, 
nature, necessity, accident, Elements, energy, intelligence—None of these can be the First Cause. They are 
effects, whose only purpose is To help the self rise above pleasure and pain.”). For the English translation, see 
MICHAEL NAGLER, UPANISHADS 159 (2007).            
75 The gravitational force, which impacts on matter and thereby maintains regularity and rhythm, impacts on 
consciousness as an interplay of cause-effect, the laws of karma.   
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temporally to periods negligible in comparison with cosmic time scales. After each 
phase, states of consciousness may recur; that recurrence, however, is determined by 
the cause-effect mechanism, the laws of karma. The recurrence ends when 
consciousness liberates itself from the entanglement of cause and effect. This 
liberation is possible only by consciousness becoming conscious of the super-
consciousness which is the ultimate reality of all matter and consciousness.  
The end of consciousness is also the end of matter and the material world 
consciousness has perceived. This end is inevitable for consciousness, whether it 
voluntarily chooses to liberate itself from the bounds of space-time or not. When 
consciousness ends, the biological human system hosting consciousness perishes and 
dissolves in matter.76 However, this biological process is perceivable only to those 
states of consciousness which are within the frame of space-time. Consciousness 
which has ended its state of consciousness, if it escapes the pull of karma to take on a 
new state of consciousness, merges into the super-consciousness.77  
On balance, consciousness builds a reality around itself, a material reality of time 
and space, matter and energy, and cause and effect; all these splendid perceptions are 
but imaginations of the super-consciousness. Reality so construed is the result of the 
micro-intelligence of consciousness. As long as consciousness remains nescient of its 
figment-like existence in the imaginations of the super-consciousness, its intelligence 
remains incomplete in the incompleteness of matter and space-time. This 
incompleteness—ignorance of a singular reality—renders consciousness subjective 
regarding any determination of reality, or for that matter any determination of truth.          
 
A. Exploring the Transcendental Singularity  
 
The predicament of those who would study reality is that they have senses to 
experience but cannot experience reality; they have eyes but cannot see reality; they 
have ears but cannot hear reality; they exist in time but cannot measure reality; they 
are located in space but cannot locate reality; they are conscious of causality but 
ignorant of what triggers causes. Every inquiry into time and space returns the reply 
“It [reality] is not this, not this, not this”. The inquirers feel what beings in a super-
being’s imagination would feel. They have a world, a world of everything, which is 
but a nothing. However, if a being in the imagination realizes that it is an imagined 
being, it can re-imagine the imagination which imagines it. In the same way, 
consciousness, which realizes that it is not a mere composite of atoms but a figment of 
the imagination of the super-consciousness, might shift the focus of its ontological 
inquiry to “itself”. The object of inquiry in that case is a nonmaterial, beyond-
quintessence, diaphanous type of matter—consciousness.78 In such an inquiry, 
methods of inquiring into matter such as observation, quantification, experimentation, 
and the many empirical means of verifications, are inconsequential. The attitudes 
typical of those inquiring into matter, as well as their ever-triumphing claims of 
                                                 
76 A profound theoretical explanation regarding the end of consciousness and the dissolution of the matter 
hosting it into matter itself is found in the Buddhist Tantra. See VESNA A. WALLACE, A INNER 
KALACAKRATANTRA: A BUDDHIST TANTRIC VIEW OF INDIVIDUAL 57 (2001). 
77 Id. at 59.  
78 Diaphaneity is the nonmaterial texture of consciousness. See John Smythies, Space, Time, and Consciousness, 
10 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47, 47 (2003).  
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material objectivity and the inherent precision of their formulations, would prove 
flawed in the face of the diaphaneity of consciousness.     
The foundational nature of inquiry then has to be an individual “self-inquiry” 
carried out by jettisoning the feeling of a material “I” (ego) dwelling in time-space and 
thereby feeling one with reality79 or, in contrast, by cognitively engulfing everything 
materially manifested as if it all belongs to a non-material “I”.80 The former method is 
a negation of what appears as material reality and the latter a process of “self-
integration”, i.e., integration of one’s consciousness into the super-consciousness.81 
The emptiness of the sense of “I”—the “pseudo individuality”82—however, is 
understood by giving thorough instructions to the mind about the properties of the 
ontological wall separating the imagined from the imagination.83 Cosmic perspectives 
are taken and rigorous cosmological approaches are pursued to develop a sense of 
acosmism, which is the first step in causing the sense of “I” to collapse. In these 
approaches the cosmos is studied as a pantheistic transcendence, which has to be 
strictly differentiated from the sociologically cultured cosmic approaches seen among 
certain critical realists and theoretical physicists. The transcendental view of the 
cosmos is theoretically assimilated to a biological perspective,84 which grounds 
transcendental insights into the much accustomed [Husserlian] material ontology.      
Until this stage, inquiry into reality is only a process of internalizing the concept 
of reality as it is philosophically accounted for by those who have first-hand 
experience of reality. All that is required by this process is for the seeker of reality to 
provide propedeutics for an intellectual ascension, to gain a fine-grained understanding 
of the structure and composition of mind and matter85 and the relationship between 
mind and matter, and to theoretically situate reality. The whole process in fact amounts 
to a conceptual tidying up and organizing of consciousness for an intellectual 
transcending, for the “philosophizing”, so to speak, that has to follow.  
The cosmic perspective, and the subsequent replication of the cosmological 
process as an organic phenomenon,86 helps identify the human body as a micro 
                                                 
79 Ramana Maharshi designed a method of sceptical questioning by asking “Who am I?” followed by rigorous 
cognitive self-tuning. See RAM DASS, PATHS TO GOD: LIVING THE BHAGAVAD GITA 108-09 (2004).  
80 Id. at 86 (“You expand and expand and expand who you see yourself to be, until it’s all included within you”. 
Id.).  
81 See Hilary Anderson, The Process of Self-Integration in Internal Yoga Psychology, YOGA J., November-
December 34-36 (1976).  
82 Homo Leone, The Vedantic Absolute, 21 MIND: NEW SERIES 62, 68 (1912).  
83 The state of mind that comes into existence after philosophically instructing the mind regarding the emptiness 
of “I” is known as Viveka. This view belongs to the “Samkhya School”, although it is recognized in Advaita 
Vedanta. See MAX MULLER, THE SIX SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 310-13 (2008).  
84 This approach is part of Buddhist Tantric tradition, which views the cosmos as both animate and inanimate, 
i.e., as matter and consciousness, respectively. Cosmic properties are identical for both the animate and 
inanimate cosmos. The dynamics of the animate cosmos are more open to empirical verifications. Such an 
observation would reveal the development of the animate cosmos as starting with the five elements—earth, 
air, water, wind, and quintessence—and soon evolving into a biological process. For details on this process, 
see WALLACE, supra note 76 at 56-64. The whole process is an effort to see the inanimate cosmos as animate, 
especially as a human body. For an insightful reading of the Tantra as having a social perspective, see GAVIN 
FLOOD, TANTRIC BODY: THE SECRET TRADITION OF HINDU RELIGION (2006).  
85 The structure and composition of matter comprise the five elements of the animate cosmos mentioned above. 
See supra note 84. On the composition and functions of mind, see Manmatha Nath Banerji, Hindu 
Psychological Basis and Experimental Methods, 50 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 328 (1937).  
86 When the cosmos is replicated at the micro level as the human body, the Tantric concept of dual cosmos—
animate and inanimate—is also replicated as gross body (sthula shareera) and subtle body (sukshma 
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manifestation of matter and the human mind as a gateway to transcend material 
consciousness. This identification is followed by an empirical inquiry. However the 
empiricism involved is not the typical scientific process of externally directed 
experimentation and evidentiary verification; on the contrary, it denotes an interaction 
between the mind and the body.87 The mind-body interaction is carried out first 
through a rigorous execution of certain physiological practices which sublimate the 
body (since body is identified as the micro manifestation of elemental cosmos), 
thereby facilitating the mind situated in it to transcend the strictures of both matter and 
consciousness.88 This is followed by a psychological fine-tuning in line with certain 
ethical standards prescribed on the basis of the theoretical abstractions of reality. 
These standards include non-violence; truthfulness in speech and action; impartiality; 
an irresistible longing and quest for reality, yet humility before transcendental 
knowledge; and love and care for fellow beings.89  
The inquiry then advances to the third stage which involves steps such as 
intelligent dialogues with those who have sensed the super-consciousness, “hearing” 
their experience of the super-consciousness,90 “reflections” on those experiences, a 
cognitive analysis of what is heard, and rigorous “meditation” on reality.91 At an 
advanced phase of this stage of inquiry, the duality of gross body and subtle body 
constructed by consciousness collapses.92 As the duality collapses, consciousness 
senses the absence of material consciousness. This is the true state of consciousness, 
the super-consciousness.93   
Consciousness which has reached the super-consciousness experiences 
singularity in perception.94 Unlike consciousness, the super-consciousness has a 
truth—the truth of emptiness, the truth of fullness, and the truth of being the supreme 
intelligence. Once realized, the super-consciousness is intellectually secure such that 
                                                                                                                                                        
shareera). On these nuances, see SWAMI RAJARSHI MUNI, YOGA: THE ULTIMATE SPIRITUAL PATH 64-66 
(2001). 
87 This mind-body interaction is the purpose of Yoga. The most comprehensive theoretical account of Yoga is 
that of PATANJALI, THE YOGA SUTRAS OF PATANJALI (James Haughton Woods, trans., 1923).  
88 Banerji, supra note 85 at 337-43.  
89 These behavioural qualities are derived from the four qualities of a seeker of reality—calmness, self-control, 
forbearance, and detachment—mentioned in Verses 69 & 82 of Vivekachudamani.   
90 Vivekachudamani, verse 70.  
91 Vivekachudamani, verse 70. Meditation on reality as a way leading to the super-consciousness is emphasized 
in the Pancadasi of Vidyaranya/Bharatitirtha. See Andrew O. Fort, Reflections on Reflection: Kutastha, 
Cidabhasa, and Vrittis in the Pancadasi, 28 J. INDIAN PHIL. 497, 505 (2000).   
92 Vivekachudamani, verses 71-74.  
93 Vivekachudamani, verse 126.  
94 Here, I describe the duality (of consciousness) and the singularity (of super-consciousness) as perceptions: 
Duality exists, because when perceiving an object, the subject sees him-/herself in the process. 
  
Object (1) + Subject (1) = Duality in perception (2). That is, (1 + 1 = 2).   
 
However, when the subject transcends the dual consciousness between him/her and the object, the subject 
becomes an observer (Saksin) of the perception process. Yet, he/she performs the process of perceiving the 
object—not as an “involved” participant of the process but as a “detached” participant who takes guidance 
from the super-consciousness.   
 
Object (1) + Subject (0) = Singularity in perception (1). That is, (1 + 0 = 1).  
 
The value of the subject is “zero” because the consciousness of the subject is transcended and the subject 
does not see him-/herself as part of the process.  
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there is no retreat to the level of consciousness;95 it is intellectually complete in that it 
is not indeterminate before any teleological questions, and it is emotionally composed 
in that it “remains always unaffected internally”.96 Being the unaffected purest state of 
mind the super-consciousness is free from desires, ego, and hatred, just as it is 
unaffected by pain and pleasure.97 Sankara in Upadesasahasri has explained the 
characteristics of individuals who have the super-consciousness.98 Andrew O. Fort 
captures this state pithily: 
 
[Such an individual is] endowed with equanimity, self-control, 
compassion, concern for others, and is versed in scripture. He [sic] is 
also detached from visible and invisible enjoyments, beyond all works 
and means, and knowing and established in brahman. He [sic] has 
faultless conduct, being free from flaws like selfishness, lying, jealousy, 
trickery, evildoing, etc. and having the sole aim of helping others, 
wanting to employ his knowledge.99  
 
Being a fullness in itself, the super-consciousness does not need the values of 
essentialistically ordered social systems such as law and markets to realize its oneness 
with humanity; it has the sense of Self in everything and from that sense there arises a 
sense of duty towards humanity. Finally, being the ultimate logic and reason, it does 
not need the logic and reason of any externally ordered epistemic systems to validate 
its existence.      
Once an individual’s consciousness develops irretrievably into the self-illumining 
super-consciousness, it acquires the ability to observe the body and provide a meta-
phenomenological perspective to mind about the experiences of the body100—the 
advantageous position of having a “final intellectual court of appeal”.101 Since such 
observation is of the super-consciousness and is no longer that of consciousness, it 
maintains the singularity unique to the super-consciousness,102 which helps individuals 
                                                 
95 See Walter Slaje, Liberation from Intentionality and Involvement: On the Concept of Jivanmukti According to 
the Moksopaya, 28 J. INDIAN PHIL. 171, 176 (2000).  
96 Id. at 177.  
97 REZA SHAH-KAZEMI, PATHS TO TRANSCENDENCE ACCORDING TO SANKARA, IBN ARABI, AND MEISTER 
ECKHART 59-60 (2006).   
98 Individuals bearing super-consciousness have similar phenomenological properties as the Dasein of 
Heidegger. See VENUS A. GEORGE, AUTHENTIC HUMAN DESTINY: THE PATHS OF SHANKARA AND HEIDEGGER 
313 (1998); On Dasein, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 67-90 (1962).   
99 Andrew O. Fort, Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Sankara on Jivanmukti, 19 J. INDIAN PHIL. 369, 372 
(1991).   
100 Such observation is made possible by a faculty of the super-consciousness called Saksin (witness). See BINA 
GUPTA, THE DISINTERESTED WITNESS: A FRAGMENT OF ADVAITA VEDANTA PHENOMENOLOGY 4-5 (1998). 
However, observation through the super-consciousness must not be confused with any observation through 
consciousness. The latter is typical of material inquiries. See TARA CHATTERJEA, KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM 
IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 18 (2002). See also Bina Gupta, Samkara’s Notion of Saksin, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
HINDUISM 1376-91 (Nagendra Kr. Singh, ed., 2000).  
101 See Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Vedanta as Philosophy of Spiritual Life, in HINDU SPIRITUALITY: VEDAS 
THROUGH VEDANTA 231, 239 (Krishna Sivaraman, ed., 1989).   
102 Andrew O. Fort, The Concept of Saksin in Advaita Vedanta, 12 J. INDIAN PHIL. 277, 278 (1984).  
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reject all materially ordered differences in the world and perceive the humanity as an 
entirety. This kind of awareness is a cosmic consciousness.103  
Singularity in perception and a cosmic consciousness generate a state of 
selflessness—altruism—when performing one’s duties.104 These duties are not 
prescriptions of any democratic or other political forms of society, but a sense of 
responsibility that comes into being after sensing the microcosmic relation of human 
beings to the macrocosmic reality and the cosmically inherent oneness of humanity.105  
The duties emanating from one’s political and social consciousness, however, 
vary from society to society. When a society is conceived on a specific organization 
such as the “global governance”, there appears a conflict of duties. The notion of the 
“ideal” built into minds by a society perpetuates the conflict. However, the sense of 
duty generated by the non-dualistic cosmic consciousness eclipses the social ideals 
inlaid in minds and engenders toleration, sympathy, and mutual respect among 
individuals.  
 
B. Situating the Transcendental Singularity: A Rationalist Perspective  
 
Sociality, which has established itself as human reality, is a superimposition on 
the transcendental reality of humanity. Seen this way, sociality is a deluded 
consciousness of the being and the transcendental reality its true consciousness106. 
However, what causes the transcendental reality to prevail over sociality is not simply 
the fact that the formulation of the latter preceded that of the former; the predominance 
has deep phenomenological logic ingrained in it. Understanding that 
phenomenological logic requires a rational restatement of the relationship between 
consciousness and the super-consciousness.107 
Seen in a rational way, there can be no super-consciousness without 
consciousness, for consciousness is the organic state of being. This position has two 
implications. First, the super-consciousness is an imagination/formulation of 
consciousness and, second, consciousness is the first and final cause of everything. It 
follows that the sociality contrived by humanity is its reality.  
Believing in the ultimate nature of consciousness has, however, intellectual costs: 
it prompts existential questions; it engenders ontological mysteries and relative 
truths;108 and it renders consciousness itself, or constructs of consciousness, as the 
                                                 
103 STHANESHWAR TIMALSINA, CONSCIOUSNESS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: THE ADVAITA DOCTRINE OF 
‘AWARENESS ONLY’ 101 (2009).   
104 This view is related to the concept of Karma Yoga. See generally Bhagavad Gita Ch.3.  
105 However, the view that the duties individuals have to perform do not arise from the directives of any 
contemporary forms of the society does not preclude the scope for the society to become a platform for human 
existence. This optimism towards new forms of the society is converted into a blueprint later in this article.  
106 For a phenomenological explanation of how consciousness is deluded, see Tao Jiang, Storehouse 
Consciousness and the Unconscious: A Comparative Study of Xuan Zang and Freud on the Subliminal Mind, 
72 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 119, 121-27 (2004).  
107 In Vedanta, rational reasoning (Vichara) is meant to rationally ascertain the distinction between the real and 
the unreal. See SWAMI ADISWARANANDA, THE VEDANTA WAY TO PEACE AND HAPPINESS 95 (2004) (“Vedanta 
exhorts an aspirant to scrutinize the meaning of Truth and make a critical estimate of what he or she has 
realized to be true”).   
108 This is a stance in Pudgalavada Buddhism, which prompted the school to stand for a unifying reality. See 
Anindita Niyogi Balslev, An Appraisal of I-Consciousness in the Context of the Controversies Centering 
Around the No-self Doctrine of Buddhism, 16 J. INDIAN PHIL. 167, 172 (1988).  
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meta-phenomenon or meta-intelligence of the experiences of consciousness. Into the 
bargain comes the scientific discovery of extra dimensions of matter—which 
otherwise remain beyond the observations of consciousness—that challenge the three-
dimensional time-space deemed to be the only dimensional perception of 
consciousness.109 If this scientific fact is ignored arguendo and the completeness of 
consciousness is examined only from the viewpoint of logic, then the negative aspect 
of consciousness is its “self-referential referentiality”, so to speak.  
The view that consciousness is a self-referential referent need not always be 
regarded negatively, since the super-consciousness, which is deemed to be referencing 
consciousness and a self-referential referent in itself, is a referent of a self-referential 
referent, i.e., consciousness. This position, however, saves the super-consciousness 
from being a self-referential referent; it becomes an intellectual formulation of 
consciousness.  
In the present inquiry into reality, the formulation that there is a super-
consciousness becomes the “minimum working hypothesis”, which Aldous Huxley 
articulates: “That there is a Godhead, Ground, Brahman, Clear Light of the Void, 
which is the unmanifested principle of all manifestations”.110 Inquirers pursue this 
hypothesis empirically and intellectually in order to transcend the body and the 
perceptions of consciousness,111 and thereby they experience the super-consciousness. 
Ian Whicher calls this transcending an “epistemic transformation”: “This epistemic 
transformation and reassessment of experience involves the recognition and inclusion 
of a formerly concealed, nonappreciated, and obscured mode of being”.112  
Those inquirers who get the experience of singularity of the super-consciousness 
also acquire the ability to observe the collapse of the duality of consciousness (also the 
collapse of the intellectual coherence it had) and the same consciousness which has 
become dormant—but not “eliminated”113—due to the transcending. In a word, 
consciousness continues to exist, but is guided by the super-consciousness, which has 
induced a modified mind-stuff.   
Hence, for the super-consciousness consciousness exists as an observable system; 
the self-referentiality of the latter is a delusion. But for consciousness the super-
consciousness does not exist, or remains unobservable. Yet, before commencing any 
inquiry, both the super-consciousness and consciousness have a hypothetical existence 
as self-referential systems. Subsequent to the inquiry and the actualization of the 
super-consciousness, the inquirer becomes aware of the completeness of the super-
consciousness and the incompleteness of consciousness. This awareness—that the 
super-consciousness exists as a fullness and consciousness as a transcended but 
observable state—is referred to theoretical terms as Advaita (non-dualism). It is not 
                                                 
109 For an informative account on these extra dimensions, see Ashok Sen, String Theory and Einstein’s Dream, 
in LEGACY OF ALBERT EINSTEIN: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN CELEBRATION OF THE YEAR OF PHYSICS 25-46 
(Spenta R. Wadia, ed., 2007).  
110 Aldous Huxley, The Minimum Working Hypothesis, in VEDANTA FOR THE WESTERN WORLD 33, 34 
(Christopher Isherwood, ed., 1945).  
111 For a pithy account of the structure of consciousness and what happens to that structure when consciousness 
is transcended, see MARVIN LEVINE, THE POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF BUDDHISM AND YOGA (Mahwah: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), pp.115-20, 135-38.  
112 IAN WHICHER, THE INTEGRITY OF THE YOGA DARSANA: A RECONSIDERATION OF CLASSICAL YOGA 282 
(1998).  
113 Id. at 136.  
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“monism” for, in Advaita Vedanta, consciousness does not disappear with the super-
consciousness.114   
The rationalist argument that the super-consciousness is an imagination of 
consciousness is thus misleading, if not untenable. Nonetheless, the rationalist can be 
assuaged by restating the relationship between the super-consciousness and 
consciousness: consciousness is an opportunity to know the super-consciousness. Had 
consciousness not existed, the super-consciousness would have been an absolute 
existence—an undisturbed calmness, the singularity. Because consciousness exists it 
has to know the super-consciousness. That means consciousness is a medium to know 
the super-consciousness.   
This argument that consciousness is a medium to know the super-consciousness 
can be viewed from a slightly different perspective. That is, if one starts with a 
conviction that the unmanifest singular super-consciousness (x) in human beings wants 
to become manifest, it must assume a micro form—consciousness. In other words, the 
super-consciousness has subtracted “It” from “Itself”. But, since the super-
consciousness is fullness and that fullness, if taken away from fullness, retains 
fullness, subtracting the super-consciousness from the super-consciousness does not 
create a micro state. Accordingly, x–x = x. This renders the super-consciousness only 
unmanifest.  
For this reason the super-consciousness has struck a duality between It and the 
consciousness It has imagined by biding consciousness under a veil of illusion. Under 
this illusion, consciousness senses duality of mind and matter, and the super-
consciousness remains hidden from consciousness. In this state, consciousness 
becomes x–1.  In reality, consciousness is only x, but under the veil of illusion 
consciousness appears to consciousness as super-consciousness subtracted (x–1).  
In sum, the whole process is a result of our own (human) desire to know 
ourselves. We are x and we are x–1. However, we have forged a duality in order to 
know ourselves. That the duality around us is our own imagination is unknown to our 
senses.   
Because consciousness is the opportunity to know the super-consciousness, 
consciousness must be a heuristic, such that living with it must have the elements and 
learning through it must have the embedding of the transcendental reality, which is the 
“perennial hypothesis”.115 This inevitability for a heuristic prompts the need for a 
revision of sociality and a reformulation of the idea of law; and as long as law is on 
shaky ground, tenability cannot be expected of international law.  
Hereinafter it would be unfounded to refer to the form of law that has to guide 
humanity to its reality “international law” given the expression’s irrelevance.116 The 
expression has become irrelevant because the social consciousness which harbours 
                                                 
114 On the side of logic, the “singularity”—characteristic of the super-consciousness—may tightly fit into 
“monism”, since singularity refers to the state of transcendence before the non-duality occurred.   
115 The expression “perennial hypothesis” is used by Yaran in a roughly similar context in Islamic cosmology, 
See CAFER S. YARAN, ISLAMIC THOUGHT ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: CONTRIBUTION AND CONTRAST WITH 
CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 144 (2003).      
116 Cf. Philip Allott, The Human Condition and the Role of Law, 14 SYMPOSIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 10TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE MASTER OF LAWS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMME, The University of Hong Kong, 13 
March 2010 (on file with the author) (“By wherever name, [the] transcendental ideas act as universal ideas … 
They will be identified, eventually and at last, in the ideal superstructure of international law. Id.)  
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notions such as state and sovereignty has proven misguided and the legal 
consciousness—of that social consciousness—which contributes to and sustains these 
notions collapses. Hereinafter, whenever the article has to bring up any form of 
guidance humanity receives in realizing its reality, the article will refer to that 
guidance (also the discipline that provides means to obtain that guidance) as “the Law” 
and when reference is to law as the legal consciousness of the society, the article uses 
the term “law”.    
 
V. LAW AS A SUPER-INTELLIGENT GUIDANCE 
 
It is likely that consciousness has the intellectual quality of the super-
consciousness. In fact, the whole intellectual fabric of consciousness is bestowed up on 
it by the super-consciousness. Even though the “cognitive veil” constricts the 
perceptions of consciousness to a three-dimensional world of forms and phenomena, 
consciousness is neither empty of the super-consciousness nor it is full of the super-
consciousness; consciousness is the super-consciousness present but unrealized. Since 
consciousness is the super-consciousness present, consciousness will have what 
Husserl terms “noetic perceptions”,117 i.e., perceptions of or resembling those of the 
super-consciousness.118 Yet, the attitudes consciousness has accumulated, which may 
be called the “Karmic bag” attached to consciousness, predisposes consciousness to 
observe the worldly phenomena in an ontic perspective.119  
Thus, the social consciousness humanity has accumulated is a result of ontic 
states. The ontic perspectives have come to exist by way of deontic language 
modalities (consider, for example, that norms in the society transpire by way of 
deontic speech).120 Yet, given the noetic flashes in the mind, consciousness cannot be 
totally ontic; nor can it be totally noetic. However, eventually the opaqueness of noetic 
perceptions yields to the ontic perceptions of consciousness, a process which 
Abdirahman A. Hussein calls, the “magic negation” of reality.121 Ultimately, what 
transpires is an ersatz model of transcendental reality as perceived and conceived into 
a sociality by consciousness and its “existential devices”.122   
That sociality is transcendental reality writ small is apparent from the many 
logical attributes of transcendental reality manifest in sociality/the society. That is to 
say, many logical features of the super-consciousness are present in consciousness. 
But, given the imperfections and limits of consciousness, the flashes of transcendental 
reality, which is an intellectual singularity, appear as duality for consciousness, i.e., “I” 
and the “society”. This duality of a singularity does not allow transcendental reality (“I 
am reality manifest”, “my consciousness is the super-consciousness in delusion”, “the 
                                                 
117 See Martin Jay, The Life World and Lived Experience, in A COMPANION TO PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
EXISTENTIALISM 91, 94 (Hubert L. Dreyfus & Mark A. Wrathall, eds., 2006).   
118 BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, THE BUDDHA NATURE: A STUDY OF THE TATHAGATAGARBHA AND ALAYAVIJNANA 
207, 211 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991).  
119 By “ontic” I mean an intellectual conviction that consciousness can have physical dimensions although it 
cannot have physical states. For an enlightening discussion in this vein, see generally Barbara Montero, The 
Epistemic/Ontic Divide, 66 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 404 (2003).  
120 See SEBASTIÁN URBINA, LEGAL METHOD AND THE RULE OF LAW 151 (2002) (drawing on Riccardo Guastini).  
121 ABDIRAHMAN A. HUSSEIN, EDWARD SAID: CRITICISM AND SOCIETY 39 (2002) (presenting Said’s critique of 
Sartre).  
122 Id. at 40.  
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super-consciousness is the ultimate reality”). Such a denial of a singular consciousness 
renders the dual consciousness of “I” and the “society” (sociality) the ultimate reality 
of humanity.123 Accordingly, sociality has concepts logically parallel to those of 
transcendental reality, e.g., abstractions such as a self-referential sovereign (the social 
ultimate in place of absolute consciousness) and social karma (the web of cause-effect 
resulting from the interaction of law and politics in the sovereignty-field in place of the 
cause-effect created by the transcendental reality).124   
If sociality is no more than a superimposition on reality, law has a facilitating role 
in that superimposition. To reaffirm that role, law is a constituent of sociality in the 
society—it is causative of social karma and it is a theoretical account of the society (in 
the latter role, law is an elite discipline). Most of all, law is an experience of high order 
for lawyers and a directive for the masses. When reality/super-consciousness eclipses 
sociality—including law—fabricated at the level of consciousness, what ensues is not 
a state disparate from the perceptions of consciousness, but only a higher level of 
consciousness. For this reason, the concept and role of law only need intellectual 
refinement from their role in the consciousness to a role in the super-consciousness.125 
As simplistic as it may sound, however, such a refining would also have a polemical 
effect on the idea of the society and all forms of social organization.126     
The project127 of refining the idea of law is not solipsistic, for it is situated on the 
fringes of many “higher law” projects, Agambenian jurisprudence etc. However, the 
project this article envisages does not intend to evoke any paradigms of higher law or 
“natural law” if they are taken in the strictest epistemological sense.128 Yet, the project 
may share the analytical route common to many forms of non-positivistic, non-
formalistic, and non-textualist approaches. Any other similarities apparent on the 
surface will collapse at the deeper level of logic and language applied in this project.   
 
A. A New Concept of Law 
 
When an individual transcends consciousness and realizes the super-
consciousness, all images and concepts of consciousness become meta-subjects of the 
individual’s super-consciousness. This process where all constructs of consciousness 
become part of the super-consciousness may be called a non-becoming of 
                                                 
123 The duality of consciousness has, in fact, two manifestations: physical and social. The physical manifestation 
of duality is mind and matter, i.e., “I” and the “universe”. This duality is the effect of the observation of the 
manifest universe, and quantification of that observation, (that science engages in). The social manifestation of 
duality engages in applying the same methods of observation and quantification in the disciplines—the social 
sciences—which help create the society. This results in the same kind of duality as science engenders—“I” 
and the society—appearing in the conception of the society.  
124 The Nyaya Vaisesika School of the Vedic epistemology deems cause and effect (Karma) as created by 
Adrsta—a version of the transcendental reality specific to Nyaya Vaisesika. See YUVRAJ KRISHAN, THE 
DOCTRINE OF KARMA 149-52 (1997).   
125 This intellectual action, I hope, meets Allott’s revolutionary expectations: “For those who suffer, in body or 
in spirit, from the imperfections of the human world as it is, the best way to make a better world is the way of 
law”. See Allott, supra note 42 at 413.  
126 For a reflection to the effect that a reconceiving of law—called for in modernity—would have ontological 
threats to the concept of law in how it is socially/normatively situated, see Neil Walker, Out of Place and Out 
of Time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates, 14 EDINBURGH L. REV. 13 (2010).  
127 What is provided in this article is only a sketch of a larger study by the author on philosophy and logic.  
128 See e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place of ‘Higher Law’ in the Quotidian Practice of Law: Herein of 
Practical Reason, Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 438 (2009).  
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consciousness.129 Since this non-becoming also applies to all constructs of 
consciousness, sociality—and law as its constituent—becomes drawn into the process 
of non-becoming.   
When law is in the process of non-becoming, what essentially happens to law? 
This question prompts one to ask further: “What purpose does law serve in the 
society”? How is law conceptualized at the level of consciousness? Answers to these 
questions would help ascertain what transpires in law when its “ground”130 changes 
from the society to transcendence. A simplest yet most profound definition of law, 
which encompasses its meaning and purpose, is that law is a reasoning which provides 
“right ways … through which consciousness can give a universal justified account of 
its unity from its own resources”.131 The “right ways” are logically drawn from 
sociality, since sociality/society is the mental repository of the entire resources of 
consciousness and the ultimate paradigm for testing the rights and wrongs of 
humanity. This being the case, what actually has to transpire in law during its non-
becoming is a cleansing of the individual and collective legal consciousness.132  
Conceiving the ground of law as transcendence is nothing unknown to the history 
of philosophy. Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas made 
attempts in this vein.133 In their conceptions, transcendence is the enigmatic 
[“incomprehensible”] dimension of human mind. However, the incomprehensibility of 
this dimension is considered to be “an appearance of what is very comprehensible” to 
human mind.134 That is to say, comprehension of the mind is a comprehending of the 
enigmatic transcendence. On balance, this philosophical position holds that the ground 
of law is an incomprehensible “ultimate” that is comprehendible as mental 
reflections.135 
This version of transcendence, while envisaging an ultimate, anchors “ideal 
behavior” or “standards of behavior” to the level of consciousness. Transcendence is 
thus no more than a fine-logic to validate the constructs of consciousness. As there is 
no intellectual transcending, the realm imagined as the ground of law is not the least 
bit transcendental. Social ideas such as sovereignty and justice are theoretical 
derivations of this purported transcendence, validating constructs of consciousness 
such as the society (social consciousness) and law (legal consciousness). This 
Occidental transcendentalism forges a super-sociality; instead of cleansing social and 
legal consciousness, it defends sociality.  
Law can be on a profound transcendental foundation only if law’s/the society’s 
non-becoming is commensurate with the supreme intelligence (intellectual singularity) 
                                                 
129 See Isa Upanishad (Verse 12): Andham tama: pravishanti ye sambhuthimupasate Tato bhuya iva te tamo ya u 
sambhuthyam rata: (“Into blind darkness they enter, people who worship non-becoming; And into still blinder 
darkness, people who delight in becoming”). Translation as provided in PATRICK OLIVELLE (trans.), 
UPANISADS 249 (1996).  
130 “Ground of law” refers to the psychological/philosophical plane where the “ideal” for determining the 
substance and authority of law lies, e.g., sociality or the transcendence. See generally Elif Cirakman, 
Transcendence and the Human Condition: Reflections on Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas, 84 ANALECTA 
HUSSERLIANA 315 (2005).   
131 Id. at 319.  
132 See and Cf. Vivekachudamani, verse 11.  
133 See generally Cirakman, supra note 130.  
134 Id. at 316.  
135 There are, however, subtle differences in the perspectives of Kant, Heidegger, and Levinas. For details, see 
generally id.  
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of the super-consciousness. In that case, law would be devoid of its canonical and 
inscriptional form, its linguistic discursivity, and the logical coherence of the 
individual subjectivities it defends. Law would then become part of the non-becoming 
of consciousness—an intellectual pursuit, the transcending.136 Consequently, law 
would be a communication of the absolute super-consciousness that would steer the 
mind and body dwelling in the time-space of physical dualities.137    
Thus, conceptually the Law is a goal to be realized and a guidance by the super-
consciousness informing conduct in the world. Only by pursuing the goal can one be 
in the advantageous position of receiving the “Absolute good” of humanity.138 P. 
Narasimham makes this dual image of the Law clear: “Only after the transitional stage 
… only when our consciousness has ‘sensed’ the Unity, can we aspire after the beyond 
good and evil. There can be no self-censcious [sic] delusion anywhere and every one is 
the best judge for oneself in this matter”.139  
Transcending is therefore a prerequisite to receiving guidance from the super-
consciousness. The guidance does not come as an earthly vision or sound because the 
super-consciousness is a “new mind, new nerves, new perspectives and new 
samskaras (thought potencies)”, untouched by the values of time and space.140 That is, 
the body gets the super-consciousness to observe the thoughts of a consciousness 
which is already falsified. “False consciousness” means that consciousness exists for 
individuals, consciously, but not self-consciously, as negated consciousness. Because 
consciousness is falsified, mind dwelling in the body will not heed consciousness but 
the super-consciousness.  
When it comes to the question of the super-consciousness reckoning what is good 
and bad, there is no such reckoning, as the super-consciousness is a singularity. Since 
a singularity has no relative perceptions, good and bad in it are ideas of a falsified 
duality.141 The minds of individuals who have realized the super-consciousness do not 
see any schism between good and bad except in their meta-observations of the dual 
physical/social world. Such individuals resemble characters in a story who realize that 
the good and bad in their world are a meticulously ordered fantasy of a storywriter. If 
they transcend the story-world and dissolve in the mind of the storywriter, the final 
truth is the storywriter,142 who is an amorphous intelligence, and may be deemed to be 
the basic and ultimate “good”. And, if one prefers the term “bad” to refer to that 
intelligence, then it is the basic and ultimate bad. Regardless of what one calls it—
good or bad—the super-consciousness is an ultimate, singular standard of existence.  
However, at the level of consciousness there is duality, and hence there exists the 
good-bad schism. Generally, a consequentialist, deontological, or virtue-ethical moral 
                                                 
136 For details on this transcending, see supra Section IV.A. Exploring the Transcendental Singularity.  
137 Prefixing “dualities” with “physical” has a logical connotation. That is, for individuals who have realized the 
super-consciousness and who receive guidance from it, dualities exist only as meta-phenomena, experienced 
by their mind. They are conscious that what mind experiences is a virtual reality—from which they are 
detached—of the world bound in time and space.  
138 P. Narasimham, The Vedantic Good, 24 MIND: NEW SERIES 37, 39 (1915).  
139 Id.    
140 SWAMI ADISWARANANDA, MEDITATION AND ITS PRACTICES: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO TECHNIQUES AND 
TRADITIONS OF MEDITATION IN YOGA AND VEDANTA 347-348 (2003).  
141 For clarifying the schism between singularity and duality, see supra note 94.  
142 This metaphor is adapted from a similar one by Swami Abhedananda. See SWAMI ABHEDANANDA, ATTITUDE 
OF VEDANTA TOWARDS RELIGION 176 (2007).  
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perspective determines good and bad when consciousness is social (which includes 
semi-social or sub-social consciousness, e.g. religious faith-systems and ideologies). 
However, all the abovementioned approaches are more or less explanatory in nature 
and create, and contribute to, a conceptual space for subjective explanations and 
judgments regarding good and bad.143  
Notwithstanding the many theoretical models for determining and explaining 
good and bad, humanity has been able to reflexively judge certain behavior as good 
and bad. Peter Philip Simpson exemplifies such behavior: 
  
The selfless devotion that spouses show to each other and to their 
children, that soldiers in battle show to their country, that people of 
goodwill all over the world show to the poor, the deprived, the 
depressed, the lonely, and to the suffering generally, even at the 
personal cost to themselves, amply illustrate the human capacity to 
recognize the good of others and to act on it regardless of the good of 
self.144  
 
Why have we considered these types of behaviors good? Because such behavior is a 
result of the noetic flashes that blind the ontic mind enclosed in illusion. Ignoring or 
failing to perceive these flashes and acting against them amounts to bad behavior or 
wrong-doing.145 This view implies that, barring a few noetic flashes, human mind is 
basically dual and egoistic. However, this understanding of human judgment regarding 
good and bad is in a certain sense forward looking in that it reinforces the intellectual 
position that the super-consciousness and consciousness are in a micro-macro 
relationship (which is unknown to consciousness) and that there is only a dimensional 
divide between them.   
A transcending to the super-consciousness erases all traces of duality from mind. 
Yet mind retains that duality as a falsified notion. However, at the level of the society 
it is impossible for everyone to realize transcendence,146 as it requires prolonged, 
protracted, and sustained intellectual efforts that must be pursued through education 
and lived experience.147 Hence for the majority of humanity, the Law would exist as a 
goal to be realized in order to attain the intellectual maturity to discern good and bad 
(when seen as a goal, the Law may be called the “Ultimate Law”).  
This view squarely resonates with the heuristic nature of consciousness that 
entails a methodological program in which the super-consciousness would be the 
hypothesis of life’s inquiry into reality. Therefore, it is essential for such a program to 
have a transcendental foundation. In addition, in view of the educative nature of this 
program, the path to the Ultimate Law should be mapped out.  
                                                 
143 See PETER PHILLIPS SIMPSON, VICES, VIRTUES, AND CONSEQUENCES: ESSAYS IN MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 56-59 (2001).   
144 Id. at 69.  
145 Id. at 72.  
146 See AUSTIN, supra note 2.  
147 Enlightenment through life and action is the essence of Karma Yoga, see SWAMI ADISWARANANDA, FOUR 
YOGAS: A GUIDE TO THE SPIRITUAL PATHS OF ACTION, DEVOTION, MEDITATION, AND KNOWLEDGE 11-78 
(2006).  
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In this order of things, the Law has to assume the character of a discipline, a 
discipline which has a reality-oriented theory, logic, and reasoning. The rest of the 
article, drawing insights from Vedic and Sanskrit epistemology, sketches the 
foundation of such a discipline.   
 
B. “The Law”: A Sublime Discipline            
 
Individuals in pursuit of reality have to progress through certain stages before 
they are exposed to the theory of reality and other advanced and empirical methods of 
inquiry into reality.148 It is these stages that constitute the Law—the first lesson and 
first discipline that humanity must learn. In learning this discipline, individuals 
develop the ability to transcend to the level of the Ultimate Law. The stages through 
which inquires of reality have to traverse—in other words, the Law—are acquiring: 1) 
a fine-grained grasp of grammar and language-use (Vyakarana), 2) skill in debating 
(Nyaya) and interpretation (Mimamsa), and 3) knowledge about the phenomenology of 
matter or the manifest reality (Samkhya). What differentiates these types of knowledge 
from the conventional, society-oriented legal knowledge (reasoning and logic) is their 
transcendental anchoring. Below I briefly explain how each of these skills and forms 
of knowledge149 (I shy away from calling these skills “legal skills” and “legal 
knowledge”, for the conventional image of law which has encapsulated humanity in a 
few doctrines does not exist any longer) helps the inquirers to appreciate the 
transcendental reality, it motivates them and provides them with the fundamental 
knowledge for advancing intellectually towards the super-consciousness or the 
“Ultimate Law”.150  
 
Grammar and Language-Use: Deconstructing the grammar and style of language-use 
is imperative when humanity is in pursuit of its transcendental reality, since the fall 
(falsification) of sociality implies a fall of the socially structured “idealized speech 
community that is internally consistent in its linguistic practice”.151 In the society there 
exists a presupposed pattern of the cognizing of sentences. For example, take the 
sentence “the universe exists”. In the normal case, there is likely to be no “preventer 
cognition” when cognizing this sentence, since it is a social-scientific understanding 
that the universe exists. The absence of a preventer cognition enables the cognizor to 
cognize the meaning of the sentence.152 However, if the statement is “The universe 
                                                 
148 See supra Section IV.A.  
149 What is provided here is only a thumbnail view. Each stage is a tradition—a convergence of many schools 
and sub-schools.   
150 Is the super-consciousness the “Ultimate Law”? I emphasize that the super-consciousness is the ultimate 
intellectual state or the reality of human beings. When individuals draw on the enlightenment of the super-
consciousness to inform conduct in the world, the super-consciousness may be referred to as the Ultimate 
Law. However, the idea of the Ultimate Law is relevant only when the super-consciousness is related to bodily 
existence and conduct in the world. The concept of the Ultimate Law is irrelevant when conceptualizing the 
super-consciousness per se.   
151 See NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE 16 (1986). I understand 
that a homogenous “speech community”, bearing in mind the criticisms against it, is a conceptual tool more 
than a reality. That conceptual existence will, however, suffice for my purpose since I only mean that among 
the diverse speech communities there exists a conceptually generalizable language-structure for the society.  
152 See and Cf. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Epistemology of Testimony and Authority: Some Indian Themes and 
Theories, in KNOWING FROM WORDS 69, 84-85 (Bimal Krishna Matilal & Arindam Chakrabarti, eds., 1994).  
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does not exist” or “the universe is an illusion”, a preventer cognition will obstruct the 
cognition and will lead to disbelief and subsequent rejection of the idea by the 
cognizor. This pattern of human cognition may have negative effects on human 
understanding when non-societal transcendental notions are relayed to the inquirer. To 
overcome the problem of cognitive denial, the description of transcendental reality 
should have persuasive syntax capable of defeating any likely preventer cognition. In 
other words, there has to be an element of “expectancy” in sentences.153 This 
expectancy has to be purely linguistic, i.e., “an understanding derived of a 
sentence”,154 free from a pre-existing psychological context.155 In the Sanskrit 
grammatical tradition, expectancy is generally created by invoking a desire to know 
about the doer or the cause.156 Therefore the statement “The universe is an illusion” 
will have expectancy if it is cast in a manner which has a hidden or passive reference 
regarding the doer and causation, e.g., “the universe is a materially manifest super-
intelligent imagination”. This sentence would prompt further questions such as “What 
is that super-intelligence?”, “What prompts imagination?” “If the universe is an 
imaginary, what is it that we observe?”, and so on, thus prompting a chain of sceptical 
questioning in contrast to instant denial, as in the case of the statement “the universe is 
an illusion”.  
This type of linguistic deconstructive-cum-structuralist approach is relevant not 
only for the transcendental project but also for studying and appraising existing 
scriptural and philosophic accounts of transcendental states. In short, the endeavour is 
to teach individuals to dispose of the phenomenological prejudices, inculcated in them 
by the society-oriented disciplines.     
   
Skills in Debating and Interpretation: These skills empower the inquirers to engage in 
profound logical reasoning. Among the debating skills, the most prominent one is 
refutation, which is primarily meant to affirm the perennial hypothesis by countering 
possible materialist oppositions to the transcendental reality.157 Affirmation is not 
always directly made; it is often made by positing seemingly logical situations—
fundamentally absurdities—to the opponents and prompting them to accept such 
positions, rendering their oppositions absurd. This type of skill is best suited to arguing 
against the sophistries of denialists rather than against rational sceptics. However, 
triumphing over an opponent by the art of refutation is an extreme measure in 
debate;158 it is a rare occurrence. Generally, adversarial positions are simply forged in 
                                                 
153 This expectancy in the Sanskrit grammar tradition is known as akanksa. For an informative description of 
akanksa, see Purusottma Bilimoria, Akanksa: ‘Expectancy’ in Sentential Comprehension: An Advaita Critique, 
9 J. INDIAN PHIL. 85 (1981).  Akanksa is also present in art forms conveying transcendental messages. See 
HARSHA V. DEHEJIA, THE ADVAITA OF ART 89-90 (1996).  
154 Id. at 91.  
155 See id. at 90.  
156 Id. at 87.  
157 See Sung Yong Kang, An Inquiry into the Definition of tarka in Nyaya Tradition and Its Connotations of 
Negative Speculation, 38 J. INDIAN PHIL. 1, 3 (2010). Sanskrit epistemology calls this method tarka, which is 
defined in the Nyayasutra as a kind of deliberation “in which reasons are given for assumptions regarding an 
object whose true nature is not known in order to obtain knowledge of its true nature” (definition as provided 
in Kang. Id.)  
158 Texts like Caraka Samhita, however, deem victory-oriented debate (Jalpa) as constructive. See generally 
Hugh Nicholson, The Shift from Agnostic to Non-Agnostic Debate in Early Nyaya, 38 J. INDIAN PHIL. 75 
(2010).  
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a debate to remove any mistiness surrounding the focal hypothesis. However, the truth 
of an argument or of a whole argument structure—be it in an adversarial or non-
adversarial debate—is not to be tested against a given fact, empirical evidence, 
doctrinal coherence, or deontological ethics as in legal reasoning, but tested against the 
argument’s logical compatibility with (and ability to confirm) the perennial 
hypothesis.  
Like the debating skills, transcendental inquiry entails proficiency in 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics in the transcendental milieu transcends the standard 
function of hermeneutics—textual interpretation—to encompass interpreting cognitive 
perceptions, both sensual and transcendental. The former function, however, exists in 
transcendental philosophy as well,159 bordering on the legal hermeneutics that ranges 
from the simple unpacking of legal propositions to the post-structuralist historicizing 
of legal discourses.160 That is to say, the conventional hermeneutic tradition of textual 
interpretation, in the transcendental context, has “articulated increasingly refined rules 
and metarules for the interpretation of ritual acts and statements in their intrinsic 
interrelations and in relation to possible larger and broader motivations and attitudes 
towards the world”.161 However, when it comes to interpreting cognitive perceptions, 
the intention is to set consciousness free from any material objectivity the perception 
might have contacted. In this process interpretation is limited not only to the 
perceptions generated by consciousness but also to the process by which perceptions 
are generated.162   
The ultimate objective of the hermeneutics is to help an individual conceive 
transcendental singularity in terms of a singular worldly ethic, Dharma.163 Dharma is 
the Ultimate Law—the guidance of the super-consciousness. Dharma is the 
behavioural nature of the super-consciousness.164 It is the ideal state of mind and 
manner of conduct. 
 
Knowledge about Material Reality: Knowledge about the material universe 
strengthens one’s ability to understand transcendental reality. The road to such 
                                                 
159 The hermeneutic tradition that is conformist in nature within the Vedic epistemology is Purva Mimamsa. See 
NATALIA ISAYEVA, SHANKARA AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 200 (1993).   
160 On the conceptual range of legal hermeneutics, see Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of 
the Legal Text, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 23 (Gregory Leyh, ed., 1992).  
161 Francis X. Clooney, What’s a God? The Quest for the Right Understanding of Devta in Brahmanical Ritual 
Theory (Mimamsa), 1 INT’L J. HINDU STUD. 337, 337 (1997). Texts in this context more often are mantras 
(hymns). For a view that mantras are speech acts that merit a hermeneutical reading, see LAURIE L. PATTON, 
BRINGING THE GODS TO MIND: MANTRA AND RITUAL IN EARLY INDIAN SACRIFICE 60 (2004).  
162 See DAVID B. ZILBERMAN, ANALOGY IN INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 73 (2006).  
163 K.R. PARAMAHAMSA, DHARMA 2 (2008). 
164 The singularity of Dharma may prompt scepticism given that Vedic commentaries often refer to Adharma—
the corresponding opposite of Dharma—and that many societies have founded law and order systems on the 
basis of the schism between Dharma and Adharma. On such societies, see B. S. Chimni, International Law 
Scholarship in Post-colonial India: Coping with Dualism, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 23, 24-32 (2010) (articulates 
how Dharma was conceptually corrupted by the many socio-political discourses in pre- and post-colonial 
Indian society). However, I hold that Adharma is the basic nature of consciousness (save for the noetic flashes 
that consciousness receives from time to time) that has to be transcended so as to attain the Dharmic state of 
mind. This view, however, is in opposition to all theoretical efforts by which Adharma is used to caste 
Dharma as a spatial-temporal cultural relativity. For such an image of Dharma, see generally ARIEL 
GLUCKLICH, THE SENSE OF ADHARMA (1994).   
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material knowledge requires a profound understanding of the duality seen by 
consciousness.  
According to materialist schools,165 the universe is the matrix of all creation. The 
universe manifests itself as a salient physical system, perceivable only through the 
unmanifest soul in each individual. This perception of the universe (prakriti) is, 
however, different from the universe (mulaprakriti) itself.166  
The individual is a mind and body complex.167 The mind is intelligence. The 
mind perceives the body—the universe—such that the body exists in the mind. All 
phenomena of the universe also occur in the mind. The soul is a silent observer of the 
perceptions of the mind—be they the macro phenomena of the universe or micro 
feelings such as pain and pleasure.168    
Individuals are urged to gain knowledge about their material reality in order to 
know the structure of consciousness. The materialist theories and their logical 
positions are evaluated by employing hermeneutical methods and contested by way of 
ratiocination. Such evaluation and contestation help individuals to situate material 
reality as an illustrative convenience to depict the transcendental reality, thereby 
providing a “technical formulation” of reality.169  
 
As a discipline that includes the material ontology of humanity, methods of 
reasoning and logic to evaluate that ontology, semiotic linguistics of a high intellectual 
order, and a heuristic to realize the ultimate reality of humanity, the Law would 
become a methodically organized knowledge which transcends all other disciplines. 
The Law would no longer be a  state of consciousness existing in a social 
consciousness within individuals, but a rich epistemology to meta-evaluate the 
constructs and causes of consciousness and consciousness itself. The Law would no 
longer be a set of doctrines sustaining a social consciousness, but would be a method 
of inquiry that provides a pathology of the social conditions in which humanity exists. 
The Law would no longer be a constituent of sociality, but would be a first step and 
first lesson towards, and the first perception of, transcendental reality. 
And, beyond its existence as a discipline, the Law would no longer be a 
determinant of good and bad, but would be the ultimate and sole standard of conduct 
in the world. The Law has to be the Ultimate Law. The Law is the super-
consciousness.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165The profoundest theories of duality are those of the Samkhya school.  
166 GERALD JAMES LARSON, CLASSICAL SAMKHYA: AN INTERPRETATION OF ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 170 
(1969).  
167 See M. HIRIYANNA, OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 270-71 (1993). In Samkhya tradition soul is called 
purusha and the universe prakriti. 
168 LARSON, supra note 166 at 171.  
169 That material theories (Samkhya) are used to augment the transcendentalist position is evident from Sankara’s 
critique of Samkhya. For the particulars of Sankara’s critique, see id. at 209-33. One “technical formulation” 
of transcendental reality, tempering it against the material reality is the Panchadasi of Vidyaranya (also 
attributed to Bharatitirtha). See SWAMI KRISHNANDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PANCHADASI (1992).  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
 
It has been the contention of this article that the unmanifest self in individuals is 
reality, it is the ultimate truth.170 The unmanifest self is the singular super-
consciousness in everyone. The super-consciousness is the true human condition.  
Individuals remain deluded as along as they deem perceptions of consciousness 
to be reality. Such deluded existence forges “seeming reality”171—such as sociality—
in the eyes of humanity. When individuals become aware of the macro-intelligent 
super-consciousness of which they are a micro-intelligence, the seeming reality is 
eclipsed by a conceptual knowledge of the super-consciousness. The conceptual 
knowledge of the super-consciousness serves as the perennial hypothesis of life. This 
knowledge of reality—and the hypothesis it provides—is the “interactive reality” in 
everyday life.172 Life becomes thus a heuristic process that helps realize the super-
consciousness, the transcendental reality.  
In rendering sociality only a seeming reality—although it takes away all vital 
constituents of sociality such as law from reality—law resurfaces as the ultimate 
guidance for humanity (the Ultimate Law) and as the knowledge that helps in the self-
becoming of humanity (the Law).  
The heuristic nature of life (and the super-consciousness it may lead to) has to be 
taken into account in organizing human life in the world. Deeming the egoistic 
duality—“I” and the “world”—as reality is the cause of social friction and its violent 
spillovers affecting the world. Life has to be lived in pursuit of the reality of life and, 
ultimately with the aim of entering that state of fullness where one sees everyone and 
the entire universe in oneself and oneself in everyone and the entire universe. The 
Brhdaranyaka Upanishad proclaims this very sublime purpose of life as a shift from 
“unreal to real, darkness to light, and death to immortality”.  
This article has tried to describe that concept of human existence which would 
have emerged had the many medieval and modern intellectual projects not influenced 
human thinking and in organizing life in the world. However, in as much as they have 
influenced human thinking and we have developed the social concept of humanity, so 
much the better; as humanity is proud of its intellectual progress, so, too international 
lawyers are proud of international law. Yet, envisaging the human condition as the 
pre-scientific epistemic communities have—in terms of mind techniques and thought 
experiments, and looking inward—might provide a caveat to ponder whether humanity 
has erred on the side of its ontology. If that pondering prompts a few to set off on a 
                                                 
170 In the Chandogya Upanishad the master tells the student: Sa ya esonimaitadmyamidam sarvam tat satyam sa 
atma tat tvam asi svataketo iti (Ch.6) (The Self is the essence of the entire universe, That is the truth, Thou art 
That) (My translation). Chapter 6 of the Chandogya Upanishad where this verse appears is in the form a 
dialogue between Saint Uddlaka and his son Svataketu.  
171 Such an awareness of reality is known as pratibhasika satya. See MICHAEL JAMES, HAPPINESS AND THE ART 
OF BEING 286 (2007).  
172 This awareness of reality is known as vyavaharika satya. Id. Tibetan philosopher Mipam has set apart 
interactive reality from the experience-of-ultimate-reality. He calls the former phenomenological reality, a 
particular perception in which [theoretical] awareness of reality removes any contexts-of-representation from 
the inquirer’s mind. On Mipam’s description of phenomenological reality, See generally Douglas S. 
Duckworth, Two Models of the Two Truths: Ontological and Phenomenological Approaches, 38 J. INDIAN. 
PHIL. (2010).  
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course that will lead them to work for a transcendentally/intellectually united 
humanity, this article will have fulfilled its purpose. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE TRAGEDY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Agnostic about the scientific foundations of international law, this article creates 
a conceptual framework for evaluating the discipline’s design of thought. At the heart 
of the discourse is an awareness that pairings of regimes previously unknown have 
occurred in international law and that the “doctrinal complex” of international law 
has reconciled these pairings by way of an interpretative and rationalist reasoning. 
Sceptical about this act of reconciling, this article subjects the rationalities—common 
interest and market interest—found to be clashing in all the regime pairs to a 
thorough analysis. The objective is to find out if at a deep structural level this pairing 
of rationalities has coherence. The article also demonstrates that common interest and 
market interest, in their rawest form, are socially systematized forms of altruism and 
egoism—deemed to be the perennial poles of human thought—respectively.   
First, the article studies the design of common interest in a two-fold perspective: 
(a) common interest as philosophy, wherein the ethical and moral base on which the 
concept rests is examined, and (b) common interest as doctrines, wherein the article 
analyses the doctrinal and political mould provided for common interest in the ideas 
underpinning international law and politics. The philosophical and doctrinal designs 
are then juxtaposed to illuminate the conceptual reality of common interest. The 
juxtaposition reveals that doctrines have distorted the true concept of common interest 
and that common interest is originally a philosophical concept that urges humanity to 
restructure human thought and intelligence at higher levels of consciousness. Such a 
restructuring would help humanity to discover their existential reality and on the 
strength of such consciousness constitute egalitarian societies—societies where human 
dignity realizes meaning through sentiments such as altruism. 
Second, a similar approach is employed for examining market interest. However, 
the market is viewed first as ideology and then as doctrine. This analysis reveals that 
the reality in the case of market interest is that it is an ideological mindset promoting 
egoism.  
Third, the article sets up a dialogue between the rationalities of common interest 
and market interest. The interaction takes place at two levels. On the first level, the 
reality of both concepts, i.e., common interest as a philosophy and market interest as 
an ideology interact, revealing that the pairing of common interest and market interest 
is theoretically unfounded and has a deleterious effect for humanity. On the second 
level, common interest, as apparent in doctrines, interacts with market interest as 
reflected in doctrine. Here, the pairing is seen to have a harmonious structure. 
Paradoxically, the pairing which is adverse in theory entails harmony in doctrines.   
Thus, examining a simple regime conflict under a microscope, the article reveals 
how deleterious a pairing of rationalities is that otherwise appear to have been 
reconciled by doctrinal reasoning. The findings also suggest that the design of 
doctrinal thought in international law is flawed, so much so that it obscures 
humanity’s true reality from it.    
The article has engineered its discourse in such a way that international law has 
the ontology of humanity and the foundations of human thought in juxtaposition. It is 
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pioneering in a methodological sense in that it has an analytical framework drawn on 
Vedic and Sanskrit epistemology. To augment its arguments the article relies on 
Vedanta and quantum physics.  
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I. INTRODUCTION        
 
International law is a doctrinal complex.1 Doctrinal fetishism is its style of 
reasoning.2 Inward and outward “spiralling” around a doctrinal center is its attitudinal 
                                                 
1 “Doctrinal complex” may well be the Marxian “superstructure”. However, nothing seriously Marxian is 
intended as I employ the concept in this Article.   
2 “Doctrinal fetishism” captures in its meaning a sort of legal reasoning which has a fixated dedication towards 
legal formalism as opposed to any meta theories or transcendental visions regarding law. The reasoning that 
treaties have immanent powers in establishing norms in the international society and that any internal or 
textual modification of a treaty can strengthen the normativity in international law is one example of such 
fetishism. In a broader frame, doctrinal fetishism is a mental posture (one identified by Max Weber) that takes 
“law as given”´. On the Weberian position (though in a different analytical context), see Daniel Bodansky, 
International in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2006). My attribution of the aforesaid 
meanings to doctrinal fetishism is inspired by Lemaitre’s articulation of “legal fetishism”. See Julieta 
Lemaitre, Legal Fetishism at Home and Abroad, 3 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 6 (2007). Lemaitre relates 
the following meaning of “legal fetishism”: “[legal fetishism] is used to describe an excessive attachment to 
the letter of the law in contradiction with logic, convenience and justice” (p.7). Later on, she argues that legal 
fetishism is a mask to hide and reject reality: “what is rejected is the reality of emptiness, the reality of task, 
the lack of intrinsic morality and the value of human qua human” (p.17). These observations capture the anti-
transcendental and anti-philosophical approaches of legal formalists who fetishize doctrines.  
In international law, doctrinal fetishism is a consequence of “state-centrism”—a hope as well as despair 
that international lawyers have to live with, as Marks put it. When a state became the representation of an 
ontological truth, doctrine as a system of belief came to constitute and organize the affairs of the state. On the 
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pattern.3 Rule-based doctrinarism is its structural design.4 Biases,5 sympathies,6 
                                                                                                                                                        
state as an ontological reality, see Sébastien Jodoin, International Law and Alterity: The State and the Other, 
21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2008) (suggests that the “ethics of statehood” should be replaced by “the ethics of 
alterity”). The view that doctrine is a result of state-centrism implies a symbiotic theoretical position according 
to which doctrine is state-centered belief and doctrines hypostatize a state as well as guard it from the evil 
influences of ethics and morals. See generally Susan Marks, State-Centrism, International Law, and the 
Anxieties of Influence, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 339 (2006). But, see ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? A REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
(1986) (argues that a substantial dichotomy exists, in terms of substance as well as method, between the 
concept of state and the doctrines sustaining the concept).    
3 Attitudinal pattern is an intellectual approach evident from the direction that arguments in international law 
generally take. In the spiral analogy employed here, doctrine is the center from which the arguments originate, 
which then spirals outward to an extent which the scholarly orientation of the cognizor permits. The more the 
arguments spiral outward, the more the cognizor distances him- or herself from the doctrines, yet the doctrinal 
essence (the umbilical connection to the center) of the arguments remains. To spiral outward, scholars take 
several standpoints and adopt various rhetorical tools. An extended pattern of argument is inward spiralling 
whereby the arguments make a phenomenal return towards the center upon reaching a certain limit. A piece of 
writing, e.g., a monograph or article, is not necessarily illustrative of the outward and inward spiralling of 
arguments; scholarly lives, even trends associated with an academic chair or institution, can exemplify such a 
pattern.   
To illustrate, an outward spiralling can be inferred from Mälksoo’s instructive presentation on the styles 
of reasoning, arguments, and lives of five Estonian international law professors in the University of 
Dorpat/Iur’ev/Tartu. See Läuri Mälksoo, The Science of International Law and the Concept of Politics: The 
Arguments and Lives of the International Law Professors at the University of Dorpat/Iur’ev/Tartu 1855-1985, 
76 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 383 (2005) (starting from the deeply ingrained positivist convictions of August von 
Bulmerincq and Carl Bergbohm, who believed in the strict separation of law and politics, the arguments spiral 
outward through Vladimir Hrabar’s recognition that “law has to be close to the facts” (Id. at 460) and arrive at 
Ants Piip’s assertion that politics is an essential element of international law and Abner Uustal’s conceiving 
international law within an ideological frame). Although the arguments appear to be only on a continuing 
outward spiral, one receding from the doctrinal center (positivism), a nuanced reading of the arguments of 
these professors provides, says Mälksoo, a “story of ruptures and discontinuities, beneath the great continuity” 
(Id. at 498).   
On balance, international legal discourse and the attitude of its scholars and professionals, amid all the 
critical and new streams, have a spiralling pattern. Breaking the doctrinal/spiralling pattern renders any 
thought devoid of a pattern/design and nomadic; an alternative pattern becomes necessary. Scope for 
alternative modes of reasoning is apparent from C.G. WEERAMANTRY, THE LORD’S PRAYER: BRIDGE TO A 
BETTER WORLD (1998) (provides spiritual visions for a personal and global transformation). See also PHILIP 
ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD (1990). But, see Philip Allott, The Concept of 
International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31 (1999) (optimistic that international law in its modern form can find 
a place within his own transcendental vision).   
As regards the spiral pattern, I am not the first to employ it as a metaphor in the context of international 
law. Korhonen employed a spiral metaphor when articulating that scholarly rationality circles inward and 
outward, as if in a spiral, over three postmodern sensibilities which she metonymically calls “tragedy”, 
“fortress” and “cave”. See Outi Korhonen, New International Law: Silence, Defense or Deliverance, 7 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1995).   
Finally, perceiving spiralling as the attitudinal pattern of international law does not invade or contradict 
the “oscillating pattern” identified by Koskenniemi in From Apology to Utopia. His way of looking at things 
captures a pattern of arguments within the doctrinal world of international law—an inside story—and is a 
standpoint in the outward spiralling of arguments. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: 
THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS (2005).     
4 This position is hard fought and has been hard won by the scholars of international law from a jurisprudential, 
doctrinal configuration put together by Hart (rules) and Dworkin (principles and interpretation). For a succinct 
account in a densely populated area of scholarly research that leaves room to understand how and to what 
extent the doctrinal conception of law is shaped by the debate between Hart and Dworkin, see Michael Bayles, 
Hart vs. Dworkin, 10 L. & PHIL. 349 (1991).   
5 Biases are conceptual and ideational inclinations towards what Hoffman calls “background conceptions” of the 
times of yore. Conceptually, biases are belief-systems on the basis of which international legal discourse 
operates and legal machinery functions; e.g., reliance on precedents is one mode by which past concepts 
become biases and afterwards become systematized as belief-systems. The present rule-based international 
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constitutive approaches, resistance to criticism, all such attitudes and actions have a 
doctrinal flavour and content in international law. International law is taught 
doctrinally.7 Its sources are doctrinal.8 It maintains its structural coherence by means 
of doctrines.9 International offices work under austere doctrinal formalism.10 
                                                                                                                                                        
legal system bares heavy traces of past concepts. On how biases have crept into international legal discourse 
from background conceptions, see Geoffrey Hoffman, Critique, Culture, and Commitment: The Dangerous 
and Counterproductive Paths of International Legal Discourse, 29 NOVA L. REV. 211 (2005).   
6 Sympathy is a social presumption derived from a socio-cultural hierarchy existing in international society. 
International law uses an empathetic approach to safeguard and protect the creamy layer of the hierarchy or 
any other vulnerable group by means of its doctrine-centered, rule-based architecture. Doctrinal reasoning 
exemplifies that empathetic approach of international law. For support, see Note, Sympathy as a Legal 
Structure, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1961 (1992) (situating sympathy in legal and judicial reasoning); Lynne N. 
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).   
7 A typical discourse in a public international law classroom has a preset pattern in which students are taught 
from day one to be sceptical as to the legality of international law (for want of certain doctrinal attributes) 
every time they grapple with an international issue. The classroom discourse thus presents the conception of 
an enigmatic doctrinal complex consisting of a panoply of institutions, rules, normative semi-structures, 
methodically shelved principles, and [quasi-] judicial architectures. The pill for every international problem is 
concealed somewhere inside the complex—to be found beneath the structured prose of treaty clauses or to be 
derived from the reasoning of judges. Classrooms cast students into a doctrinal mould such that they remain 
insulated for rest of their lives from any other pattern of reasoning. See generally Gerry Simpson, On the 
Magic Mountain: Teaching Public International Law, 10 EUR. J.  INT’L L. 70 (1999) (provides an appraisal of 
the types of instructions existing in international law—doctrinal, theoretic, and political—and proposes a new 
type of “teaching contexts”). This being the typical international law classroom, many law schools in the 
United States have started to use economic approaches to validate the structural designs of international 
institutions and explain the behavior of various international actors.    
8 Virtually every “source discourse”, mostly cast as “source doctrine”, in international law draws on Article 38 
(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. For details on the sources of international law, see IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998). However, the normative complex of Article 
38 (1), which comprises treaties, international custom, and general principles of law, if critically 
conceptualized, will turn out to be a figment that helps international lawyers dispel the scepticism that 
international law is a meta phenomenon. As Koskenniemi states in a similar vein, “It [sources] tells the lawyer 
where can he find the law in an objective fashion”. See Koskenniemi, supra note 3 at 303. On the many 
rhetorical moves within the source doctrine, see David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. 
J.INT’L L, & POL’Y 1 (1987) (“Source doctrine is a quite well worked out argumentative practice about the 
authority or “binding nature” of various legal instruments”. Id. at 20). A similar radical pattern can be seen in 
Koskenniemi, id at 303-87 (every discourse/practice on source doctrine swings between the binaries of 
“consent” and “justice”).    
A concept such as “equity”, which is deemed as casting the grace of “justice” and fairness on law, is also 
a positivistic source doctrine in international law. See Anastasios Gourgournis, Delineating the Normativity of 
Equity in International Law, 11 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 327 (2009). But, see generally Thomas M Franck, 
Equity in International Law, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-61 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, ed., 
1995) (illustrates that equity acts as a solvent ensuring fairness in every doctrine of international law).  
9 The response of the International Law Commission (ILC) to the issue of fragmentation of international law is 
noteworthy in this context. In its report on fragmentation submitted during the chairmanship of Martti 
Koskenniemi, the ILC dealt with a clash between the doctrines of lex specialis and lex generalis, certain 
questions regarding treaty applications, and doctrinal hierarchy in international law. See Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, REPORT 
OF THE STUDY GROUP OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). For 
scholarly responses, see Anne van Aaken, Defragmentation of Public International Law Through 
Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal, 16 IND. J.  GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 483 (2009) (develops a 
hermeneutical model for defragmentation which has to address norm conflict by an act of “balancing” at the 
level of principles); Christian Leathley, Note: An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportunity?, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259 (2007) (provides a 
design for a “judicial hierarchy” in a fragmented international legal system); Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm 
Conflict in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27 (2005); For a 
perspective on fragmentation, see Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007), (fragmentation has a 
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International settlement of disputes is a doctrinal reconciliation.11 Growth of 
international law is measured in terms of the expansion of doctrines12 and international 
law is said to be dynamic when social changes are contained by way of the creation of 
new doctrines or modification of existing ones.13 Doctrinal inadequacy causes 
international law to be “in crisis” and doctrinal adaptations overcome such crisis.14  
The doctrinal complex is, however, a fragile architecture; any perturbation in the 
global environment shakes and disturbs the order of this complex of international 
law.15 Ideational pressures, high-impact global events, or social movements can cause 
perturbation.16 Symptomatic of a perturbed state are inter alia a loss of centrifugal 
force severing its components from international law, defaulting and schizophrenic 
principles, unspecified actors, and most prominently, “disparate rationalities”. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
utility-purpose for the powerful states in that it increases transaction costs for smaller countries); Martti 
Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 553 (2002). 
10 For details on such “executive international law”, see, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: 
The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 633 (1962); Hans Corell, The Role of 
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 358 (1991); Michael K. Young, The Role of 
the Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Department of State: Institutional Arrangements and Structural Imperatives, 
16 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1998) (presents the outcome of an empirical study on the policy overlap in the 
routine doctrinal work of attorney-advisers); Sir Ian Sinclair, The Practice of International Law: The Foreign 
and Common Wealth Office, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 117-34 (Bin Cheng, ed. 
1982). But, see Koskenniemi, supra note 3 (proposes a reflective community of international lawyers which 
pools socio-political knowledge in its doctrinal routines).  
11 Koskenniemi goes a step further and demonstrates the predicament faced by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) (and the emptiness/subjectiveness of its sovereignty doctrine) when both parties to the dispute in the 
Right of Passage Case (1960) based their claims on the same doctrine. See Koskenniemi, supra note 3 at 208-
09.         
12 It is a general conception that international law develops “through the restatement of existing rules or through 
the formulation of new rules”. See THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (6th Edition, 2004). 
The view that the development of international law is tantamount to the expansion of doctrines is apparent 
from the writings of early international law scholars. See e.g., Editorial Comment: Pitman B. Potter, The 
Future of International Law, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 632 (1943) (“changes in the procedure for international 
legislation are needed, in its formulation …, and in its enforcement” for strengthening international law). In 
addition, source doctrine also has played a major role in the development of international law. See Harlan 
Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 74-85 
(2007).  
13 In the aftermath of decolonization, with the emergence of the Asian and African states, international law met 
with the challenge of accommodating the claims and interests of the new states. The primary aim was to 
inscribe their rights in a legal instrument or, at the minimum, formalize their claims. For a summary of this 
trend, see Maurice Flory, Adapting International Law to the Development of the Third World, 26 J. AFR. L. 12 
(1982). The post-decolonization period also witnessed the sprouting of new doctrines such as the principles of 
the common heritage of mankind, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and sustainable development. 
This process as a whole was depicted as a sign of the dynamism of international law. 
14 The regulatory challenges posed by globalization and the legal adaptation to them through buffering 
mechanisms such as new rules, institutions, and rational strategies exemplify the doctrinal response and 
adaptation to crisis.  
15 This observation is derived from Teubner’s autopoietic theory of law (law is self-regulating). See generally, 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993). Evaluating the autopoietic theory, King writes: 
“In the language of autopoietic theory, a perturbation in the social environment which enters the meaning 
system of law creates a structural coupling at the point of perturbation between law and any other systems, 
both social and psychic, involved in generating the perturbation” (original emphasis). See Michael King, The 
‘Truth’ about Autopoiesis, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 218, 225(1993). For a criticism of Teubner’s version of 
perturbation, see Review Article: Anthony Beck, Is Law an Autopoietic System?, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
401, 411-12, 417 (1994).    
16 Such an influential social movement is depicted in BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
BELOW: DEVELOPMENTS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003).  
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concept of disparate rationalities serves as an analytical springboard for this article. I 
will return to the import and niceties of disparate rationalities shortly. For the moment, 
suffice it to say that disparate rationalities manifest in international law as pairing of 
regimes hitherto unknown or considered improbable:17 Among the simplest pairs are 
environment and trade, the regimes of oceans and outer space and trade, human 
security and trade, and so on.18 To continue, to counter any perturbation the doctrinal 
complex has an auto-response system19 which works by way of a set of interconnected 
doctrinal moves that reinstate the order of the complex through scholarly interpretative 
manoeuvres reinterpreting old doctrines or through new methods to practice those 
doctrines and thereby provide new meanings and contextuality.20   
This Article proceeds on the basis of a conviction that disparate rationalities 
(together with other symptoms) have come to exist in international law, implying that 
the doctrinal complex of international law is in a crisis. However, the auto-response 
system of the complex has mediated and harmonized the disparate rationalities by 
establishing new institutional frameworks and by implanting new discourses.21 This is 
notwithstanding that the existential logic of the institutions in which disparate 
rationalities are harmonized has been a puzzle for many scholars and the activities of 
such institutions mistrustful for various global actors. Yet, the system/complex has 
adapted to disparate rationalities by a process of validation. Validation has been 
accomplished through three modes: first, by situating the disparate rationality as a 
significant element of a larger social transformation; second, by linking the institution 
within which the disparate rationalities are mediated to the doctrinal complex of 
international law; and third, attributing to them the character of a hegemonic scheme 
whereby they are objects of criticism.22 In the third case, ironically, the fact that 
disparate rationalities are phenomena worthy of criticism and of resistance is what 
provides validation. On balance, the doctrinal complex, by grappling with the disparate 
rationalities, has demonstrated a self-constitutive process by which it can persevere 
against societal transformations and turbulences.   
Having validated the disparate rationalities, the effectiveness of the doctrinal 
complex in the post-adaptation/post-perturbation phase is being tested in terms of the 
utility and functionality of the complex in the changed circumstances. Disparate 
rationalities are set on course for a “norm status”. Once become norms, their norm 
                                                 
17 See Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS. INT’L L. J. 61, 82 
(2005) (asserts that disparate rationalities are side effects of fragmentation; “fragmentation pits particular 
rationalities against each other”).  
18 Id. However, this Article considers the above examples as only discursive frameworks within which 
rationalities exist. Every such framework is composed of certain sets of doctrines, precepts, beliefs, methods, 
ideas, and ethics, a collective systematic understanding and cognitive reflection of which represent 
“rationality”. For a related view, see Alexandra Khrebtukova, A Call to Freedom: Towards, a Philosophy of 
International Law in an Era of Fragmentation, 4 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 51 (2008) (argues that regimes are 
social reality writ large: “the regime does not hold views about a bounded issue, it hold views about the 
world”. Id at 62.).  
19 For support, see generally TEUBNER, supra note 15.  
20 An example of this type of salvaging is the rational approach to customary international law. See infra Section 
III.B.1.  
21 See Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J. 
INT’L REL. 395, 413 (2009).  
22 These doctrinal acts of validating the disparate pairing of rationalities are illustrated later in this Article. See 
Infra Section IV.B. 
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status would liberate disparate rationalities from any further need for validations. 
Being on a course to normativity, disparate rationalities are continually subject to 
evaluation which, however, is by means of the much habituated interpretative—as well 
as the very much in fashion “rationalist”—reasoning focused on the many doctrines of 
the complex. What might be the result if disparate rationalities were subjected to a 
theoretical analysis? By theoretical analysis what I mean is not to scrutinize the 
normative base of disparate rationalities, but to inquire into the “philosophical 
composition”23 of a disparate rationality by delving into each of its component 
rationalities. If the two rationalities that form a disparate pair are juxtaposed on the 
basis of their theoretical composition, would it generate a different dialogue and have a 
different socio-political, even ontological, meaning than what doctrinal/rationalist 
interpretation provides? Would such an analysis then inspire the creation of alternative 
methods and models to analyse the utility and effectiveness of contemporary thought 
in international law, may be a totally new way to perceive the functions and purpose of 
international law?  
As said, the disparate pairing of rationalities has manifested itself in the 
conceptual landscape of international law as regime-parings; for example regimes 
focusing on securing or promoting the common interest of peoples/humanity such as 
the environment regime or the regime for outer space or regime for oceans, have 
paired with the trade regime promoting market interests.24 Common interest and 
market interest are thus the mindsets seen in these regimes; these mindsets represent 
rationalities. In each of these regime-pairings one could witness these two rationalities 
clashing. Hence, what makes a pairing disparate is the coupling of incompatible 
rationalities, common interest and market interest.    
   International law scholarship is resplendent with analyses mediating between 
the dichotomous poles of any two regimes forming a pair and the chaos such a pairing 
has created. However, no exclusive analysis of the polarities between the mindsets 
powering the conflicting regimes has hitherto been undertaken. To fill that gap being 
one purpose of this Article, it departs from analysing the conflict specific to any two 
regimes and adopts a broader perspective on disparity. Indeed, the main objective of 
the Article is to examine the dialectic and dialogical impact of the two underlying 
rationalities—common interest and market interest—and not that of two regimes or 
any one or a few type/types of doctrines related to common interest and market interest 
within given regimes. If a single doctrine or set of doctrines were taken for 
examination, only the contextual dynamics of that/those doctrine/s could be examined, 
which would be too constricted for an evaluation of the doctrinal complex of 
international law.  
Hence, both rationalities—common interest and market interest—are studied as 
separate but interrelated collectivities comprising principles, precepts, beliefs, 
                                                 
23 On the meaning of “philosophical composition”, see supra note 18.  
24 See Koskenniemi, supra note 17. Trade (market interest) is present in every pairing. In fact, the pairing of 
other rationalities with trade is what renders the pairings disparate. The logic of this invasion by the trade 
related rationality into every other rationality is articulated later this Article. See infra Section III.A.    
The concept of “market interest” discussed throughout this Article pertains to the liberal free market with 
its emphasizes on “individualism”; at times, however, I take a broader view of the market in order that certain 
basic features common to all forms of the market are taken into account. I use the expressions “market 
interest”, “market rationality” and “market mindset” interchangeably.   
 7
methods, and ethics. The essentiality of each collectivity is explored with the aid of 
various philosophical tools in order to ascertain its epistemological meaning, which I 
refer to it as its “reality perception”. Once we establish the perceptions of reality 
rooted in common interest and market interest, we can test if they correspond to each 
other. If they are disparate, then reconciliation of conflicting regimes by the doctrinal 
complex is only a “surface healing”. In that case, one has valid grounds to be sceptical 
about the entire survival mechanism (adaptability) of the doctrinal complex, and the 
more so about the functional and existential logic of the complex itself.       
The selection of the pairing of common interest and market interest for analysis 
has a higher analytical utility and ambition than I have hitherto provided. Above, I 
have asserted that common interest and market interest are not two principles of 
international law, but are simply two underlying mindsets of substantial social and 
moral import. In other words, every disparate paring of regimes manifested in 
international law has in it the mindsets of common interest and market interest 
conflicting against each other.25 However, a philosophical journey into common 
interest and market interest reveals that these mindsets are in fact socially systematized 
forms of two micro rationalities—altruism and egoism respectively. Altruism and 
egoism have been regarded as the perennial poles of human thought ever since 
humanity began to systematically conceive any forms of thought—philosophical, 
political, social, legal, or economic. With such an awareness, when I place the thought-
structure of international law within the clash between common interest and market 
interest, I gain an analytical framework in which the dialectic of international law can 
be viewed in the context of the structure and dialectic of human thought.  
In the spirit of its analytical ambition, this Article defines doctrines in a 
comprehensive manner (and later on verifies that definition as ideal) in order that the 
present design of thought in international law falls into the category of doctrine. 
Accordingly, the idea of doctrine employed in this Article has a triple meaning, each 
an extension of the other. The first is a narrow meaning: It is narrow when it is 
attributed specificity, that is to say, the concept is isolated from its multi-contextual 
dictionary meaning (religious doctrine etc.) and limited to doctrines in the context of 
law, or “legal doctrine”. In this approach, doctrine is simply “a rule or principle of 
law”26 including treaties, customary law, etc. Second, doctrines are seen in a broad 
sense to include the positive legal framework espoused by the mainstream in 
international law which, in addition to rules and principles, includes diplomatic 
correspondence, government policies, organizational strategies, functional and 
methodological standards, etc.27 Any reference to doctrine vis-à-vis the doctrinal 
complex of international law has this meaning. Third, doctrine in its broadest sense 
means a discourse prompted by a subconscious psychological loyalty to certain 
sentiments embedded in the agents’ mind and a collective observance of the ideals 
                                                 
25 Those clashes that do not represent these two elements may be called “structural clashes”. Structural clash 
does not represent the clash between any “interrelated collectivity” of rationalities. To illustrate, a clash 
between two provisions of a treaty as to the question of which one prevails over the other is a structural clash. 
26 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 4th Edition. An insightful representation 
of a rule-family can be found in Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 956, 960-68 (1995) 
(considers that the basis of delineation of rules into a family is the legal act of interpretation). 
27 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 26.  
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resulting from such discourse.28 Under this definition doctrine is a mindset 
perpetuating personal/group interest, as opposed to any common interest of humanity, 
and thus represents egoism. This idea is related to the second meaning of doctrine in 
such a way that when the doctrinal complex functions, it presumably generates 
egoism. It is this third meaning of doctrine that I have employed in the many analyses 
in this Article. However, convolutions, if any, have to wither, and as will be apparent, 
these definitions are only a basis for the discourse and means of delineating a concept 
of doctrine.29 As the discourse proceeds through many analytical routes, a clear and 
articulate concept of doctrine takes form and its nature comes to light. In its simplest 
sense, doctrine in this Article refers to the current pattern of thought in international 
law,30 and not necessarily, as generally understood, rules and principles, etc. 
This analytical setting of this Article posits certain schools and streams of 
thought, revolting against the complex, which have lodged claims of being anti-
doctrinal and reformative in stance, as engendering the same [egoistic] effects as the 
doctrinal complex.31 In the broader analytical framework of this Article, their claims 
                                                 
28  This idea of doctrine is inspired by Unger’s conception of doctrine. While constraining his conception of legal 
doctrine to fit within his views regarding formalism, Unger defines legal doctrine as related to “[a] form of 
conceptual practice that combines two characteristics: the willingness to work from the institutionally defined 
materials of a given collective tradition and the claim to speak authoritatively within this tradition …”. See 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). My claim 
that doctrines have an expansive (also multiple) meaning finds endorsement in A. Peczenik, Scientia Juris: 
Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law, in A TREATISE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND 
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE VOL.4 8 (E. Pattoaro, ed. 2005).   
29 See infra Section II.C. (The Concept of Doctrine).  
30 The definition of international law provided by Kennedy—that the discipline is a sum total of the 
“sensibilities”, “viewpoints” and “mission”—is doubtlessly tantamount to deeming the current pattern of 
thought in international law to be doctrine. For Kennedy, international law is what is discernible from its 
thought structure:  
Their [international law professionals] disciplinary consciousness or lexicon is composed 
of typical problems, a stock of understood solutions, a vocabulary for evaluating new ideas, 
a sense about their own history and a way of looking at the world. They launch projects of 
criticism and reform within and against this professional vocabulary.  
David Kennedy, My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in International Law?, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 104, 
104 (2000).  
31 A new stream of anti-doctrinal reasoning has been initiated by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS), which 
examines law culturally, linguistically, and rationally. For rigorous CLS analyses of international law, see 
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); Koskenniemi, supra note 3. For an overview 
of CLS, see Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 81 (1991).  
There have emerged many critical groups, declaring their allegiance to CLS and claiming to have anti-
doctrinal approaches and methods, e.g., feminist theories (examine the extent to which international law has 
been skewed by the historical narratives of men); Third World approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
(hold that contemporary international legal structure marginalizes the Third World countries and peoples. 
TWAIL’s assumptions are borrowed from subaltern studies); International Legal Process (a method to monitor 
and study the process and application of international law, which is more “reformist” and less “deconstructive” 
in nature); and “Law and …” (an interdisciplinary approach whereby ideas and concepts are drawn on 
neighbouring disciplines, e.g., economics and international relations, to examine the utility of law). Although 
the tenets and methods of most of the new streams overlap, all of them fairly resist the dogmatic composition 
of international law. On feminist theories applied to the analysis of international law, see, e.g., Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 613 (1991); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379 (1999) 
(from a humanitarian law standpoint). On TWAIL, see e.g., RAJAGOPAL, supra note 16; On International 
Legal Process, see Mary Ellen O’Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334 (1999) et 
seq; “On law and …”, see Annie Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International Law 
and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 
367 (1998) (provide a methodological perspective on a combined IL/IR scholarship). et seq. For a thumbnail 
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are shown to be misguided, establishing that many critical, new streams of thought in 
international law only serve the doctrinal complex instead of providing alternative 
structures.            
In part II, the Article studies the design of the idea of common interest in a two-
fold perspective: (a) common interest as philosophy, wherein the ethical and moral 
base on which the concept rests is examined, and (b) common interest as doctrines, 
wherein the Article analyses the doctrinal and political mould provided for common 
interest in the ideas underpinning international law and politics. The broad definition 
of doctrine positions discourses such as Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) and global governance within the province of doctrines and thus within the 
analytical range of this Article. The philosophical and doctrinal designs are then 
juxtaposed to illuminate the conceptual reality of common interest. The juxtaposition 
reveals that doctrines have distorted the true concept of common interest and common 
interest is originally a philosophical concept that urges humanity to restructure human 
thought and intelligence at higher levels of consciousness. Such a restructuring would 
help humanity to sense their existential reality and founded on such consciousness 
constitute egalitarian societies—societies where human dignity realizes meaning 
through sentiments such as altruism. 
In part III, a similar approach is employed for examining market interest. 
However, the market is viewed first as ideology and then as doctrines. In this part of 
the Article, the “Economic Analysis of International Law” is positioned as a doctrinal 
discourse and shown to be as an incomplete approach which misleads humanity from 
its reality. This analysis informs that the reality in the case of market interest is that it 
is an ideological mindset that promotes egoism.  
 In part IV, the Article sets up a dialogue between the rationalities of common 
interest and market interest. The interaction takes place at two levels (See Table 1). On 
the first level, between what has come out as the reality of both concepts, i.e., common 
interest as a philosophy and market interest as an ideology interact, revealing that the 
pairing of common interest and market interest is theoretically unfounded and has a 
deleterious effect for humanity. On the second level, common interest, as apparent in 
doctrines, interacts with market interest as in doctrine. Here, the pairing is seen to have 
a harmonious structure. Paradoxically, the pairing which is adverse in theory entails 
harmony in doctrines.   
Thus, having a simple regime-conflict on a microscopic magnification, the 
Article reveals how deleterious is a pairing of rationalities that otherwise appear to 
have been reconciled by doctrinal reasoning. The findings also suggest that the design 
of doctrinal thought in international law is flawed, so much so that it obscures its true 
reality from humanity. In the conclusion the Article explains the relevance, scope, and 
purpose of the analysis for the future of humanity.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
view of the many new streams of thought, see Anne Peters, There is Nothing more Practical than a Good 
Theory: An Overview of Contemporary Approaches to International Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 25 
(2002).  
For a review of the architectonics and rhetoric of CLS, see J. Paul Oetken, Form and Substance in Critical 
Legal Studies, 100 YALE L. J. 2209 (1991) (presents the criticism that the contradictions CLS claims to be 
present in liberal theory and structures are manifested in CLS as well).  
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(altruism) 
Market Interest 
(egoism) 
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 Doctrine                                       Doctrine 
      
 TABLE 1 
 
The Article deviates from the bounds of conventional inquiry—it tests “is” 
against “ought”, employs the analytical methods of Vedic metaphysics, relies on 
quantum physics, invades meanings deeply ingrained in concepts, and engineers its 
discourse in such a way that international law has the ontology of humanity and the 
foundations of human thought in juxtaposition.  
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF COMMON INTEREST  
 
The term “common interest” does not have a definite denotation. It in general 
refers to concepts which serve the interests of all peoples; the same spirit of the term is 
also relayed through other terms with minor nuances such as “common good”,32 
“general will”,33 “general interest” or “public interest”,34 “collective will,”35 and so on 
and so forth. Scholars select the germane term on the basis of their scholastic motives 
and orientations. Two facets of the idea of common interest are generally apparent, 
first that of a philosophical idea, and second of doctrines, the latter being more obvious 
and is amply available in contemporary legal, social, and political literature, whereas 
the former lies buried mostly in ethical and transcendental wisdom. This part of the 
Article examines the structure of the idea of common interest, first as philosophy and 
then as a legal and political doctrine.  
 
A. Common Interest as Philosophy  
 
If modernity is recognized as a tradition, or as a minimum post-tradition, then the 
distance between modernity and what we originally understand as tradition is not far.36 
                                                 
32 See e.g., B.J. Diggs, The Common Good as Reason for Political Action, 83 ETHICS 283 (1973) (common good 
is achieved when interests of all persons are fairly and equitably served. Id. at 291.).  
33 Analyses of the term “general will” often associate the term with Rousseau. For instance, see John A. Clark, 
The Definition of the General Will, 53 ETHICS 79 (1943) (asserts that “[g]eneral will is a common interest and 
purpose actually present in each individual and developed to the degree that each, in consideration to his 
relationship to the rest, sees clearly wherein his own advantage lies”. Id. at 86.). Another study drawing on 
Rousseau’s conception of general will is Gopal Sreenivasan, What is the General Will?, 109 PHIL. REV. 545 
(2000).   
34 The term “general interest” or “public interest” (used synonymously) is generally seen in procedural law, 
where the term is used in an implied mode, without specifying its theoretical essence, in order to assert certain 
doctrinal aspects of the legal/judicial process.     
35 See Brij Lal Sharma, Authority and Obedience in Vedanta, 46 INT’L J. ETHICS 350 (1936) (“The collective will 
is the will of a group of people”). Id. at 361. Sharma holds that the collective will could be in conformity with 
or in conflict with the universal will—God’s will—and that collective will is a variable which determines 
individual will vis-à-vis the universal will. Id.        
36 The oeuvres of German philosopher Dieter Henrich, who follows in the footsteps of German idealism, which 
commanded a “return to subjectivity” in philosophy, is an example of the perspective “modernity as post-
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It is the belief that the ideas governing modernity are designed by a “critical-
hermeneutic attitude towards tradition”.37 That being the idea of ideas governing the 
world, the contemporary legal and political thought might be a critical derivative of 
tradition.38 Vesting faith in the constitutive power of tradition, in the context of 
common interest, takes one to the foundational belief of every socio-religious tradition 
that humanity has one common goal, tersely transmitted as “realization of one’s 
reality”, removing the aesthetic tinge of which makes the belief a persisting self-
evaluative social question “Who am I?”.39        
Most religious tradition considers the quest for reality (who am I?) as the singular 
goal for humankind, and in that way its only interest should lie in bringing about their 
reality. At this point, I must caution the reader that, speaking of religious tradition, I 
refer to a sort of ethical epistemology having roots in metaphysics, didacticism, and 
transcendental logic.40 The idea of religion employed in this Article is far from that of 
any organized faith-system.41 In other words, I talk about religion with the same spirit 
and attitude as when one talks about any other branch of knowledge, for example, 
civics, mathematics, or psychiatry. To continue, among the many religious teachings, 
Hindu philosophy deviates slightly from its counterparts42 in directly addressing the 
question “who am I?” and providing a method of inquiry to explore it. Hence, I mostly 
use Hindu philosophy to highlight the philosophical meaning of common interest. 
Another reason for drawing predominantly on Hindu philosophy is its metaphysical 
and subjective anchoring, which complements the Article’s scepticism towards the 
undue faith in reason and material empiricism apparent in the philosophy underlying 
contemporary international law. My reason for excluding non-Hindu wisdom is not to 
be presumptuous by relying authoritatively on those religions about which I am 
meagrely-informed, although it is highly probable that a non-Hindu analytical route 
and religious precepts would also yield the same conclusions as I have for this study.     
                                                                                                                                                        
tradition”. For an instructive account, See generally DIETER FREUNDLIEB, DIETER HENRICH AND 
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY: THE RETURN TO SUBJECTIVITY (2003). My hazy view of the relationship 
between tradition and modernity was clarified by the review article Gabriel A. Almond, Marvin Chodorow & 
Roy Harvey Pearce, What has Happened to the Idea of Progress?, 13 CONTEMP. SOC. 132, 132 (1984).   
37 Almond, Chodorow & Pearce, supra note 36 (“critical-hermeneutic attitude” is one among the three attitudes 
towards tradition). 
38 Tradition in this context comprises ideas of the pre-Enlightenment period, mostly metaphysical and 
transcendental, which are often criticized for their value-load by the Enlightenment thinkers.   
39 “Self” as a theme has transcended the borders of social psychology and philosophy and recently become a line 
of research in international law, a discipline which had been considered as a positive science since the late 
nineteenth century.  
40 See J.N. Mohanty, The Structure of the Religious World, 37 SOPHIA 103, 113-15 (1998) (clarifies that religion 
is religiosity: an ontological inquiry into human reality—“a profanity”—by stimulating the aesthetic faculties 
of mind).   
41 Such a focus, however, does not disregard the reformatory scope of organized faith. See e.g., Book Review: 
William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746-1749 (2003) (holds that an 
interaction between religious faith and law is at the heart of being a good Christian and good legal theorist). 
42 Islam, for instance, prescribes that devout faith in God is the path to happiness and well-being. Instead of 
treading an ontological route, individuals have to seek God by leading a pious and virtuous life. For an 
insightful account on Islam, see S.A. NOGOSIAN, ISLAM: ITS HISTORY, TEACHING, AND PRACTICES (2004) 
(“Humans are called only to believe and to submit”. Id. at 96).  
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 The Advaita Vedanta (non-dualism) (hereinafter “Advaita”) philosophy43 of 
Hinduism posits that a certain “veil of illusion”44 has placed the human reality beyond 
the limited cognitive power human beings have and that individuals should strive to 
bring about that veiled reality45. In a similar vein, Buddhist thought considers 
discovering the truths about life as the “most cherished” goal for humankind;46 this is 
the state which Buddhist scriptures refer to as Nirvana. The goal varies with minor 
subtleties from religion to religion on the basis of their epistemological foundation and 
the faith-system each has prescribed, although every religion focuses on an ultimate 
infinite reality. In addition to providing goals, religious traditions have laid down the 
processes for reaching the goals. One assumption that could be made at this point is 
that it is such processes geared towards a common goal which generate common 
interest among individuals. In other words, a common interest emerges when a group 
of individuals pursues a common goal. Uniquely, Hinduism requires relinquishing all 
worldly interests if the ultimate goal is to be reached. This view renders any interest, 
and for that matter common interest, a misnomer. What then is the common interest in 
the Hindu context? In the following, I demonstrate that it specifies solidarity, which 
incurs fraternity and a sense of oneness, factors which lead to social harmony. This 
demonstration reveals that a set of egoistic individuals pursuing a common goal 
exemplifies only an assortment of personal interests and not a common interest. What 
follows is a succinct account of the method to bring about the true reality of 
humankind which involves the ascension of reason to higher levels, a state at which a 
common interest is generated.  
                                                 
43 Advaita Vedanta is a pantheistic philosophy, propounded by Adi Sankara, asserting that the universe and all 
beings are manifestations of “Brahman”, who/which is the ultimate infinite reality. In Its human manifestation, 
Brahman is normally unidentifiable because of a veiling property called “Maya”, which creates a dualism 
between the human (scripturally known as “atman”) and the Brahman immanent in every human being. See 
CYBELLE SHATTUCK, HINDUISM (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.56, 58. See also OLIVER LEAMAN, KEY 
CONCEPTS IN EASTERN PHILOSOPHY 4-8 (1999). 
44 Brahman has a veiling property (maya), which hides the Brahman inherent in every being. Maya is also 
depicted as ignorance, ignorance of the nonduality between Brahman and the Self. See LEAMAN, supra note 43 
at 7; S, Radhakrishnan, The Vedanta Philosophy and the Doctrine of Maya, 24 INT’L J. ETHICS 431 (1914).  
45 The human mind, according to Hindu psychology, is a “mind-stuff” comprising faculty (manas), intelligence 
(budhi), ego (ahamkara), and a mental store-house (chitta). Every object is perceived by the mind, which 
stands between the Brahman/Atman/Self and the object under perception, transmitting the form and meaning 
of the object to the Self. This human mental structure is what I refer to above as the “limited cognitive power” 
of human beings. See SWAMI AKHILANANDA, HINDU PSYCHOLOGY 29 (2001). However, individuals can 
surpass the limited power of their cognition by detaching the mind structure from the object and the Self. Once 
detached, the mind structure does not transmit images of any of the worldly passions to the Self. Detachment 
of the mind, however, does not mean an end to the material world; rather it is a state which helps the Self to 
judge the material world and its processes by way of an inner higher faculty. When this state comes into 
existence, individuals are said to have realized their reality. Detachment of the mind structure from the worldly 
objects can be accomplished through various “Yogas”. See James H. Leuba, The Yoga System of Mental 
Concentration and Religious Mysticism, 16 J. PHIL., PSYCHOL., & SCI. METHODS 197, 198, 199 (1919). 
46 BRADLEY K. HAWKINS, BUDDHISM (1999), p.64 (“From the Buddha’s point of view, the most important way 
to employ one’s incarnation as a human being, itself a very rare event, was to strive for Enlightenment”, Id. at 
65).  
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Hinduism lays down three methods to realize the ultimate goal:47 a) knowledge, 
b) selfless service, and c) devotion. Relevant methods are prescribed for the seekers on 
the basis of their “temperaments and mental capacities”.48 What masks the reality from 
individuals is ignorance of the reality, thereby rendering mind a phenomenon of 
limited cognitive power, a state similar to what Kant lamented as being the peculiar 
fate of human reason.49 Hindu psychology considers the limit of cognition as due to 
the element of ego present in every “mental operation”.50 Kant, however, disappointed 
by the limits of reason, retreated “as if frightened by its [reality’s] stupendousness”.51 
At this point Hinduism transcends the Kantian notion that “intuition is confined to 
sense perceptions”52 and the bounds of time and space, and teaches how reason can 
escape confinement. However, reason that escapes the sense-time-space framework, 
unlike in the Kantian scheme, is not simply a cognitive process, but a multi-channelled 
process involving learning, action, meditation,53 and devotion,54 which can be pursued 
either in combination or separately. Irrespective of the process the seekers opt for, it 
triggers the ascension of human reason to transcendental planes at which the mind can 
perceive reality.  
The ascension of reason is possible only when the mind is detached from the 
material world, for in a state where mind is attached to the material world, it sees the 
world through the ego, whereupon everything to be perceived in terms of plurality and 
duality of sorts.55 The detachment of mind from the material world should be the first 
step in the heightening of reason,56 as aptly echoed by Purushottama Bilimoria “If one 
could cultivate the […] emotion of detachment … then one would achieve a state of 
                                                 
47 According to Hindu scriptures, there are four methods, or yogas, to reach the ultimate goal: 1) Karma-Yoga 
(path of service), Jnana-Yoga (path of knowledge), Raja-Yoga (path of mind control), and Bhakti-Yoga (path 
of devotion). See AKHILANANDA, supra note 45 at 174, 75 (drawing on Vivekananda).  Of the four, Raja yoga 
has application in the other three Yogas, a reason why I have not specifically mentioned it as part of the Yoga 
types.   
48 Id. at 175.  
49 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 99 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood, trans. & eds. 1998).   
    Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with 
questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of 
reason itself, but which it cannot also answer, since they transcend every capacity of human 
reason.  
    Id.  
50 See Manmatha Nath Banerji, Hindu Psychology: Physiological Basis and Experimental Methods, 50 AM. J. 
PSYCHOL. 328, 331 (1937) See also supra note 44.      
51 SWAMI KRISHNANANDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 27 (1992).   
52 Id.  
53 On the fine points of meditation as an intellectual technique that helps one achieve the higher consciousness, 
see generally Wolfgang Fasching, Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Meditation, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & 
COGNITIVE SCI. 463 (2008) (“Meditation is the endeavour to withdraw from one’s being occupied with the 
objects of consciousness in order to become aware of consciousness itself”).   
54 See generally D. Mackenzie Brown, The Philosophy of Bal Gangadhar Tilak: Karma vs. Jnana in the Gita 
Rahasya, 17 J. ASIAN STUD. 197 (1958). Tilak, having been sceptical about knowledge-based means of 
enlightenment, expounded a philosophy of activism in which action was considered as a common duty, 
irrespective of caste or occupation. All the while he believed that knowledge and devotion also have “[a] place 
under certain times and condition”. Id. at 200.  
55 See AKHILANANDA, supra note 45 at 177 (discussing how to evade seeing duality and plurality in everything 
by gaining knowledge about reality (Jnana-yoga)).  
56 See supra note 45. 
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reasonable intelligence”.57 Selfless service is one quality that can disengage the ego 
from the senses through which material world is perceived.58 In the same manner, 
intense love and irresistible longing for a personal deity or spiritual form can liberate 
perceptions from the shadow of the ego. In such a detached state, reason becomes 
illuminated and acquires the power to “[t]ranscend even the limitation of the nervous 
system”.59   
Social rationalists assert that the state that occurs when mind is detached from the 
material world causes inactivity, whereas certain modern disciplines, set on rationalist 
pedestals and claiming to ensure/secure human welfare through that disciplines’ 
processes, would suppose the sort of enlightenment discussed above as perpetuating 
inefficiency.60 The arguments rationalists put forward in support of their faith have, 
indeed, profound bearing on modern societies. However, an extended interpretation of 
Advaita can prove the rationalists’ beliefs to be the result of a simplistic reading of 
Advaita, if not a refusal to understand it.  
According to Advaita, the state arrived at by detaching the mind from the body is 
only an intermediary stage in the progress of mind towards a higher level of 
consciousness where reality lies.61 This intermediary state resembles a deep 
“dreamless sleep” and is a “desire-less state of consciousness”62 in which one has 
neither a sense of self nor a material identity, that is, the perception of things around 
oneself”.63 From this state, mind proceeds to the highest state of consciousness, a state 
of supreme intelligence at which one can perceive one’s reality. This state is called 
Turiya; the sense of Self comes into existence in this stage, but any identification with 
the body (duality) collapses.64 An extended interpretation of Advaita tells that entering 
Turiya “does not mean that the body is “‘ontologically’ dead”, but one’s way of 
looking at the body changes.65 In this state, mind does not identify itself with the body 
but only with the ultimate reality it has realized.66  
Turiya helps an individual “observe”67 the three-dimensionally bound state of 
mind-body and provides visions of a fourth dimension.68 This fourth dimension is 
                                                 
57 As quoted in Kathryn Ann Johnson, The Social Construction of Emotions in the Bhagavad Gita: Locating 
Ethics in a Redacted Text, 35 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 655, 669 (2007).  
58 Selfless service to humanity is Karma-Yoga. On Karma-Yoga, see SWAMI SIVANANDA, PRACTICE OF KARMA 
YOGA (2001).    
59 See AKHILANANDA, supra note 45 at 18 (referring to Raja-yoga).  
60 The contentions of such disciplines are well summarized, and juxtaposed with altruism in Serge-Christophe 
Kolm, Altruism and Inefficiency, 94 ETHICS 18 (1983).  
61 For the hierarchy of consciousness, see WILLIAM M. INDICH, CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 67-116 
(1980).   
62 Daniel Raveh, Ayam, aham asmiti: Self-consciousness and Identity in the Eighth Chapter of the Chandogya 
Upanisad vs. Sankara’s Bhasya, 36 J. INDIAN PHIL. 319, 323 (2008). Vedic texts describe this state as susupti. 
For a comprehensive treatment of susupti, see ARVIND SHARMA, SLEEP AS A STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN 
ADVAITA VEDANTA (2004).  
63 Raveh, supra note 62 at 325.  
64 Id. at 330.  
65 Id. at 329.  
66 Id.  
67 The power of observation discussed here is not sensually driven. It is a faculty of super-consciousness, an 
intellectual-field, known as Saksin (“witness-consciousness”). According to Gupta “the concept of saksin in 
Advaita is the single most important postulate of the principle of revelation operative in experience”. See BINA 
GUPTA, THE DISINTERESTED WITNESS: A FRAGMENT OF ADVAITA VEDANTA PHENOMENOLOGY 4 (1998).  
68 Naming this dimension a “fourth dimension” may not be proper, as dimensions are discussed in scientific 
circles as the three dimensions of space (left-right, up-down, and forward-backward) and one dimension of 
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outside the framework of the time-space in which we live. This dimension beyond our 
time-space is the central theme of the currently explored M-Theory of theoretical 
physics (discussed as the “eleventh dimension”), according to which our physical 
universe is one among the many membrane universes, each with its own time-space, 
floating in an infinite amaterial space.69 Augmenting the insights of M-Theory with the 
accounted experiences associated with Turiya brings out the hidden cosmic truth that 
all universes (implying a “multiverse”), including our three-dimensional one, are only 
states of consciousness hidden within the brain states and a cognitive experience.70 
This view implies that the physical universe is an unreal state of consciousness seen 
though the senses, aptly captured by Sankara in the aphorism: Brahma satyam jagan 
mithya (“only the Real is real, universe is a mirage”). Turiya is the true state of 
consciousness.  
Although Advaita supposedly ends at the Turiya stage, the extended reading 
construes Turiya as the beginning of a good life, provided one chooses not to detach 
the self from the nervous system and from the material world itself (Samdahi).71 
Daniel Raveh puts this idea succinctly:  
 
[A] person in turiya is free either to attend the ‘phenomenal world’ or 
to withdraw from it; either to participate, take part and hence identify at 
least to a certain extent with the so-called ‘externality’, or to opt out, to 
withdraw his senses from their objects as a tortoise withdraws.72  
 
Living in the world, the enlightened Self beholds the world through its higher 
consciousness and the reality it has sensed.73 Such individuals with illuminated reason 
will have an outlook structured internally upon an awareness of human reality, which 
enables them to better identify themselves with their comrades, habitat, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
time. However, for the sake of clarity, I do not follow these distinctions. This classification is notwithstanding 
the seven new micro-dimensions of space added by the String Theory and M-Theory of theoretical physics.  
The fourth dimension is not to be confused with the “fourth state of consciousness” in the hierarchy of 
consciousness, as Turiya is often described, although the difference between the fourth dimension and the 
fourth state is only that they are separate analytical categories. On the states of consciousness, see MICHAEL 
NAGLER, UPANISHADS 199-205 (2007) (the four states of consciousness are waking state, dreaming sleep, 
dreamless sleep, and Turiya).  
69 See MICHIO KAKU, PARALLEL WORLDS: A JOURNEY THROUGH CREATION, HIGHER DIMENSIONS, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE COSMOS 207-216 (2005).  
70 See ANIL K. RAJVANSHI, NATURE OF HUMAN THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON MIND, MATTER, SPIRITUALITY AND 
TECHNOLOGY 25-27 (2004). For support, see Laurence J. Lafleur, Time as a Fourth Dimension, 37 J. PHIL. 
169, 171 (1940) (substantiating that universal time is outside the three dimensions, though space need not be); 
John Smythies, Space, Time and Consciousness, 10 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47 (2003) (“[C]onsciousness 
may have its own space-time system and its own system of ontologically independent and spatio-temporally 
organized events”. Id. at 55.). The relationship between a Higher Consciousness and time-space are thoroughly 
and systematically presented in The Self-Aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Material World by 
theoretical physicist Amit Goswami. See ALEXANDRA BRUCE, THE DEFINITIVE UNAUTHORIZED GUIDE TO 
WHAT THE BLEEP DO WE KNOW!? 101- 13 (2005).   
71 See Raveh, supra note 62 at 332; But Cf. AKHILANANDA, supra note 45 at 19, 20.  
72 Raveh, supra note 62 at 332.  
73 For details on what would be the thoughts and deeds of an enlightened one who has chosen to be an 
embodiment of reality, see Andrew O. Fort, Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Sankara on Jivanmukti, 19 J. 
INDIAN PHIL. 369 (1991).  
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universe itself.74 They are active and efficient, quite contrary to what the social 
rationalists maintain. However, what prompts efficiency is not the desire to be better 
off than others, but a sense of being a representative microcosm of human reality in the 
world, from which emerges a sense of duty and care to fellow beings and the world.75  
  Swami Akhilananda relates that social harmony is in close proximity to an 
individual with illuminated reason:   
 
When a man is master of his own mental forces, he will be able to 
understand and influence the minds of others. He is well established in 
poise and creates an atmosphere of peace. When anyone enters the 
presence of such a person, he consciously or unconsciously absorbs the 
peaceful atmosphere and derives poise and benefit from the contact. A 
man of superconscious realization can be compared to a luminous 
substance which radiates light. It not only illuminates itself but also 
objects within its radius. Similarly, a man with a unified mind emanates 
wisdom and strength to others.76   
   
S. Radhakrishnan echoes the same perception that “the touch of reason makes the 
whole world kin”,77 “reason makes [individuals] act on a feeling of the unity of the 
whole human race”.78 Individuals with illuminated reason are assets for the world; 
through them the feelings of camaraderie, solidarity, love, and compassion acquire 
meaning.79 Such individuals are vital constituents of a society. Their illuminated 
reason is what causes societies and humanity to self-constitute;80 the collectivity of 
their reason is the rudiment of democratic societies.  
                                                 
74 This identification is captured in P.B. Rana Singh, Nature and Cosmic Integrity: A Search in Hindu 
Geographical Thought, 26 GEOJOURNAL 139 (1992). See also SRI AUROBINDO, ESSAYS ON THE GITA 338-40 
(1995).     
75 Situating this sense of “Self” in the phenomenological category of “altruism”, Pedro Oliveira writes: 
It is indeed a life-altering experience in which one becomes a real witness of the unbreakable 
and uncreated Ground which sustains all existence and all life. The energy of such 
“witnessing” is of such an order that it reduces to ashes every form of self-concern, of self-
preoccupation, and leads the one to whom such experience has come to a life of selfless 
service that has no end.  
See Pedro Oliveira, Altruism’s Inextinguishable Fire: Annie Besant’s Testimony, 129 THE THEOSOPHIST 24, 
29 (2007).  
76 AKHILANANDA, supra note 45 at 20.  
77 S. Radhakrishnan, The Ethics of the Vedanta, 24 INT’L J. ETHICS 168, 170 (1914).  
78 Id.  
79 In the context of Indian nationalism, cultural leaders of India had similar visions for nation-building. Van 
Bijlert observes: 
The divine can be and has to be realized by every member of the nation. This can be done 
by developing all human potential that is available. Everyone has to do this for him or 
herself, but not for one’s own sake, but for the sake of others. Self-realization in a spiritual 
sense and realization of the fullest potential of the nation thus converge. But self-realization 
actually equals selflessness in the ultimate sense, because one realizes oneself by helping 
others to fully realize themselves.  
See Victor A. Van Bijlert, The Ethics of Modernity in Indian Politics: Past and Present, 9 J. HUMAN VALUES, 
53, 57 (2003).  
80 On the self-constitution of humanity and society, see generally Philip Allott, Reconstituting Humanity: New 
International Law, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 219 (1992). However, according to Allott, the human reality and the 
resulting consciousness from which humanity and society self-constitute is the material reality of human 
beings, not their transcendental reality. Allott seems to be Kantian in his observations on the limits of reason.    
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Having articulated a design for the enlightenment of reason and the reformation 
of the self, I might have pushed the concept of a common interest into a philosophical 
wilderness, which may prompt some readers to ask: “Does our common interest lie in 
a spiritual pursuit”?81 “Can’t common interest be cast in a non-spiritual mould”? Had 
the description been a non-spiritual one, it would have rendered common interest a 
value-barren and unintelligent concept, one engendered in a group of naïve individuals 
egoistically pursuing a common goal. The interest of an individual in such a group will 
either be the result of a raw desire for an object (or the benefits thereof) 
simultaneously sought by many other individuals and a visceral reaction to the call of 
the ego to possess the object and maximize one’s benefits.82 The ego erects alleys 
through which desire traverses to the goal, thereby isolating the mind from meeting 
with other minds. “Such modes of action, while gregarious in external appearance and 
result […] are not in any true sense social”.83 Any common interest seen among such 
groups is synthetic.         
However, as said earlier, annihilation of the ego elevates reason to hitherto 
inexperienced planes, a state at which one’s mind, completely disengaged from senses 
and free from any selfish motives, perceives reality. In this ego-free state, mind 
comprehends the psychological desires and social needs of others with whom one is 
bound by certain social norms.84 In such an enlightened state, mind enters into a new 
bond with other members in the group.85 As more individuals heighten their reason by 
relinquishing personal interests, social solidarity will emerge.  
Thus the state of solidarity and social harmony ensues from renouncing personal 
interests;86 a common interest is what induces solidarity. A common interest is 
simultaneously the vital constituent of solidarity, and it is a common interest, a product 
of enlightened reason, that sustains social harmony. All things considered, what unifies 
individual and society is a spiritual pursuit87—a heuristic method—that entails the 
annihilation of ego and enlightenment of reason.88     
Finally, a mind, if its reason denies any reality beyond the world it can otherwise 
perceive and it persists with the freedom of reason, what Kant censures as the 
“unbelief of reason”89 (or non-spirituality), tends to deny any sense of duty,90 be it 
duty to fellow beings or to the society. Unbelief of reason/non-spirituality is “a 
precarious state of human mind”91 from which personal interest grows. Unilluminated 
                                                 
81 Spirituality is an intellectual pursuit to break the bounds of time and space and to inform the mind of a higher 
intellectual potential than what it believes it has.  
82 For support, see J. Mark Baldwin, The Basis of Social Solidarity, 15 AM. J. SOC. 817, 821 (1910) (asserts that 
gregarious groups are many times driven by mechanical instincts).  
83 Id. at 822.  
84 See id. at 824.  
85 Id. at 826.  
86 Cf. J.T. Punnett, Ethical Alternatives, 10 MIND 85, 89 (1885). While recognizing the hostility between 
common interest of the society and individual interest, J.T. Punnett spoke out in favour of “a formal 
reconciliation between them by recourse to the noumenal and permanent individual, who, having his roots out 
of Time, is one with other individuals and with the essence of Being itself”.  
87 For support, see generally, Id. (holds that human progress is an ethical pursuit).   
88 See Baldwin, supra note 82 at 826 (a sense of the self “[u]nifies the individual and the society, and establishes 
solidarity on the higher plane of common intelligence and joint volition”). Id.     
89 IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY 17 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood, trans. & eds. 
1996).  
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
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reason, when coupled with personal interest (ego) on the pretext of designing 
investigative methodologies that provide precision and objectivity to guide reason, 
builds value-systems to pursue selfish motives.    
To conclude, humanity shall gain a finer understanding of its ontology. It is in its 
common interest. It requires a restructuring of one’s perceptive capabilities from the 
material limits of time-space to a state of cosmic intelligence. That state of super-
intelligence is the cognitive “ought” of humanity—an enlightened and fertile state of 
mind from which the sentiment of altruism sprouts and flourishes. This understanding 
implies that a common interest is that which has the elements of altruism, and 
everything non-altruistic has to be deemed to be not in the common interest of 
humanity.  
It is also the case that, the common interest as manifested in the many doctrines 
of international law has to have elements of altruism in it to be genuine. With this 
qualification in mind, the next section examines whether the doctrines supposedly 
upholding a common interest in international law promotes altruism.    
 
B. Common Interest as Doctrine 
 
A classification of the doctrines relating to common interest is a lacklustre 
approach, for common interest is so broad a concept that any interpretation of it might 
know no bounds. In addition, the concept has a pluralistic profile in scholarly 
accounts. Both these factors frustrate a taxonomical base for the concept. However, 
given such a methodological difficulty, this Article sorts the doctrines of common 
interest with reference to the philosophical characteristics of common interest whereby 
common interest is identified as a spiritual pursuit leading to altruism: common 
interest is an intellectual state that exists in the absence of personal interest, a concept 
that provides a heuristic method for the reformation of the self and society, and a 
constitutive agent of an egalitarian society.92 That being the case, any non-altruistic 
aspects of common interest assume a doctrinal character. In other words, wherever 
there is a value/knowledge system within which there are vestiges of personal interests 
or patterns of collectively pursuing personal interests aiming a common goal, one finds 
common interest in the form of a doctrine.93 This view is consistent with the definition 
                                                 
92 See supra Section II A.    
93 This whole approach is neither a rhetorical convenience nor an escape route, but one which has 
epistemological kinship with medieval Indian linguistic metaphysics. This tradition maintains that possession 
of an intellectual faculty called Pratibha (a sort of “enlightened imagination”) helps the rhetors transform 
existing reality by way of cognitive, aesthetic, and linguistic invasion into meanings. For a discussion on 
Pratibha and its transformative potential, see David Shulman, Illumination, Imagination, and Creativity: 
Rajasekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannatha on Pratibha, 36 J. INDIAN PHIL. 481 (2008).   
Sanskrit tradition says that there can be tangible effects on what is implied as reality when ideas lying 
abstract in mind are relayed to the material world by the inventive power of speech and language. That is to 
say, when mind, speech, and language, with all their innate creative power, perform a linear operation, there 
can be a tangible effect on reality. However, speech and language in the Vedic context pertain to Hymns 
(Mantra) and not discursive practices such as legal reasoning. See Jan Houben, The Sanskrit Tradition, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS IN FOUR LINGUISTIC TRADITIONS 49, 59, 63 (Wout van Bekkum, ed. 1997) (on the 
semantic tradition of the Vedas).  
Philip Allott conceives this method as the “recreating” of reality. However, he expresses this Vedic idea, 
differently but in an equivalent spirit, with a tinge of philosophical materialism to the effect that human beings 
look at the material world and perceive their reality in their minds as images, which when stimulated by 
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of doctrine provided earlier, i.e., doctrine is a schematized discourse prompted by a 
group holding certain shared sentiments as well as a mindset which fuels particular 
interests as against any common interest of humanity at large.  
Second, to sort the doctrines of common interest, I now bring in the concept of 
politics, for politics is understood as related to a group-oriented action which is 
contradistinctive to altruism of any sort. Any traces of politics can turn “something” 
into non-altruism, which implies that everything political is non-altruistic. The 
following postulate throws light on how the element of politics can turn a discourse 
into doctrine. 
 In international law, doctrine is the foundation of legal practice, for diplomacy 
and international settlement of disputes, which are the essential aspects of the practice 
of international law, advance through doctrines. Correspondingly, in international 
politics, the two vital aspects of interstate relations—policymaking and foreign 
relations—are doctrine-centered; in addition, doctrine is a legitimizing agent of 
political strategies and decisions. Doctrine is the common gauge of fairness for 
international law and politics.94 In fact, all international law is politics,95 or, 
conversely, politics is all dressed up as international law, which implies that doctrines 
of international law have the values of law and politics96 (value presupposes a 
collectivity of reasoning, design, rationale, and functioning). The many doctrines of 
international law representing common interest are also an amalgamation of law and 
                                                                                                                                                        
imagination and reason become ideas. Then they can recreate their reality by transmitting ideas through 
language. See Allott, supra note 80 at 222.   
When this method is applied to the present context, doctrine is “what is deemed to be the present reality”. 
The philosophical abstractions of common interest then become “constitutive ideas” to be “effectuated”. When 
constitutive ideas invade the meaning/images of doctrines through the channel of language, they provide 
doctrines with a new meaning and material effect.  
However, this method is not an all-purpose method; i.e., it cannot be applied for invading any concepts in 
accordance with the cognizor’s subjective, intellectual ambitions. Its application is contingent upon certain 
contexts and intellectual positions. As said earlier, this method pertains to Mantras/hymns: Mantras, in their 
simplistic sense, are linguistic mini-structures bearing the cosmic truth: they have high transformative 
potential, meant to lead humanity to its reality (On Mantras, see generally LAURIE L. PATTON, BRINGING GODS 
TO MIND: MANTRA AND RITUAL IN EARLY INDIAN RITUAL SACRIFICE (2005). Given that Mantras are this 
method’s subject of application, one prerequisite for the application of the method is that the context must be a 
“quest for human reality”. Moreover, the idea of invading and transforming a concept must include in it an 
awareness of human reality as well as an ontological credibility.   
Since the preconditions for applying this method fit in with the analytical context and aims of this Article, 
the method is employed here.  
94 This implies that a “fairness box” is attached to doctrines, which turns a doctrine into a representation of a 
“social situation”. The fairness element attached to a doctrine is emphasized by Tiller and Cross while 
articulating the psychological comfort of judges with doctrines: “[d]octrines are mentally economical, 
allowing for quicker resolution of cases because judges need not think the logical underpinnings of fairness 
and equity for the given factual situation”. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine, 
100 N. W. U. L. REV. 517, 530 (2006).  
95 For the case that international law is politics, see generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3. In Koskenniemi’s 
scheme, the belief that international law is politics (apologetic) is persistently opposed by a belief that 
international law is moralistic (Utopian) in character. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International 
Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4 (1990). But, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law: 20 Years 
Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7 (2009) (asserts that the political nature of international law is obscured by a 
“managerialism” that has come to dominate the practice of the discipline).  
96 By restating that, in my scheme, doctrine refers to legal formalism in international law, I affirm that doctrine 
has elements of both law and politics in it. However, I leave the reader to assess—using Koskenniemi’s grand 
scheme—the plight of legal minds caught between law and politics inside the doctrinal world. See 
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3.     
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politics. Thus, having posited that international law has the elements of politics, any 
analysis that views common interest as a doctrinal matter would involuntarily absorb 
every perspective of common interest that has a political pall over it. This logic 
justifies the inclusion of much politically-oriented thought in international law, 
purporting to be anti-doctrinal, into the domain of doctrine. This methodological 
stance is further justified later in this part.97     
On the strength of these grounds, two branches of thought in international law, 
known to promote a certain common interest, diverse in terms of geo-ideological 
origin and structure, are analyzed to see if what they pursue is altruistically driven 
common interest:98 first, Third Worldism represented by the discussions on the Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), which line up with the Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS), largely a socially-oriented school of thought; second, the global 
governance paradigm—a Northern project—which provides a forum for a social 
interaction and thereby aims at securing the common interests of peoples across the 
globe. The analysis confirms that defining TWAIL and global governance as doctrinal 
discourses is realistic.     
Some readers might ask why I have forsaken any doctrines specific to 
international law, e.g., the principle of state responsibility or sovereignty, or any 
particular set of rules to examine the doctrinal construct of common interest. Why did 
I choose TWAIL and global governance, movements which generally fall outside the 
conventional meaning of “doctrine” and have fairly resisted the rule-model of 
international law? I earlier provided a general explanation for ignoring specific 
doctrines as part of the general analytical scheme of the Article. As regards the 
doctrines related to common interest, in addition to the reasons provided above, there 
is an extra ground for choosing TWAIL and global governance as doctrines: the 
present focus on common interest as a convergence of human rationalities, a process 
driven by the cosmic consciousness of humankind. However, under formalist and 
state-centric international law the idea of common interest was deemed to be only the 
common interest of states,99 the securing of which was nothing more than a diplomatic 
target. The idea of the common interest of the world’s peoples was indefinite,100 and 
any allusion to peoples or human beings as one collectivity was cast as “affairs of 
state”, which lay far afield of any idea of collective rationality. Conversely, 
international law in our day, through its anti-formalist approach, as seen in many of its 
new streams, has advanced to become a peer among the social sciences and has 
assumed a sensitivity towards the cultures, values, and interests of individuals and 
groups. For this reason, the common interest promoted by such a socially oriented 
international law through its various new streams represents a convergence of 
                                                 
97 See infra Section II. B.2.  
98 Unger’s idea of doctrine can loosen the grip of weirdness, if any, that might be on my idea of the doctrines of 
common interest. See Unger, supra note 28 at 565. Unger’s conception of doctrine casts its shadow on socially 
oriented movements or causes that generally escape the conventional positivist idea of doctrines.   
99 To ascertain the extent of conceptual heaviness the idea of ‘state’ exerted on international law, see generally 
Roland R. Foulke, Definition and Nature of International Law, 19 COLUM. L. REV. 429 (1919).  
100 See Timo Koivurova, The International Court of Justice and Peoples, 9 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 157 
(2007) (upon reviewing the extent to which individual rights have featured in the decisions of the ICJ 
concludes that collective rights of peoples have never been a normative force in the development of 
international law). For support, see Ian Brownlie, The Place of Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. 
REV. 435 (1964).  
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rationalities. Since TWAIL and global governance are such new streams in 
international law, the rationalities pursuing a common goal within these streams 
constitute the common interest of peoples.           
 
1. TWAIL: Means did not justify the end  
 
In international law, Third Worldism, after a brief spell of doctrine-centered New 
International Economic Order (NIEO),101 has now undertaken the task of 
“Twailing”.102 International lawyers, with a psychological affinity to that “political 
reality”103 which the French economist Alfred Sauvy called the “Third World”,104 who 
are postmodernists, anti-essentialists, and deconstructionists (collectively called post-
structuralist), make up the majority of TWAIL scholars. They believe that social 
structures were substantially altered by the colonial scholars using the thought and 
practice of international law, first as a medium to create social and normative 
hierarchies and then as a base to sustain such hierarchies.105 Hence to knock down the 
hierarchies, Third World scholars seek to discredit international law, by deconstructing 
it,106 revealing its inner contradictions,107 using methods such as historiographical 
analysis108 and critiquing the rule-oriented mainstream international law. Both 
methods are objective: that is to say, when historical narratives are interactively 
                                                 
101 Chimni and Anghie would consider this movement as part of TWAIL I, a phase when Third World scholars 
(some of them in the spirit of historical revisionism) challenged the Euro-centrism of international law and 
sought to reform it by recasting core doctrines. See Anthony Anghie & Bhupinder Chimni, Third World 
Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77 
(2002).  
102 By the expression “Twailing”, Gathii verbalized the acronym TWAIL to represent the process of 
interpenetration between the ideals of liberal conservatism and Third Worldism and the revision of “accepted 
praxis, orthodoxies, and hierarchies” in international law in a “conceptual space” created as a result of the 
interpenetration. See James Thuo Gathii, Rejoinder: Twailing International Law, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2066, 2068 
(2000).  
103 Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, PROC. AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., 31, 35 (2000). A meaning attribution to “Third 
World” in a non-political vein is in Martin W. Lewis, Is there a Third World?, CURRENT HIST. 355 (November 
1999). Lewis recommends for replacing “Third World” with “Poor Parts of the World” since the expression 
Third World lacks descriptiveness and that it is “loaded with oriental preconceptions”. See id at 358. However, 
Rajagopal asserts that the expression “Third World” is amply descriptive, as “it reveals the hierarchical 
ordering of the international community at both the statal and non-statal levels” in addition to critically 
situating such hierarchies within the larger framework of colonialism and imperialism. See Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1998-99).   
104 See Robert Malley, The Third Worldist Moment, CURRENT HIST. 359, 360 (November 1999).  
105 In a reverse manner, Mutua states that the objective of TWAIL is “[t]o understand, deconstruct, and unpack 
the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions”. See Mutua, supra note 103 at 31.  
106 Id.  
107 Andrew F. Sunter, TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry, 20 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 475, 477 
(2007).  
108 For one such historiographical account, see ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (narrates how European/Western states, over the years, passed on the 
baton of sovereignty by keeping it off from the Third World states). See also Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From 
Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 
41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 529 (2000); DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY (2001). On the 
relevance of historiography in international law, see George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, Martti Koskenniemi 
and the Historiographical Turn in International Law, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 539 (2005) (considers 
Koskenniemi’s The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (see infra note 216) as a work employing historiographical 
analysis by attempting “to rewrite the past”, see id at 548, 557).   
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replayed from a Third World perspective, there arises a collective conscience and a 
feeling of oneness in the minds of the peoples of the Third World, which prepares 
them for a collective resistance against all forms of marginalization.109 Moreover, 
when one adopts a critical stance towards international law, it provides a potential 
conceptual space—one akin to what Gathii visualized when liberal conservatism and 
Third Worldism finally interpenetrate110—where ideals for building an egalitarian 
world can be conceptualized. In sum, what bring together scholars and peoples of the 
Third World under one common interest are: first, the realization generated by the 
historiographical accounts that their identities were determined by common historical 
acts and second, the optimism, sprouted from being critical and deconstructive, that 
there lies an opportunity to recreate their social world.  
TWAIL scholars writing historiographies, like any historiographers, have a 
particular analytical and observational standpoint regarding the colonial time-space 
framework. From this standpoint they subject colonial discourse and dialectic, and 
conceptual architectures to a methodical analysis.111 In this process, given TWAIL’s 
nascent state and comparative paucity of methods and the urge to resist the tools and 
concepts of the Anglo-American and continental traditions,112 a tendency to lean on 
the rhetorical tools of postcolonial streams such as subaltern studies groups is 
apparent.113 However, more than “critical rigor”, it could be that, postcoloniality drew 
the TWAIL scholars, who were on a deconstructive path, to such streams. Equipped 
with these tools, TWAIL engages in unraveling the Euro-centricism in international 
law by way of several micro-methods: a consciousness-analysis of self and others, 
which provides identity symbols within which Third World groups may form 
collectivities; documenting the record of domination114—an error-manual for further 
social engineering; and counter rhetoric that generates a revolutionary and fighting 
spirit among the Third World actors.115 The collective effect of these methods on 
international law is “deconstruction”.116  
                                                 
109 I use the expression “interactive replay” to represent the narrative strategy in the Historiographical scheme of 
TWAIL, taking into account the constructionist method—of engaging in interaction with the social world and 
the self—adopted by the TWAIL scholars. The collective conscience emerging from such narratives are hence 
non-essentialist in nature.      
110 See Gathii, supra note 102.  
111 See generally ANGHIE supra note 108. Despite the growing interest in TWAIL, most of the literature coming 
under the banner TWAIL is devoted either for expressing TWAIL’s oppositional stance or in articulating 
agendas; only a few works have embarked on historiographical analyses of the history of international law.    
112 But, see Sunter, supra note 107 at 480 (points out that there is a strong urge to resort to the analytical tools of 
the Anglo-American thought).  
113 The fact that Subaltern Studies have an impact on TWAIL scholars is best represented in B.S. Chimni, 
Alternative Visions of Just World Order: Six Tales from India, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 389, 395-96 (2005) (states 
that perspectives, such as that of the subalterns, have a critical property in it such that they can facilitate in 
conceptualizing the form and substance of a just world).  
114 Such documentation is in Anthony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (1999).  
115 The insight I have gained on these methods is shaped by a general reading of Gyan Prakash, Subaltern 
Studies as Postcolonial, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1475 (1994).  
116 However, modern subalternism would say that deconstruction does not have any calls for reversing 
hierarchies, instead it equilibrates knowledge sources:  
 [T]he recognition that the third world historian is condemned to knowing “Europe” as the 
original home of the modern, whereas the “European” historian does not share a 
comparable predicament with regard to the pasts of the majority of humankind” [sic], 
serves as the condition for a deconstructive rethinking of history. 
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Since methods such as historiography and foundational critique are believed to 
generate some sort of common interest among Third World groups, below I focus on 
those methods and their application by TWAIL scholars. Afterwards, I examine if the 
common interest generated under such methods is, in effect, a common interest.   
   
TWAIL and Historiographical Method. Historiography is an art of sorts. It requires 
ingenuity and imagination117 and, like any art, it sketches images in the human mind, 
which motivate human action.118 In other words, the methods and processes of 
historiography are agents inducing an internalizing function in the historiographer as 
well as in the minds of the one who reads the historiography. How does this 
internalization happen? To answer this question a close look at the professional tasks 
and sensibilities of historiographers is necessary.  
Historiographers generally analyze historical accounts which are representations 
of the speech and practice of earlier times.119 Yet, there is a group of historiographers 
who suspect that there is a historical reality. They hold that past only provides 
analyzable evidence exposed to numerous inferences resulting in contradictions.120 
However, new historicists, among them the anti-essentialists and the realists, stand 
firm against any tendency to drive the past into remoteness. They assert that rejection 
of the past creates a “horizontal otherness”121 and a world of the dead.122 Therefore, 
against reducing the relevance of accounts of the past to merely generating 
contradictions, they create a countermove in the form of engaging in a dialogue with 
the past and integrating past voices into theirs.123 John E. Toews analogizes this 
process as “historiographical exorcism”.124 Toews elaborates Historiographical 
exorcism in view of a semi-fictional formulation:125  
 
First, it [historiographical exorcism] summons or conjures up the world 
of the departed spirits so that they may speak to the inhabitants of the 
present with their own voices. Its aim is to make the past, or a specific 
                                                                                                                                                        
See Id. at 1486.          
117 See Carl Becker, What is Historiography?, 44 AM. HIST. REV. 20, 22 (1938).  
118 The idea of images motivating human action dates back to Aristotle. See C.E. McMahon, Images as Motives 
and Motivators: A Historical Perspective, 86 AM. J. PSYCHOL. (1973) (articulates the ebb and flow of the 
theory of motivation). Vedic literature also expounds that mind has a storehouse where images of the past are 
stored; these images trigger a process which culminates in action.  
119 However, this is too simplistic a way of putting across the relationship between history and historiography. 
Caught between the Realist (historiography interprets historical narratives to make inferences from 
descriptions of past events) and Constructionist (historiography is a representation of the present) views the 
relationship has been somewhat blurred. Yet, the role of the past/history, despite the subjection to critical 
scrutiny, has been of relevance in shaping a scientific historiography. For an enlightening discussion in this 
vein, see TUCKER AVIEZER, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST: A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 254-262 
(2004).  
120 See id. at 256.  
121 It is called “horizontal otherness”, for this otherness, which is a “temporal otherness”, is diametrical to the 
“hierarchical otherness” created on the basis of essentialist attributes, e.g., culture, race, and gender. See John 
E. Toews, Historiography as Exorcism: Conjuring Up ‘Foreign’ Worlds and Historicizing Subjects in the 
Context of the Multiculturalism Debate, 27 THEORY & SOC’Y 535, 546 (1998).  
122 See generally Id.  
123 Id. at 550.  
124 Id.  
125 Toews draws this observation on Toni Morrison’s historical fiction Beloved.   
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past, visible and audible in ways that allow us to imagine it as if we 
were there. Second, it engages in experimental attempts to appropriate 
or integrate the voices of the dead into a more inclusive understanding 
of the conditions of the personal and collective identity, subjective 
agency and social action in the present, and in so doing, to lay the 
haunting spirits to rest, to bury them with full recognition of their 
legitimate place in the public story that defines us.126    
 
In conjuring the past, historiographers study the way historians have amassed 
traces of past lives, societies, and cultures and the dialectic they employed in 
organizing historical texts—an analytical standpoint. However, in contrast to the 
historians, who examine the past by pushing themselves into a different time-space 
framework, historiographers contextualize the historical records by remaining in their 
current situation. It is their situationality127—that is the spatial-temporal structure to 
which one’s mind has set up a connection128—which conditions the modes and types 
of analysis of the historical texts. Roughly speaking, historiographers are objective, 
i.e., they critically and analytically approach the past, but prejudicially, for they are 
driven by the cultural and academic sensibilities already embedded in them. Owing to 
this prejudice their sole focus is on assimilating history into their thought-structure, 
thereby relevantizing the past.129 The past then becomes the authentic history of their 
ideas130 and historiography an account of their identity-shaping. This kind of 
assimilation undermines the scope for any further relative assessment of their identities 
vis-à-vis their past, as the assimilation renders that past error-free. The past then 
dissolves in their identity.     
When the historiographers are TWAIL scholars, the situation is even complex in 
that in addition to the horizontal otherness, whereby past becomes “other”, the 
otherness forged on account of ethnic, cultural, racial, sexual, and national grounds in 
the past comes to light.131 The latter is more or less a vertical otherness, since it comes 
in the form of hierarchies. The historiographers in that case have to assimilate not only 
the past but also the fact of subjugation and oppression and the sentiments and outlook 
                                                 
126 Id. at 535, 36.  
127 Korhonen, while correlating the epistemological constraints and praxis of law, the method which she calls 
“situationality-analysis”, defines situationality as “[a]ll the biological, anthropological, social, cultural, 
historical, traditional, political, economical etc., conditions that influence an actor-subject and, thus, yield its 
ever-changing limits and potentials”. See Outi Korhonen, International Lawyer: Towards Conceptualization 
of the Changing World and Practice, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW 373, 376 (Jens 
Drolshammer and Michael Pfeifer, eds. 2001).  
128 See Korhonen, supra note 3.   
129 Cf. PHILIP ALLOTT, HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 337-39 (2002) (“history-
writing” is subjective, without a defined purpose and method).     
130 This view is curative in an unconstructive way if Allott’s thesis that “Humanity has no history, only histories” 
(id. at 339) is taken seriously. That is to say, when the Historiographers assimilate one of the many 
interpretations of history into their thought-structure they are in fact situating that particular interpretation as 
the only and true history. 
Craven points out that the tendency to assimilate the past, both uncritically and critically, is very much 
seen among the historians of international law. See Matt Craven, Introduction: International Law and Its 
Histories, in TIME, HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 6, 7 (Mathew Craven et. al. eds., 2007).  
131 Toews, supra note 121 at 546. 
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of the subjugated into their identity; any failure to assimilate the past, to paraphrase 
Toews’ cautioning, implies a rejection of the conflicts and divisions of the past.132  
Historiographers assimilate the past to the present by way of memory.133 Past is 
stored in the memory as images, as are hopes for the future.134 Once reason envelopes 
the images of the past and hopes for the future, an individual identity takes its form. In 
the case of Third World historiographers the assimilated past stored as images of 
subjugation, marginalization, and exploitation, when it interacts with their anti-
imperialistic deconstructive sensibilities of the present and hopes for the future, Third 
World historiographers conceive their “selves”135 as embodying oppositional 
resistance136 and revolutionary reformism.137 These conceived selves are collectivized 
by language into ideas and approaches;138 steering TWAIL as a movement to oppose, 
collectively resist, and reform the international legal system, which is perpetuating an 
unjust global order.139    
In such a spirit of inquiry, opposition, and resistance, TWAIL perceives a neo-
imperialism being perpetuated in the contemporary world order in the guise of 
domineering ideologies which are portrayed as if they were natural outcomes of a 
global process. These ideologies are ingrained into the society as an order through 
international institutions designed on imperial lines and legitimized by the rules of 
international law.140 Furthermore, hegemonic forces with the aim of frustrating the 
resistance of poor states have fragmented international law into various anomalous 
units.141 Prompted by such perceptions, TWAIL designs its agenda to safeguard the 
interests and rights of the peoples of the Third World from the domineering groups. 
The socialist ingenuity of some TWAIL scholars has identified the domineering 
groups as representatives of the capitalist class142 and socio-economic marginalization 
perpetrated by them as a class-oriented action. They often identify themselves as anti-
hegemonic as well. In that order of things, TWAIL’s revolutionary reformism turns 
                                                 
132 Id.  
133 On the correlation between the past, memory, and the present, see generally BARBARA A. MISZTAL, THEORIES 
OF SOCIAL REMEMBERING (2003), pp.99-125. et seq.  
134 This Aristotelian observation is presented in McMahon, supra note 118 at 466.  
135 See Allott, supra note 80 at 222 (explaining how humans self-constitute). 
136 See Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. 
INT’L L. J. 353, 397 (1998) (Third World scholars “[s]hare a sense of anger … [t]hat frequently wells into 
outrage”).   
137 I resorted to the expression “revolutionary reformism” since it adequately captures a sentiment emerged from 
colonial discontents, the structural transformation being advocated by TWAIL scholars, and TWAIL’s 
resistance to transnational organizations. For a brief description of the character of revolutions, see R. Stahler-
Sholk, Revolution, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI.  (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, 
eds. 2001), pp.13299-13302.       
138 Allott transmits this view in the following words: “Using socially the self-conceived capacities of individual 
consciousness (imagination and reason and memory and language), society constructs great structures of ideas 
which may be called theories”. (original parenthesis and emphasis). Allott supra note 80 at 224.     
139 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL 
Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 171, 176, 177 (2005).  
140 See generally B.S. Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World 
Approach, 8 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. (2007).  
141 See generally, Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 9.    
142 See B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2004)   
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out to be a reconstruction of class hierarchies143 and TWAIL’s stand for securing the 
collective common interests of a marginalized class.    
Although successful in rallying the Third World scholars under a single banner, 
the oppositional and revolutionary stance has not rendered TWAIL a “monolithic 
collegium”.144 There are obviously structural and attitudinal reasons for the 
heterogeneity within TWAIL, but according to TWAIL scholars, more than anything 
else it is the “divide and rule” line of attack of the “transnational elites”, first against 
the Third World nomenclature and then against Third World coalitions, both of which 
threatens the unity of TWAIL.145 TWAIL suspects that such imperial strategies operate 
through an elite intelligentsia and for this reason Third World international lawyers 
need to, as B.S. Chimni says, “refuse to unquestioningly reproduce scholarship that is 
suspect from the standpoint of the interests of the Third World peoples”146 and develop 
as alternatives to “mainstream Northern scholarship” inter alia public-oriented 
projects in the form of visual arts and like pursuits.147 TWAIL thereby recognizes 
vestiges of imperialism and class domination in a portion of international law 
scholarship which are to be dealt with through a “hermeneutics of suspicion”.148  
What does TWAIL aim to achieve in its overall scholarly course of action? 
Evidently, to provide a foundational critique of international law that draws on 
empirical understandings149 and thereby transform international law into a law of 
emancipation.150 Having these objectives in focus and therefore persisting in a mode of 
action that transcends the historical and doctrinal foundations of international law, 
TWAIL has already laid an epistemological base which has to steer and legitimize any 
future course of action.151 However, as seen above, TWAIL epistemology, despite the 
constructionist claims, has been shaped by a process commencing with a 
phenomenological prejudice in favor of the Third World—determined by the current 
situationality of the scholars—prior to any constructionist analysis and assimilating 
histories to the present.152 The assimilation of the history of domination into TWAIL’s 
present identity injects hatred and a cultural vendetta against the West into the 
scholastic sensibilities of TWAIL followers. Chances are that novices in TWAIL 
subconsciously absorb this hatred such that in their analyses of international law they 
apply an oppositional dialectic,153 which perpetuates a class struggle,154 resulting in an 
                                                 
143 See B.S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 29 
(2004) (quoting Harold J. Laski).  
144 See Okafor, supra note 139 at 176.  
145 B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 3, 6 
(2006).  
146 Id. at 15.  
147 Id. at 22.  
148 On hermeneutics of suspicion as a stance of TWAIL, see Sunter, supra note 107 at 497-501.  
149 “Empirical understanding” means what Chimni states, the “lived experience of the ordinary peoples”, and is 
synonymous to what Sunter calls “marginalized world-views”. See Chimni, supra note 140 at 00; Sunter, 
supra note 107 at 478.  
150 Chimni, supra note 140 at 00 
151 Parmar sees this epistemology as the conceptual guide for pursuing human rights. See Pooja Parmar, TWAIL: 
An Epistemological Inquiry, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 363 (2008).  
152 See supra Sub-section: TWAIL and Historiographical Method.  
153 For an illustrative account of how an oppositional dialectic comes to exist, see Raj Bhala, Marxist Origins of 
the ‘Anti-Third World’ Claim, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 132 (2000) (holds that a foundational belief in the 
Marxian critiques on capitalism is the cause of the claim that the multilateral trading system is hostile to the 
interests of the third world). However, citing this illustration does not imply my support for the multilateral 
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epistemological partition of international law scholarship. As a result, the identity 
symbols being sent by TWAIL epistemology to various Third World actors have the 
character of self-centeredness and self-absorption. In a word, the epistemological 
foundation, upon which coalesced the common interest of the Third World actors, has 
the vestiges of personal interests.   
Accordingly, what has been deemed as common interest in TWAIL is a group 
interest—a collective pursuit of personal interests, a sort of “empathy-induced 
altruism”155—as against any melioristic visions. This approach, squarely hits the idea 
of doctrines expressed above, i.e., the subconscious loyalty of a group to certain 
deeply entrenched sentiments and collective observance of the ideals emerging from 
such loyalty.156 This intellectual position renders TWAIL doctrinal in nature. Being 
doctrinal in nature, the lack of altruism and presence of personal interest (attributes of 
doctrine) corrupts the concept of common interest in TWAIL, causing its search 
through international law for a global order whereby Third World “bonds with the rest 
of the humanity”157 to be self-defeating.   
At this juncture, the scenario demands a self-reflective question: Can one pass 
judgment on TWAIL for being non-altruistic? After all, TWAIL’s end-goal of social 
restructuring has an ameliorating effect and Third Worldism, to which TWAIL adds a 
voice, is a revolution against the injustice of discrimination and cultural 
marginalization. On one hand, understanding its epistemology from a goal-oriented 
perspective in all probability renders TWAIL criticism-proof, for TWAIL does not 
incite an unreflective upsurge but only champions a rational revolution from below,158 
a revolution for the amelioration of the plight of peoples living under the gloom of 
famine, poverty, hunger, homelessness, and economic underdevelopment. On the other 
hand, if we understand the world as experiencing substantial value loss—values of 
love, kindness, tolerance, unselfishness, and oneness—we envisage a revolution in our 
minds.159 The revolution in the mind is the realization of the monism of self and 
human reality. It is such a realization that drives human reason to higher planes, a 
cognitive frame in which altruism eclipses ego. In that order of things, any populist-
                                                                                                                                                        
trading system. And, it should not either be seen as self-contradictory to the critiques of capitalism I provide 
later in this Article (see infra Section III). My purpose is to emphasize how morbid obsession with ideologies 
can destroy altruism.     
154 See generally and contra B.S. Chimni, Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L. (2010) (argues for a class-based approach towards international law in order to better assess the 
structural and intellectual divides in the world).  
155 The concept of “empathy-induced altruism” is discussed and experimentally verified as threatening the 
common good in C. Daniel Batson et al., Two Threats to the Common Good: Self-Interested Egoism and 
Empathy-Induced Altruism, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1999).  
156 See supra note 28 and the accompanying text thereof.  
157 David P. Fidler, Revolt Against or from within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future 
Direction of International Law, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29, 32 (2003).  
158 See Chimni, supra note 154 at 78, 79 (recommends that all social struggles, such as TWAIL, espouse non-
violence as the preferred strategy). 
159 The raw idea of mind revolting against injustice metaphorically appears in Bhagavad Gita as Krishna (the 
universal consciousness) reincarnating in the world (mind) to save humankind from maladies: “[t]o destroy 
evil [and] to set standards of sacred duty, I appear in age after age” (as Krishna’s counsel to Arjuna). See THE 
BHAGAVAD GITA: KRISHNA’S COUNSEL IN TIME OF WAR 52 (Barbara Stoler Miller, trans. 1986). In the 
modern day context, revolution in the mind is what Allott conceived as the first step towards an international 
society. See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 257.      
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style revolutions diffusing hatred and resentment are impediments to achieving a just 
world.160 TWAIL loses merit on this point.       
The critical articulation above is neither a cavalier rejection of the tears and 
sorrows of countless human beings in the Third World nor does it characterize an 
inclination towards the promotion of universalistic ideals. What prompts this discourse 
is my optimism regarding the constitutive potential of cosmic consciousness in 
building a better world, my agnosticism about philosophical formalism, and love for 
humanity.161  
Having found the common interest sought by TWAIL to be of an egoistic quality, 
I now turn to global governance to assay its phenomenological character.  
  
2. Global Governance: A distorted conception 
     
Social theory and thought at first flickered inside international law in the wake of 
numerous triumphs and failures in the world—politics triumphed over ideology, self 
over society, rhetoric over narrative and, unprecedently, time over the past.162 During 
that turbulent time, “normative entropy”163 beset the structure of the field, regardless 
of the relentless urge by the scholars of international law to resist any design beyond 
the rule format and dogmatic reasoning.164 However, to survive that turbulence they 
had to compromise their conformism and yield to social theoretic thought. Towards 
the end of the millennium, scholars streamlined their beliefs into an idea that an 
inexorable fatalism had struck all branches of knowledge and that they and their 
discipline, like every other scholars and their disciplines were in the midst of a 
transition. They spoke as if a sweeping tragedy had affected the world that shattered 
the element of coherence in all types of knowledge, turning knowledge into an 
adimensional, borderless space.165 Many scholars have had an Enlightenment 
upbringing and they detested any type of vastness and infiniteness, phenomena which 
                                                 
160 However, lately, TWAIL scholars lean towards spiritually radiated visions regarding human unity. See B.S. 
Chimni, Retrieving “Other” Visions of the Future: Sri Aurobindo and the Ideal of Human Unity, in 
DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 197-217 (Branwen Gruffydd Jones, ed. 2006) (“[t]he stress on 
inner transformation helps those participating in the struggle for a just world order keep away egoistic 
concerns and ensure the presence of ethical behavior in transformative politics”. Id. at 211.)  
161 In addition, I intended an auto-critique of TWAIL for a reassessment of its agenda. It is, however, frightening 
and disappointing to see that TWAIL has set up a conceptual categorization, one Mutua names as a 
“minimalist assimilationist” class, which is a sort of “condemned cell” to abandon all those whom TWAIL 
deems as betrayers. Such classing can be harmful that any introspective students of international law face the 
risk of being branded betrayers by TWAIL crusaders. See Mutua, supra note 103.  
162 Probably the triumph of time over the past takes with it all other cases of triumphs and failures. For a pithy 
account, see Christine Desan, Out of the Past: Time and Movement in Making the Present, 1UNBOUND: HARV. 
J. LEGAL LEFT 39 (2005).  
163 “Normative entropy” refers to a normative fissure in the doctrinal understanding of international law and the 
resulting confusion in the governance pattern of the discipline. Falk has used the expression referring to 
certain inevitable spillovers of a philosophical shift from modernism to postmodernism. See Richard A. Falk, 
In pursuit of the Postmodern, in SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIETY: POSTMODERN VISIONS 81, 89 (David Gray 
Griffin, ed. 1988). However, in spite of the considerable parallelism in our meaning attributions, I request the 
reader to provide normative entropy the meaning I have attributed it.    
164 I do not typecast scholars of international law here. The level of conformism varies from member to member 
within the community of international law scholars. Irrespective of one’s allegiance to the mainstream, 
socially oriented thinking is a matter of style that might have been followed by many.  
165 At least the malady part of the transition is apparent from the discussion on fragmentation of international law 
and its various facets.  
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they condemn as “imprecision” or “metaphysical traps”. Because of this aversion, little 
did they attribute to the transition a philosophical or meta-connotation; rather they 
described the transition as an outcome of certain “political realities”.166 Hence, for the 
scholars of international law, any mode of governance for the changing world is 
nothing but a political process. It is against the backdrop of this mindset that I seek the 
element of common interest in the new mode of governance.167  
 In the midst of global changes, there has been an amalgamation of political 
ideology and market forces.168 These new alignments have generated friction in the 
working of existing social systems, which in turn have engendered a feeling of 
discontent among people with the overall global process.169 The discontent is not only 
ubiquitous in the social system but also pervades individuals’ inner world. Treading 
the path of reform, an “invisible governance”170 has heightened the interaction 
between people and “systems”171 all over the world under a banner of “collective 
regulation of social affairs”.172 Accordingly, it is a common discontent that is what 
may be the primary conjectural cause of marshalling peoples and interlinking their 
concerns into an epistemology of reform named “global governance”.173   
 Given that the common discontent relates to contemporary social systems, global 
governance is tasked to contrive alternative systems.174 The “top-down” pattern of 
governance has hitherto not been able to reach every type and level of social system.175 
                                                 
166 See R.S. Pathak, & Ramaa Prasad Dhokalia, Editorial Note, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS 
IN MEMORY OF NAGENDRA SINGH (R.S. Pathak, & Ramaa Prasad Dhokalia, eds. 1992).     
167 This storyline is continued later in this section. See supra notes 212-232 and the accompanying text thereof. 
168 The understanding I have on the symbiosis of politics and market is informed initially by the lectures of 
Profs. B.S. Chimni and Manmohan Agarwal, and later on shaped by, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital 
Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 7 (1999). For a recent 
summary of various views on state-market relationship and the dynamics of it, see Simon Lee & Stephen 
McBride, Introduction, in NEO-LIBERALISM, STATE POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 1 (Simon Lee & Stephen McBride, eds. 2007).   
169 Statements of this sort, though have become cliché, cannot be jettisoned as long as a coherence is found in 
describing the global process. On the lack of coherence, see generally Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg, 
Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185 (2006).  
170 A prior use of the term “invisible governance” by John Mathiason as a lament on the penumbra cast over 
international secretariats should not weaken my intent with the term that a “beyond formalism” type of 
governance has come to exist. JOHN MATHIASON, INVISIBLE GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS IN 
GLOBAL POLITICS (2007).   
171 “System” denotes a social system such as institutions, cultural clusters (e.g., diasporas), family, trade union, 
etc.     
172 See Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 169 at 188. Drawing on Renate Mayntz the authors inform that 
governance refers “to all coexisting forms of collective regulation of social affairs, including the self-
regulation of civil society, the coregulation of public and private actors, and authoritative regulation through 
government”. Id.      
173 By way of an introduction to global governance, see K. Benedict, Global Governance, in INT’L 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA   SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 6232 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001) (“Global 
governance is the combination of international and patterned human interactions that regulate action 
worldwide for the common good”. Id. at 6232).  
174 Of late, there emerged many alternative [legal] perspectives—“re-imaginations”—(mostly academic and 
intellectual in nature) on how to govern the world. For a review of these perspectives in view of global 
governance, see David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 827, 835-847 
(2008) (the many efforts to re-imagine the world should complement an understanding of the dynamics of time 
and space: “There is too much work we still need to do simply to understand how it works, how the forces and 
factors we have overlooked might be brought into the analysis”. Id. at 858).  
175 A top-down pattern for global governance does not mean absence of any bottom-up approach. Several 
regional, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic groups have been following bottom-up approaches. Here I differentiate 
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Yet, it has addressed the upper-layer issue of the decentralized nature of the 
international system that today scholars all over the world contemplate as a new means 
and methods of governing the world. Their starting point is an “assumption” that a 
compound network of culture, politics, law, and society exists at an abstract level.176 
Homogenizing and concretizing the elements in this network would mean global 
governance in a realistic sense.177 In other words, finding a common interest of the 
peoples, and if it is not found, then coordinating their assorted interests into a 
linearity,178 is the basic function of global governance.179  
To sum up, the world is navigating through a turbulence, an act which Rosenau 
conceives as passing “from one moment in time to the next”, by means of certain 
“reflective and reflexive”180 moves.181 These actions in their totality may be called 
“politics”. In what ensues, I demonstrate that governance in the name of common 
interest of the peoples of the world is nothing but politics. Later I assert that by casting 
global governance as politics the true directives of this transformative era have been 
distorted. The involvement of politics and the non-altruistic intent of global 
governance evince that there is no true common interest in its design.  
 
a. Governance is Politics  
  
  If it is the definitional burden that turns global governance hostile to any 
taxonomy, for politics it is the “proteanism” of the concept.182 Yet, politics may be 
tersely described183 as a discourse that has various patterns of manifestation.184 
Because politics is a discourse, it is a product of human reason and it functions on the 
basis of a prejudiced rationality.185 This character of politics may render any political 
                                                                                                                                                        
between the top-down and bottom-up approaches in the manner that top-down is the original pattern of 
governance (mostly multilateral concerns) and bottom-up approaches are bargains of the relevant actors to 
secure a good deal in global governance. When enquired about their respective priority-focus for global 
governance, many prominent scholars, though stood diverse with regard to their priority-areas, have consent as 
to the “trickle down” nature of governance. See generally, Global Social Policy Forum, 1 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 
1 (2001).  
176 See Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 169 at 192.  
177 Id. at 195.  
178 See James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 13 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 
eds. 1992), pp.1-29 at 13 (citing the example of the possible co-existence between the Islamic and the Western 
orders)  
179 This statement is an objective formulation of the view of K. Benedict that global governance is related to “an 
increasing consciousness of the interconnectedness of human activity on planet”. Benedict, supra note 173 at 
6233. 
180 These terms have broader connotation that all the governance related “moves and shakes” in the present 
world are condensed into them.  
181 See generally, Rosenau, supra note 178 at 5-7.  
182 See William Keech, Politics, Economics, and Politics Again, 53 J. POL. 597, 597 (1991).  
183 I timidly endeavor to express the concept of politics on the basis of the description of Stigler’s research by 
Keech. My intention is modest; I only seek a rhetorical escape route towards finding the level of politics in 
global governance. See Id. For the original research by Stigler, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 RAND J. ECO. 3 (1971).  
184 The statement is derived from Keech’s quotes from Stigler: “[p]olitics is an imponderable, a constantly and 
unpredictably shifting mixture of forces of the most diverse nature, comprehending acts of great moral virtue [   
] and of the most vulgar venality [   ]”. See, Keech, supra note 182 at 598.   
185 See id. (political systems “[a]re rationally devised and rationally employed, which is to say that they are 
appropriate instruments for the fulfillment of desires of members of the society”) (quoting Stigler).  
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action egoistic. Given that reason can be prejudiced—and in that way egoistic—
politics often witnesses a conflict between ego-driven personal interests and the 
interests of the community at large (common interests).186 Hence, a good political 
action is a proper balancing of reason and the prejudice that tends to eclipse the 
reason.187 In other words, “politics is […] the process by which private preferences are 
balanced against ‘permanent and aggregate interests of the community”.188 It is this 
process of balancing common and personal interest that maintains virtually all modern 
“international configurations”.189    
First, how have we had politics playing its balancing role and how does it 
perform a similar function in global governance?190 That is chronicled briefly 
below,191 to the effect that politics carried out the role of balancing common interest 
and individual interest initially by way of “power moves” and then, in global 
governance, through the interaction of ideas.  
Socio-political forms of the past only perpetuated self-centeredness. That is to 
say, structures such as the state, government, family, and organized religion specified 
groups of concurring individuals maximizing their respective benefits.192 They divided 
the power [unequally] among themselves and erected normative edifices within which 
they equilibrated their respective interests193. Any idea of the common interest of 
humanity was alien to them. However, when the massive socio-political 
                                                 
186 This conflict is apparent in many branches of knowledge. See e.g., Keech, supra note 182 (in the context of 
economics, the author claims that perhaps economics is a discipline which is successful in demonstrating “that 
there can be a systematic connection between individual selfishness and collective well-being”. Id. at 599); 
See generally, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 
(1975) (articulates that legal materials oscillate between the binaries of individualism and altruism, the pattern 
which manifests as conflict between rules and standards).    
187 Cf. Clarke E. Cochran, Political Science and ‘The Public Interest’, 36 J. POL. 327, 328 (1974). In a pathology 
of contemporary political science, Cochran postulates that the political process is a synthesis of varied 
personal and group interests and their transformation “into outputs, policies, or outcomes which, temporarily 
at least, satisfy the interests of the political actors”.    
188 Keech, supra note 182 at 608 (drawing on James Madison). For Madison’s original statement, see James 
Madison, The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, FEDERALIST 10, 
November 22 1787.  
189 The expression “international configurations” refers to the many types of reorganizations, general and 
sectoral, being done in the name of governance.      
190 The objective of this question is to trace the changing sequence of political control.  
191 Staying away from a methodical presentation with the aid of various ideology shifts and schools of thought as 
to how politics performed its balancing role, I densely pack those developments into a few assertions.     
192 This observation is derived from the realist position which views world as comprising of “conflict-ridden” 
states, “concerned preeminently with their security and pursuing power as the means to assure their survival”. 
A. Stein, Realism/Neorealism, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 12812, 12812-15 (Neil J. 
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001). However, the self-centeredness of families and religion has to be on a 
different foundation. The idea that families are/were self-centric is an inference drawn on the understanding 
that families are receptive to economic and political changes. For a research analyzing the extent to which 
family values accept and resist economic and political trends, see generally Gerald W. Creed, ‘Family Values’ 
and Domestic Economies, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 329 (2000) (“family is largely the dependent 
variable in relation to capitalism and the state, but cultural commitments can influence family ‘adaptations’ in 
nuanced ways”). Id. at 332.  
193 The theory of hegemonic stability and the concept and dynamics of regimes are condensed into this 
statement. On hegemony, the role of power in international relations, regime dynamics, the waning of 
hegemony, and state of international relations after the hegemony, see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).  
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transformation traumatized the power orientation among the groups,194 the curtains 
separating them were lifted, exposing state, government, etc., to the stark reality of the 
decay of formalism. Phenomenally the world entered a phase in which power became 
the weakest catalyst in balancing conflicting group-interests. From this point a 
dialectic of “alternatives” developed.  
The search for models of governance alternative to the power-oriented one was 
intensely subjective in that what was sought was an optimal mode of governance that 
could sustain the emergent interdependency (following the evaporation of power) 
among the states. Hence, networks were chosen as the apposite mode of governance. 
These “thickets of organizational networks” linking state and civil society actors have 
become the “sites of governance”195 within which governance proceeds by way of 
trans-sectoral deliberations and actions involving a multitude of actors.196 This mode 
of governance has a sort of flexibility and informality which have grown out of the 
weakening of traditional political structures and the decay of formalism. In addition, 
an instrumental rationality that engages individuals with active strategies for 
maximizing their utility,197 by adumbrating the “formal rationality” related to the day 
to day activities in various normative superstructures, emerged as the functional logic 
of the new mode of governance.198 From a legal perspective, the scenario entailed a 
“deconstruction of procedural and substantive rights, the dissolution of the normative 
legality that is historically embedded in formal justice, and the deformation of 
constitutional protections and safe-guards”.199     
In this overall process of the withering of time-space bound institutional 
mechanisms and the emergence of a floating and flexible system of governance, the 
idea of democracy and its conceptual associates—justice, fairness and equality—had 
to be situated in the new order. What the new era required was a new arrangement in 
lieu of traditional political structures to carry out the democratic process, for it was 
through democratic ideals that politics with its “power moves” has been equilibrating 
the common interest of the community and individual interests. However, democracy, 
if it is the raw Aristotelian idea of “rule and to be ruled”200 and setting a balance 
between the right to rule (asserting one’s individual standpoint or personal interest) 
and getting ruled (streamlining one’s choices with the society’s general interest or the 
common interest), always requires structural forms such as a government. When 
schematizing global governance, it became hard for raw democratic ideals to detach 
                                                 
194 Conceptual and political niceties on how interdependence replaced power orientation are articulated in 
ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 
(1977).  
195 Peter Bogason & Juliet A. Musso, The Democratic Prospects of Network Governance, 36 AM. REV. PUB. 
ADMIN. 3, 3 (2006).  
196 See generally, Id.  
197 Wolf Heydebrand, Process Rationality as Legal Governance: A Comparative Perspective, 18 INT’L SOC. 325, 
330 (2003).  
198 See generally Id. The overpowering rationality in Heydebrand’s analysis (drawn on Weber) is “process 
rationality” and not “instrumental rationality”. However, he informs that the mutual boundaries between the 
concepts are often vague. Id. at 332.    
199 Id. at 334.  
200 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 144 (Stephen Everson, ed. 1988).  
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themselves from the structural embedment of nation states201 and get re-embedded in 
the new interactive form of governance202. The biggest challenge was the reluctance on 
the part of democratic states to extend internationally the values they practiced in a 
state setting.203 A fear that any forfeiture of sovereignty to international machineries 
could obstruct states’ maximization of benefits as well as an awareness that power—
the balancing agent—does not any longer have its potency to resist the likely surge of 
conflicting interests (thereby striking a balance) when democracy is an international 
affair exacerbated the governance crisis. However, the solution was found by 
envisaging a conceptual space in which the networked interactions would take place. 
That space was to become the democratic foundation of the new form of governance.   
 In the interactive democratic process, sovereignty has been redesigned to mean 
an optimal allocation of relevant functions among the various actors.204 The ever 
contested conceptual associates of democracy such as justice, fairness, and legitimacy 
are asserted by way of a postmodern dialectic and rational practices that stand in 
accord with social realities.205 These new arrangements have prompted states to 
unleash their democratic values, which were tied up to the constitutional mindset of 
state actors. Having thus found avenues for practicing international democracy, the 
concern remaining was how it has to be practiced. Meanwhile, the neoliberal ideology 
fueled global capital mobility, setting a common goal of wealth-seeking for the states 
to pursue. However, the competitiveness involved in the pursuit left each state self-
centered and egoistic. The international democracy had to accommodate the common 
interest of capital accumulation and the states’ selfish interest of becoming better off 
than others. At this juncture a balance was struck between the common interests of the 
states and their desire to maximize benefits by way of political moves. In this 
balancing act the states are supported by a variety of actors206 such as non-
governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and civil society,207 who 
negotiate between the conflicting common interests and individual interests.  
                                                 
201 See generally Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy, 36 EUR. J. POL. RES. 1 (1999) 
(discusses the conceptual complexities globalization poses for democracy by delineating democracy from the 
embedment of nation states).      
202 See Daniele Archibugi, Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 437, 445-
53 (2004) (surveys the extent to which a cosmopolitan democracy, which is basically interactive in nature, has 
materialized).      
203 Id. at 441.  
204 See generally John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 782 (2003).  
205 This statement might sound more a generalization, however, it has been informed by scholarly works e.g. 
Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 405 (2006) (theorizing legitimacy in the governance era, propose “a global public standard for the 
normative legitimacy of global governance institutions”).   
206 It is to this balancing act that Halabi refers when he avows that “global governance is an attempt to administer 
globalization and resolve disputes between states so that developing as well as developed countries can pursue 
wealth under a constructed structure of their own choice”. See Yakub Halabi, The Expansion of Global 
Governance into the Third World: Altruism, Realism, or Constructivism, 6 INT’L STUD. REV. 21, 24 (2004). 
207 For an appraisal of the role of transnational actors in global governance, see Thomas Risse, Transnational 
Actors and World Politics, in Walter Carlsnaes, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255 (Thomas 
Risse, & Beth Simmons, eds. 2002). 
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In this international democratic process every global actor interacts in some 
fashion with others and conditions the others’ interests, choices, and identities.208 
Interactions, despite their economic leitmotif, are founded on one or a set of varying 
ideas, depending on the sector where and the theme on which the interactions take 
place. These interactions proceed on a discursive basis and their intensification opens 
new discursive courses.209  
When global actors interact, rules and standards of the international system guide 
their behavior by providing transparency to the situation.210 In addition, the 
emancipation of the legal mind from constitutional and formalist rationality and its 
subsequent espousal of an instrumental rationality211 have rendered the legal mind 
willing for any give and take deals in order to maximize the benefits of the respective 
global actor who invokes law. In the main, the balance between the common interest 
of wealth maximization and the selfishness that crops up during this pursuit is effected 
through effective and subjective interaction of ideas. These subjective interactive 
moves constitute politics in global governance.     
 Scholars of international law, in indecision for a time, presently have their 
constitutional mindset adjusted to the changing political rationalities. The fact that 
global processes entail interaction and exchange was recognized by them following a 
meek resistance.212 However, certain affirmations of a deconstructionist school 
regarding the functional futility of formalism daunted scholars’ minds.213 Before the 
ensuing despair took its toll, the deconstructionists returned with a scheme to salvage 
formalism214 and the returnees were identified as dutiful defendants of international 
law215. Their formalism differed considerably from that of the dogmatists in that it was 
an ensemble of certain sensibilities, types of consciousness, and rationalities 
culminating in social virtues such as justice, fairness, and egalitarianism.216 According 
to Martti Koskenniemi, this discursivity is a “culture of formalism” as opposed to the 
formalism associated with structure, “rigidity and objectivity”217 and any other 
                                                 
208 On how interactions shape identity, see generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of It, 46 
INT’L ORG. 391 (1992).  
209 Id. at 35, 36.  
210 See Id. 
211 See supra notes 197-199 and the accompanying text thereof.  
212 Alston criticizes the disinclination shown by international lawyers to accept the reality that a multi-modal 
governance has materialized. See Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and 
Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 435 (1997). For an inside-out view and acceptance of the shifting paradigms 
of international law in the wake of global governance, see Everton Vieira Vargas, Global Challenges and the 
Shaping of International Law, 1 BRAZILIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 166 (2006).    
213 It is with the surge of critical legal theory that many theoretical and practical limitations of international law 
came to light. von Bernstorff opines that Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia has prompted a doctrinal 
agnosticism among the scholars of international law. See generally Jochen von Bernstorff, Sisyphus was an 
International Lawyer: On Martti Koskenniemi’s ‘From Apology to Utopia’ and the Place of Law in 
International Politics, 7 GERMAN L. J. 1015 (2006).  
214 See id. at 1027. But, see Korhonen, supra note 3 at 19 (stating that the anti-formalist stance and the 
subsequent return is part of the war strategy, “knowing the enemy”). This return to formalism is an example of 
the argumentative pattern of international law on a reverse spiraling towards the doctrinal center. See supra 
note 3 and the assertion footnoted thereof.   
215 See Korhonen, supra note 3 at 19, 20.  
216 See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 500 (2002).  
217 Id.  
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contested types of formalism.218 The culture of formalism has a democratic stipulation 
“that those who are in positions of strength must be accountable and those who are 
weak must be heard and protected”.219 In the plain language of politics, accountability 
and the right to be heard and protected are each in themselves balancing acts:  
accountability entails an act of balancing between the particular interests of the ruled 
and the collective interests of the community,220 while the people’s right to be heard 
and protected entails a weighing of the particular choices of the individuals against the 
interests of the community.221 These are discursive acts. However, unlike in the case of 
legal formalism, the discursiveness inside the culture of formalism proceeds neither 
from the interpretative rationality of authority figures nor from any established 
normative practices222 but rather manifests when professionals of international law 
engage in meaningful interactions.223 The balancing of common and personal interests 
                                                 
218 For the other facets of legal formalism, see D. Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & 
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 8634 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes. eds. 2001).  
219 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 216 at 502.  
220 Accountability, according to Grant and Keohane, 
[I]mplies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge 
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose 
sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met. [It] presupposes a 
relationship between power-wielders and those holding them accountable…The concept of 
accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways 
that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for 
failures to do so.   
See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 29, 29, 30 (2005).  
When there is abuse of power, accountability mechanisms impose constraints on such abuse. As a 
democratic practice, accountability involves a rational choice between what is just and unjust when 
performance of the power-wielders is tested against some accepted standards regarding legitimacy. Id. at 30. 
The standards regarding legitimacy in a democratic setting are the common expectations of the peoples who 
confer power on the elected. When exercise of power transcends the standards regarding legitimacy, it marks a 
conceptual eclipse of the common interest of the peoples by the selfish interest of the power-wielders. 
(Compare the statement by Thomas Hartley: “the great end of meeting [in a legislature] is to consult for the 
common good and thus to transcend local or partial view[s]” (internal quotes omitted)), see J. M. Bessette, 
Accountability: Political, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 38, 39, 40 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001).  
Sanctions attached to the accountability mechanisms ensure that a balance is struck between common 
interests of the peoples and selfish interests of the power-wielders.        
221 In a formalist setting, the idea of a right to be heard and protected relates to equity.  Such a right, however, in 
a global setting ensures that individual interests are fairly signified against what has been accepted as the 
common interest. In other words, every individual has a right to take part in the global process by integrating 
their individual insights into the common interest of the community. Often the common interest of the 
community is reflected in and safeguarded by one or another international institution. Participation in the 
global process is by means of “meaningful interactions” and these interactions balance the individual interests 
and common interest. For support, see A.-J. Arnaud, Equity, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL 
SCI. 4729, 4732-33 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001) (“[E]quity has become a referent in the 
framework of globalization, re-emerging in many new areas of legal work”).    
222 Deeming the discursiveness inside legal formalism as a combination of interpretative rationality and 
normative practices is a crude formulation, beyond which lie much profounder applications of logic and 
intellect. See e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 
949 (1988) (articulating that the “immanent intelligibility” of law is the fundamental philosophy of legal 
formalism). 
223 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 216 at 502.  
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through interactions among professionals represents politics in the culture of 
formalism.224  
  Yet, the culture of formalism does not resist deconstructionism.225 It recognizes 
that there is “deformalization” in international law.226 Deformalization, however, takes 
away the conceptual terrain on which interactions take place,227 leaving international 
law devoid of a discursive surface. That being the case, an alternative surface is 
needed for the interactions to occur.228 At this point in time, the culture of formalism 
integrates postmodernity’s demand for a social interdependence into the functioning of 
international law by means of a shift towards an instrumental conception of law 
comprising expertise, active strategies, and conflict management.229 Through this 
instrumental conception of law, actors engage in particularistic interactions and seek 
the universality that might emerge out of such interactions.230 In this way, interactions 
balance the particularistic interests with universalistic interests231. The transitory 
effectiveness of instrumentalism—in contrast to the rigidity and protractedness of legal 
formalism—and a proof against biases,232 all become facets of the culture of 
formalism.       
 Thus, the epistemological drift of international law in our era was perceived and 
conceptualized by the scholars of the discipline with an artful dexterity by being 
doctrinally “atheistic”—traditional fixations no longer contributed to the mechanics of 
international law—whilst they found ontological substitutes for the discipline that are 
capable of causing the same impact as doctrines. In other words, when they attributed 
a political nature (balancing act) to global governance, scholars transposed, mutatis 
                                                 
224 Compare this assertion with Koskenniemi’s statement: “[T]hey [professionals] are engaged in a politics that 
imagines the possibility of a community overriding particular alliances and preferences and allowing a 
meaningful distinction between lawful constraint and the application of naked power”. Id.  
225 What the culture of formalism resists (to include in it) is “universalist ideologies”. However, the culture of 
formalism has in it a scope for the universal but it secures universalism by being “empty” of any catalyst that 
has the risk of triggering biases of sorts. “It [culture of formalism] tries to induce every particularity to bring 
about the universality hidden it”. Id. at 504.   
226 See Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International 
Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL ENQUIRES L. 9, 13 (2007). Koskenniemi defines deformalization as 
“[T]he process whereby the law retreats solely to the provision of procedures or broadly formulated directives 
to experts and decision-makes for the purpose of administering international problems by means of 
functionally effective solutions and balancing interest” (internal quotes omitted). Id at 13.  
227 The doctrinal complex is the conceptual surface on which the discursivity in international law exists.     
228 Cf. id at 14.  
229 See Robert van Krieken, Legal Informalism, Power, and Liberal Governance, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 5, 18 
(2001) (setting an agenda for future research prospects of legal informalism). 
According to Horwitz, a flexible instrumental conception of law is the best tool for effectuating 
transformation and reform. In an historical account of American legal formalism he articulates that formalism 
was preceded by an instrumentalism which was, however, exploited by the wealthy class to secure their 
respective interests. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
251 (1975).  
230 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 216 at 504.   
231 Koskenniemi has also attributed a “balancing” character to instrumentalism. See Koskenniemi, supra note 
226 at 13 (instrumentalism is indirectly defined as those concepts and practices to which deformalization 
retreats—“provision of procedures or broadly formulated directives … for the purpose of administering 
international problems by means of functionally effective solutions and ‘balancing interest’”). See id at 13.  
232 Horwitz asserts that legal formalism in its traditional structural form bears the “legal distribution of wealth 
against the weakest group in the society”, hence formalism has an inherent bias towards certain classes. See 
Horwitz, supra note 229 at 252.   
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mutandis, the dogmatic ethics and professionalism of the thought and practice of 
international law into the modern world in the guise of a “new international law”.  
Is the kind of transformation related above what global governance 
necessitates?233 Can’t it be that the true prescriptions of modernity urged an internal 
transformation, offering an opportunity to recreate the relationship between the self 
and the society234—a spiritual project? If so, is there a “drama of governance”235 being 
enacted before us? These questions are dealt with and answered in the next section.  
 
b. Governance Ought Not To Have Been Thus: A postmodern/quantum turn?  
 
We are the land Where every man 
stands his ground,  
as short of ideas as of faith, 
ever ablaze to inject  
inanities, to capsize conversations. 236 
 
If governance ought not to be the way it is, we have perceptually erred on the side 
of social prescriptions. That erring, however, predates governance, dating back to a 
time when the idea of society was being systematically conceived. The conception of 
global governance is merely the last in a sequence of similar errors.  
Perceptual error occurred for the first time when “objective knowledge” was 
attained by an alienation of the superior mind (soul) from the body; the objectivity 
gained from that knowledge was applied in systematizing the social world.237 It was 
the Enlightenment project that performed this alienation, and post-enlightenment 
visionaries followed suit by denying teleology.238 Both the alienation of soul from the 
body and the denial of teleology turned the world into an imperfect composite of 
miserable but rational humans.239 The Enlightenment thinkers, charged with the 
utilitarian task of improving social life by securing maximum happiness for humans, 
emphasized reason as the medium to control the forces of nature and thereby establish 
order in an otherwise imperfect world.240 Meanwhile, reason crystallized into an 
analytical epistemology, “science”,241 which directed the social process.242 The 
                                                 
233 Heiskanen displays radical sensibilities in this regard, however, with analytical objectives lying far beyond 
that of this Article: “The real call for global philosophy resonates from somewhere else: it is the forceful echo 
of our collective reading of the global reality”. See Veijo Heiskanen, Architexture: An Outline of an 
Alternative Philosophy of Global Governance, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 233, 252 (2006).   
234 See Philip Allott, The Opening of Human Mind, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. (2007) (having passed through many 
gloomy and murky phases, humanity sees “the first signs of a new human springtime”).      
235 See Kennedy, supra note 218 at 8637 (“Formal law is part of the drama of governance, the trivial or 
murderous drama of breaking eggs to make omelettes”).        
236 Robert Nazarene, We Are The Land Where Every Man, 38 AFR. AM. REV. 156 (2004).  
237 Ramashray Roy, Beyond Ego’s Domain: Emotion, Rationality, and Prajnana, 11 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING 
SOC’Y, 1, 2 (1999).  
238 By “denial of teleology” I signify Martin Heidegger’s “death of transcendentalism for the West” more than 
Freidrich Nietzsche’s “death of God”. For a juxtaposition of the views of Heidegger and Nietzsche, see J. 
Glenn Gray, Heidegger ‘Evaluates’ Nietzsche, 14 J. HIST. IDEAS 304 (1953).  
239 Roy, supra note 237 at 9.  
240 Id. at 9, 11.   
241 Id. at 9.   
242 Articulating the evolution of social organization through the life and ideas of Auguste Comte, DeGrange, 
emphasizes the influence science had over the enlightenment thinkers: “No thinker of the period could hesitate 
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objectivity science has provided offers avenues for the exercise of power “and to 
augment a positive balance of felicity, both individual and collective”.243      
The “formulaic approach” of science to social problems244 and the resulting 
epistemological specificity prompted sociologist Auguste Comte to create a new 
science—“social physics”—that has to provide “mankind a guide for directing social 
action”.245 However, social physics was run on the lines of classical physics, which 
considers reality as mere matter.246 In a similar vein, social science espoused the 
Cartesian dualism of the separation and “irreducibility” of the mind and body, with 
social processes assuming a materialistic outlook.247 Ever since, the mind-body 
correlation significantly has remained overlooked.   
When it comes to the human process in the world, it is continual, recurring over 
generations—an exodus from the past, a struggle in the present, and an advance 
towards the future.248 In this process, humanity confronts its reality many times,249 
offering itself a chance to reconceive its true identity.250 Reality affords this 
opportunity by reducing the conflict between the rationalities of materialism and 
nondualism251. Paradoxically, when reality is closer, society and existing social 
structures experience social entropy in the form of normative disorders, indeterminacy 
in thought, conflicting micro-rationalities, and fragmentation of existing knowledge. 
It is true that, lately, an unusual intellectual current has traversed the thought 
pattern of insightful intellectuals and disturbed its “systematicity”.252 Imagination and 
                                                                                                                                                        
as to the choice of route to lead to a new level of knowledge in social phenomena, whereby a guide for 
political action might be had. The road led by way of the spirit and method of science”. See McQuilkin 
DeGrange, Comte’s Sociology, 4 AM. SOC. REV. 17, 18 (1939).     
243 See Roy, supra note 237 at 9, 10.  
244 According to DeGrange, 
In the growth of science, [there is] something more than the quasi mystical application of a 
global methodology to a series of indifferent subject matters. In it he [Auguste Comte] saw 
the slow and successive recognition and the gradual isolation of homogenous classes of 
phenomena; he saw the emergence in each case of a characteristic method adapted to the 
specific nature of each isolated class of data,—a method which could never have been 
provided a priori but could have resulted from assiduous occupation with the isolate itself.  
The cognitive weariness and tedium that might have emerged out of the above process of science is what I 
refer as “formulaic approach” of science.  See DeGrange, supra note 242 at 18, 19. 
245 See id at 19.       
246 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto-critique from a Quantum Perspective, in 
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ALEXANDER WENDT AND HIS CRITICS (Stafano Guzzini 
& Anna Leander, eds. 2006), pp.181-219 at 183. Wendt’s contribution is particularly instructive that the 
sources cited therein have been a broadening learning experience for me.     
247 Id. at 182, 183.  
248 Muniz Sodré, For a Feeling of Humanism: The Political Emergence of the Emotions, 52 DIOGENES 71, 71 
(2005).  
249 Cf. Allott, supra note 80 at 220 (“Humanity has come face-to-face with itself”).  
250 Cf. Allott, supra note 128 at 94.  
251 See Sodré, supra note 248 at 72. Sodré refers to the micro level at which the rationality conflict between 
materialism and nondualism materializes, e.g., the conflict between “History and Destiny, reason and passion, 
logos and pathos”.  
Nondualism in the broader context is the theory that self/soul is a manifestation of reality and that there is 
no duality between the soul/self and reality. At an analytical level nondualism can be reduced to mean “the 
power of consciousness”. For details on the theory of nondualism as it is originally conceived, see J.J. Navone, 
Sankara and the Vedic Tradition, 17 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 248 (1956).  
252 “Systematicity” refers to a “system” which holds its various units together in a relationship and ensures that 
all its units function in unison. See footnote 14 in ‘Jeremy Waldron, ‘Transcendental Nonsense’ and System in 
the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 19 (2000) Et seq.    
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language came under stress in an unprecedented manner whereby an infectious sense 
of crisis in narration threatened human intelligence.253 At a structural linguistic level, 
the meanings that structure texts and discourse waned into an archeology of images254 
and the linguistic cords that lashed society together loosened; social structures 
collapsed as a result and the meanings associated with these structures evaporated.255 
The subsequent social events and conceptual decay showed that what the objectivity of 
human inquiry established as reality was untrue. This denial that the post-
enlightenment social order is the true human reality is an apophasis— Neti, Neti 
(reality is not this).256     
If reality is not this, what is it? To answer this question I refer to the “postmodern 
turn” the world has taken. In the ostensible decay of the social world, a group of 
futuristic philosophers have observed a postmodern turn which calls for the creation of 
new visions, ideas, theories, and processes for reconstituting and sustaining humanity 
and “human habitat”.257 In postmodernity, existing social structures are doomed to a 
gradual collapse; hence alternative means for sustaining sociality are necessary. A 
“textualist approach” has materialized as a response, which has prompted a shift from 
understanding the world empirically/materially to perceiving it rhetorically.258 Richard 
Harvey Brown conceives the shift as thus:   
 
Humans enact truth not by legislating it scientifically, but by 
performing it rhetorically. Our knowledge of truth is not based on some 
extralinguistic rationality, because rationality itself is demystified and 
reconstituted as a historical construction and deployment by human 
rhetors. Logic and reason are down from their absolute, preexistent 
heights into the creative, contextual web of history and action.259    
 
                                                 
253 See Barbara Creed, From Here to Modernity: Feminism and Postmodernism, in A POSTMODERN READER 403 
(Joseph Natoli & Linda Hutcheon, eds. 1993). Against this crisis, a few discourses of the time reacted, 
however, upon exerting stiff resistance, they collapsed before the intellectual tempest. See Neville Wakefield, 
POSTMODERNISM: THE TWILIGHT OF THE REAL 3 (1990).  
254 See generally Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, in THE POSTMODERN TURN: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL THEORY (Steven Seidman, ed.1994), pp.27-38. For Lyotard, postmodernism 
characterizes the “obsolesce of the meta narratives” and the immediately subsequent state of linguistic decay, 
id at 27).   
255 For an understanding that texts and language structure society see Richard Harvey Brown, Rhetoric, 
Textuality, and the Postmodern Turn in Sociological Theory, in THE POSTMODERN TURN: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON SOCIAL THEORY 229 (Steven Seidman, ed. 1994).  
256 Apophasis of arriving at the reality is well established in Brhdaranyaka Upanishad which by a deductive 
method—“Neti, Neti” (not this, not this)—verifies that the spatial-temporal material world is a false reality. 
This inquiry continues by ruling out, through various “methods of living” (see supra note 47 and the text 
thereof), one falsity after another until one arrives at the Brahman, the ultimate reality. For insights, see D.C. 
Mathur, The Concept of Self in the Upanishads: An Alternative Interpretation, 32 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 390 (1972). For a description on how this apophasis manifests in practice, see RAM 
DASS, PATHS TO GOD: LIVING THE BHAGAVAD GITA 84-86 (2004) (in meditation, the seekers of truth instruct 
the mind that the material perceptions such as sound, colour, smell, and light are not signs of reality).  
257 Allott speaks of a three dimensional human habitat: the natural world, the social world, and the inner world. 
In the natural world and social world, the “self” is identified within the time-space framework, whereas true 
human self can be explored only in the inner world. See Allott, supra note 80 at 220, 221.  
258 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Postmodernism and Language, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 76, 76 (Roy Boyne 
and Ali Rattansi, eds. 1990) (drawing on Lyotard); See generally Brown, supra note 255.   
259 Brown, supra note 255 at 131.  
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At the level of active socialization, thought and language facilitate a discursiveness 
through which individuals and groups could interweave their inner illumination into a 
sociality which when comes to exist would mark a union of mind and body. 
Philosophers of science aver that such a sociality is in the offing;260 the physical world 
has shed its materialism and spatial-temporality and moved away from the classical 
physics of dualism to a “macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon” of holism 
and wave-particle interconnectedness.261 This quantum phenomenon is the physical 
representation of reality262 which originally transpires in the mind.263   
Before the postmodern turn, the world was in a state of anarchy where global 
actors were self-seeking in thought and action.264 In that era, human thinking and 
sociality did not have any being-specific values beyond its organic structure and 
pattern. Humans lived a life of theatrical realism by enacting their life as directed by 
their imperfect reason as if it were their reality.265 War, insurgences, conquests, etc. 
were vigorously performed under the guidance of their somatic rationality. However, 
reality has an “unveiling” property in that it often reveals itself to humanity in the form 
of a “top-down guidance” which originates from a “superintelligent” matrix.266 This 
revelation occurs in both material and nonmaterial forms.267 At a material level reality 
manifests as quantum wave functions268 and at the nonmaterial level in our 
                                                 
260 See generally DANAH ZOHAR & IAN MARSHALL, THE QUANTUM SOCIETY: MIND, PHYSICS AND A NEW 
SOCIAL VISION (1993).  
261 Wendt, supra note 246 at 183. For an appraisal of the various views regarding mind-body correlation in a 
quantum perspective, see Harald Atmanspacher, Quantum Theory and Consciousness: An Overview with 
Selected Examples, 8 DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE & SOC’Y 51 (2004).    
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Wendt, supra note 246 at 196, 197. However, that does not render the scope of quantum physics as an analogy 
for understanding social dynamics. On the optimality and viability of science (especially quantum physics) as 
a metaphor for social phenomena, see Dimitris Akrivoulis, The ‘Quantum Politics’ Metaphor in International 
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REV. 1 (1928) (Munro is cynical about any analogy between science and the social if it is to prompt a 
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political process); Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 97 
(2007) (asserts that given the variation in social participation and the differences in the levels of social 
occurrences, a “tipping point” triggering social change is difficult to ascertain, turning the concept of critical 
mass into an “imperfect analogy” vis-à-vis the social world).   
In this connection, I invite the readers to compare Sokal’s controversial ridicule (in the form of a spoof) of 
the attitudes and approaches of the “postmodernist epistemology”. See Alan D. Sokal, Transgressing 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 SOC. TEXT 217 (1996). On 
the linguistic typology of the article in Sokal’s own words, see Alan D. Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with 
Cultural Studies, LINGUA FRANCA, May/June, 1996.     
262 ZOHAR & MARSHALL, supra note 260 at 189.  
263 See Subhash Sharma, Routes to Reality: Scientific and Rishi Approaches, 7 J. HUMAN VALUES 75, 77, 78 
(2001). 
264 This has been the contention of political realists. See generally ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER MEYER & 
VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 83-135 (1997).  
265 See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 125, 126.  
266 See Tariq Mustafa, Development of Objective Criteria to Evaluate the Authenticity of Revelation, 43 ZYGON 
737, 741 (2008).  
267 See Lothar Schäfer, Nonempirical Reality: Transcending the Physical and Spiritual in the Order of the One, 
43 ZYGON 329, 330 (2008).  
268 Id. at 336.  
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consciousness as brain waves.269 Quantum Chemist Lothar Schäfer, drawing on Hans-
Peter Dürr, asserts that reality is immanent and absolute in itself that it initially reveals 
itself to consciousness.270 It is consciousness that has to constitute matter.271 In the 
state of matter an empirical inequity can divulge reality by way of quantum mechanics 
and in a nonmaterial state the same can be discovered in transcendental meditative 
states.272   
Once a quantum path is preferred for discovering reality, a reasonable faith in the 
mysteriousness of quantum physics is called for. It is good to pay attention to Zohar 
and Marshall’s signal: “Things are very different in quantum reality”, for in the 
quantum realm indeterminacy and unpredictability permeate.273 The quantum world, 
according to Niels Bohr, comprises electrically charged particles which make 
unpredictable moves from one energy state to another,274 a phenomenon which Bruce 
Rosenblum cynically wits as “damn quantum jumps”.275 Zohar and Marshall elaborate 
the mechanics of these quantum jumps: 
 
Each possible journey and each eventual destination [of the electrons] is 
associated with a probability, but nothing is ever determined. 
Indeterminacy […] characterizes the quantum realm. The electrons may 
go to the next lowest state, it may go to the next highest state, it may 
leap over several intermediate states or even double back on itself.276 
(original italics)  
 
However, physicist Erwin Schrödinger’s interference in Bohr’s quantum dynamics 
added to the understanding regarding the quantum world that it not only comprises of 
plain particles but such particles have waves around their nucleus.277 In that state, 
when particles collide, their waves interpenetrate each other, retaining the basic 
character of the particle but assimilating the wave character of one another.278 “The 
two […] relate internally; they get inside each other and evolve together. The new 
system to which their overlapping gives rise now has its own particle and wave aspect, 
and its own corporate identity”.279 When placed in a larger network such interactions 
would generate a collectivity of charged electrons sharing and assimilating their 
immanent properties.  
                                                 
269 See generally id.  
270 Id. at 342.  
271 Id. This view is seemingly contradictory to the Vedic cosmology in the sense that according to Vedic 
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Having thus postulated a quantum dynamics, Schrödinger further prepared a 
“thought experiment”280 and discovered that electrons not only make numerous jumps 
from one state to another but also may exist in more than one state or in all states at the 
same time, rendering the real situation a set of probabilities.281 Schrödinger 
demonstrates this probability with the example of a cat in an opaque box with a 
“fiendish device that decides, randomly, whether to feed the cat with healthy food or to 
give it poison”.282 Whether the cat will live or die depends on what the device feeds 
the cat. For an observer, the reality regarding the cat is a probability.283 This 
indeterminacy/probability regarding the reality collapses once the box is opened—
probabilities collapse and reality emerges.284   
While, quantum dynamics, in conjunction with the advances of theoretical 
physics, has a more profound and expanding knowledge base, the thumbnail sketch 
provided above will suffice for the purpose of this Article. Having thus reduced 
quantum mechanics to its core ideas, I now turn to draw conclusion regarding the 
bearing it has for the postmodern social world. I do this by separating quantum 
dynamics from what Schrödinger’s thought experiment revealed. First, I consider the 
thought experiment.    
The ubiquity of microphysical particles in various states that Schrödinger has 
discovered engenders an indeterminacy of sorts, for ubiquity, when it offers multiple 
realities, hides the true reality from any observers. This appearance of numerous 
realities before the observers and their being prompted to choose the true reality is the 
social condition I described earlier as humanity’s coming in proximity to their 
reality.285 The apparent social decay and intellectual asymmetries are results of the 
indeterminacy fueled by the invasion of multiple realities. On balance, as an artful 
observation collapses the probabilities into the true reality in quantum physical world, 
the social world needs similar intellectual methods to dismantle the misguided idea of 
reality it has constituted on the basis of classical Newtonian physics, the truism 
regarding which Zohar and Marshall succinctly capture as follows: the “impenetrable 
[particles] become the individual [egoistic] ‘units’ of society, whose necessarily 
external relations are mediated by power and influence, suspicion, and mistrust”.286 To 
have an intellectual method to explode the notions regarding reality, both social 
scientists and their peers in frontier disciplines such as law need to recognize the 
logical potential of metaphysics in eliminating probabilities and identify the true 
reality.  
Now I turn to quantum dynamics. The rise of quantum consciousness in the 
scientific world underlined matter as a composite of energized particles which have 
both a particle-like and wave-like character.287 The collision of particles and their 
assimilation of wave character while retaining their particle character bring about new 
                                                 
280 See Id.  
281 Id. at 27-29.  
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physical states of matter,288 which is a sign of an “emergent reality”.289 That being the 
dynamics in the physical world, at the social level the same dynamics provides for 
assimilative interaction among the peoples, which “leads to new elements of 
consciousness from which the learning process starts out anew”.290 In sum, 
comparable to that of the physical world, the interaction in the social world prompts a 
search for a higher level of consciousness and a gradation of consciousness to that 
level, the dialectic which Allott incorporates into the idea of philosophy as “the self-
perfecting of human beings”.291 Such is the nature of transformation our age 
demanded.292  
 
Living with the Error. Regardless of what was ordained and what was churned out, a 
generation of social thinkers and professionals engaged in building on a post-
enlightenment error, an error glorified in the name of scientism, objectivity, 
rationalism, empiricism, and positivism.293 They first censured philosophy294 and its 
principal variant—metaphysics—as lacking immanent objectivity (and hence 
intelligibility),295 disregarding the fact that metaphysics is the only language that can 
decode the complex dialectical composition of nonmaterial reality.296 They deemed as 
reality what their sensual inquiry revealed to them and on account of that reality set 
epistemological standards resembling that of science to sustain the social complex.297 
Then there came the postmodern era, perturbing the social complex, which invited the 
idea of existing reality and the various functions of its manifestations to undergo an 
acid test regarding their appositeness. Learned individuals sensed the import of the 
age, however, fashioning its prescriptions into an intellectual frame bordering the 
Newtonian-Marxian dialectic materialism to which their way of thinking was attuned. 
This was particularly true of global governance. The reformism that emerged in its 
wake was intensely rational—aiming at dismantling only the forms and frames of law 
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291 See Review Essay Symposium: Philip Allott’s Eunomia and The Health of Nations, Thinking Another World: 
This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 255, 256 (2005) (hereinafter “This 
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292 See Philip Allott, Kant or Won’t: Theory and Moral Responsibility, 23 REV. INT’L STUD. 339 (1997) (appeals 
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293 The quest for the “scientific” by the scholars of law is well articulated in Jeremy M. Miller, The Science of 
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are succinctly captured in Emmanuel Voyiakis, International Law and the Objectivity of Value, 22 LEIDEN J. 
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296 For support, see F.C.S. Schiller, The Place of Metaphysics, 17 J. PHIL., PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 455 
(1920).  
297 See generally, Miller, supra note 293.  
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and society298—such that reformists proffered ersatz alternatives having the potential 
to reproduce the materialistic spirit (including the political character) of international 
law.299 In that spirit, humanity is urged to rally in the name of wealth and global 
democracy and international law arranges for a conceptual surface where any interests 
that might weigh down the materialistic pursuit can be balanced against the common 
interest of humanity.300  
Given that there is a shadow of politics in global governance, the common 
interest it promises to secure turns into an illusion, and its failure to comprehend the 
spiritual directives of postmodernity foils any scope for realizing human reality.   
The analyses in this part of the Article indicate that the majestic ambitions of 
TWAIL and global governance to secure a common interest are being undermined by 
the wrong designs of thought and dialectic they have. The discourses of both TWAIL 
and global governance were also found to promote a dialectic of egoism.  
  
C. Reality Perceptions about Common Interest: Philosophy against Doctrine          
 
When analyzed at logically articulate levels, the concept of common interest as 
various doctrines tends to give forth certain unconstructive attitudes of the aphotic 
realm of the human mind. Such negativity is inherent in doctrine in that it apparently 
alters many otherwise well-intentioned, reformist, and altruistic schemes to transgress 
the rational confines of consciousness, leading them astray. But is that the only reason 
why doctrines are negative catalysts which misguide human progress? Before I answer 
this question, I clarify why the Article has not yet detailed the configuration of a 
doctrine, although I defined “doctrine” earlier. Hitherto, the Article had a rhetorical 
convenience, a methodological privilege of discoursing on the doctrinal character of 
common interest without having provided any coherent structure for doctrine. The 
reason why I did not work with a parametric inclusive idea of doctrine is that I wanted 
to procure a finer understanding of the elements of doctrine and the epistemological 
conditions in which they function. Any notions regarding doctrines also had to be 
distilled. Accordingly, the fallacies regarding doctrines have been accented, by way of 
critiquing the objective doctrinal mindset of social thinkers, whilst explaining the 
drastic physical and social transformations in our day.301 By inferring “what ought to 
have been the concept of reality” and testing the objectivity which exemplifies 
doctrines against that inference, the misguided dialectic of doctrines was 
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comprehended.302 This argumentation would not have been possible and the analytical 
experience related to it would not have been instructive had I worked with a set idea of 
doctrine. At this time, having procured a finer understanding of the elements of 
doctrine, formulating the conceptual structure of doctrine is a realistic undertaking.   
Now I turn to the question, “Why are doctrines negative catalysts which misguide 
human progress”? The finding regarding doctrine was that it bears self-interest 
(egoism), a feature that is commonly employed to engineer socio-political structures. 
This view evidently contrasts with the results of an analysis in which common interest 
was philosophically comprehended; i.e., common interest is a spiritual pursuit and 
engenders an altruistic state of mind.303 If common interest as it is dissimilarly 
manifested in doctrines and philosophy is juxtaposed, would it theoretically 
corroborate the fallacies associated with doctrine? In what follows I venture forward in 
that vein by weighing the deep structural properties of philosophy against that of 
doctrine and then relate the findings I would have with the concept of common 
interest. Whichever—philosophy or doctrine—turns out to have a logical potential to 
secure the common interests of humanity, that will stand as the reality regarding 
common interest. In that process, I will also answer the question why doctrines 
mislead humanity from its reality. 
Henceforth, this Article cannot have the rhetorical convenience of inductive 
reasoning on doctrines used thus far. Therefore, I first theoretically situate doctrine.  
 
The Concept of Doctrine. Doctrine in general is a normative structure that bears the 
structuralist properties of “antisubjectivism” and “antihumanism”.304 Doctrines 
crystallize when the linguistic quality of structuralist epistemology configures 
individual aspirations regarding the social world of a given context and time into a 
“holistic”305 structure and attributes to that structure a certain normative value. In 
addition to doctrines being normative structures and prescriptions, the structuralist 
content in doctrines turns them into objective tools for assessing social changes and 
evaluating social performance.306 Whilst being such tools of social utility, the validity 
of doctrines, however, remains determinable by an “immanent intelligibility”—a 
logical result of the internal coherence in the holistic nature of doctrines—as against 
reference to any “extraneous elements”307 (a doctrine’s validity is also often contested 
on normative grounds308). Immanent intelligibility is essentially objective in that it 
contributes to preventing the doctrines from being swayed by any subjective 
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303 For details, see supra Section II.A.  
304 On the character of structures, see Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127, 132 
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PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 22 (1996).   
308 Such contestation occurs when what is contested as doctrine is a rule or principle.    
 46
considerations. In that way doctrines typify scientism, far from any humanistic and 
moral approximations.309  
Doctrinal reasoning has a logic ingrained in the epistemological pair of holism 
and coherence.310 Minds engaged in doctrinal reasoning have a quest for truth, which 
they always aim to achieve in an intellectual frame of coherence; the later task is what 
Aulis Aarnio terms as “interpretation and systematization”.311 Minds derive an 
aesthetic beauty from such analytical actions.312 Perception and a feeling of beauty, 
however, vary among the minds engaged in doctrinal analyses. Yet, among all of them 
a state of deep coherence is the subject and cause of beauty.313 To illustrate, if it is the 
“majestic harmony” of doctrines that ignites an aesthetic sensation in scholars, it is a 
“working beauty”, stemming from a rational identification and structured application 
of relevant doctrines, which illuminates the mind of a judge.314 In both cases, an elite 
professional language and aesthetic discursivity distinguish doctrines from what is 
spoken and done in routine human dealings.315 That elite discursivity is the crude 
quality of law, however, cast in a state of artificial salience by H.L.A. Hart as the 
unique linguistic nature of rules.316 This alienness of the majority of ordinary people 
from any doctrine endows even the most simplistic application of doctrines with 
credibility, prompting naïve approval of the legal process by the masses.317 All told, 
doctrines are impervious to the changing aspirations of the masses318 and accordingly 
to the ethics and values fundamental to a dignified human living. Given their 
remoteness from humanism and ethical sterility doctrines are ill-suited to represent 
altruism.  
However, legal professionals functioning in a doctrinal framework cast their 
glance outwards at the society when doctrines experience a normative turbulence, an 
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psychological comfort associated with it. See id. at 1025. See also Tiller & Cross, supra note 94.       
318 As a remedy, Eberie and Grossfeld suggest that doctrines/law may be made value-rich by culturally 
illumining it with the aid of socially-oriented forms of knowledge such as poetry. See generally, Edward J. 
Eberie & Bernhard Grossfeld, Law and Poetry, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 352 (2006).  
 47
internal churning, or a functional inertia. In a structural casualty as this, they fine-tune 
their beliefs and thought patterns to “social realities”.319 Fine-tuning is still only a 
matter of structural and procedural adaptation of the dialectic and functioning of 
doctrines, respectively.320 Their core rationality,321 which is that of ontological dualism 
and their objective predilections, defies any scope for a foundational revolution, and 
they perform deconstruction “in such a way as to leave their own normative and 
political commitments intact”.322  
These subjective adjustments imply that determinacy of doctrines is a matter of 
rational judgment and indeterminacy a consequence of the loss of an intellectual 
dexterity. Even in extreme cases of doctrinal casualties, a dexterous legal mind can 
endure any social turbulence and sustain a doctrinal thought-frame.  
What has been said thus far concerns doctrines as conventionally understood—as 
an ensemble of rationalities governing the contents and application of rules, principles 
and formal procedures. That structural idea of doctrines has a beauty and salience 
when conceived in an intellectual coherence; the absence of the same renders doctrines 
indeterminate. Departing from this structural form, there is a discursive form to 
doctrines. In that form doctrine is an ideological and ideational design or a discursive 
practice consequential to a subliminal loyalty towards and devout faith in one or 
another enterprise, the end result of which might be a non-altruistic mindset.323 In this 
view, any misguided discourse leading to non-altruism is also doctrine. Doctrines 
which fall under this broad comprehension and thereby qualify for inclusion in the 
second category might be innately humane and ethically constructive, in addition to 
being reformative, transformative, and foundational critiques.324 However, irrespective 
of the revolutionary zeal, critical course, and dialectical practice, followers of the 
discursive type of doctrines, like the followers of the structural type, err on the side of 
rationality by allowing their revolutionary spirit to be shaped by the materialistic 
consciousness embedded in their minds. Given that the “embedded rationality”325 
remains unchanged and it catalyzes action, any urge for a revolution yields to 
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“adaptive” and therapeutic techniques.326 Thus by being doctrine-like in terms of 
embedded rationality, discursive doctrines reinstall anti-humanism and all other vices 
of doctrines onto their conceptual surface.        
Earlier in this section of the Article, for want of a theory of doctrine the discourse 
had to be suspended. With the delineation above, the idea of doctrine is theoretically 
situated. The delineation also sheds light on the reasons why doctrines misguide the 
advancement of humanity towards its ultimate goal. If that theoretical perspective—
one heedless to humanism and human wants—is an accurate perception concerning 
doctrines, does common interest  be secured by pursuing it? The analysis thus far 
reveals that scientific objectivism and the materialistic prudence of doctrines, even if 
they sustain socio-legal systems and processes, have certain side effects. These side 
effects feature normatively in the style and methods of the discursive type of doctrines 
and shape the behavioral attitudes of its adherents. The effects of such perverse 
incentives are writ large in the case of poststructuralist projects such as TWAIL and 
global governance, whose projects turned out to be counterproductive and self-
defeating. To illustrate, that TWAIL borrows methods and analytical tools from 
rebelling groups such as subaltern studies, which confront the hierarchies deemed to 
be inlaid in social relations from positions of domination and perspectives of a class 
and cultural consciousness, is what causes TWAIL to have a cultural antagonism 
towards, to employ subaltern jargon, “the Other”.327 In the case of global governance, 
revolutionist sensibilities were apparent; however, the idea of a revolution repeated the 
proverbial process of uprooting the structures and dogmas underpinning those 
structures.328 The revolutionaries were not conscious of the physical and social 
significance of the era; they did not envisage a concept and design of a revolution 
appropriate to the times.329 Consequently, as with all revolutions, it became a 
revolution to achieve better material conditions, from which matter emerged as the 
victor over mind. Despite the promise to change the social and political world, when it 
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comes down to it, improvised [democratic] systems and [political] processes of the 
doctrinal complex are all that global governance has brought with it.330  
Misguidance of rationality occurred in the case of TWAIL and global governance 
by way of two different (almost contrasting) discursive modes, but did converge at one 
point; i.e., it was the practice of inappropriate methods which structured the rationality 
of TWAIL as ego, whereas, in the case of global governance, an ill-conceived 
rationality gave rise to counterproductive methods, and structured an egoistic dialectic. 
Given this self-defeating advance, the pursuit of common interest by way of the types 
of discursive thought and practice seen in TWAIL and global governance, leads its 
adherents astray, towards a dialectic of doctrines, and repel the rationality of its 
adherents from moving towards any possible common interest of humankind at large.      
Even with such negativities, doctrinal discursivity, at its best, could reduce 
conflicting individual values to a least common denominator, aiming at a common 
interest of the community. Myers S. McDougal names this discursivity a “global 
public order” under which an intellectual “calculus” in an interactive manner melds 
human expectations into a value-system.331 McDougal’s theory has everything 
required for securing common interest of the community, e.g., the individual at the 
heart of law and society,332 faith in human faculties, ethical sentiments, shared aims, 
and aspirations for social solidarity.333 However, McDougal has deemed individuals to 
have an enlightened rationality whereby they innately remain tolerant to conflicting 
values and are altruistic.334 Sadly, his “individual” who has to interactively engender 
value harmony, in the absence of an enlightened intelligence,335 is a narcissistic being 
bound by the materialism of time and space.336         
To conclude, doctrinal inquiries in pursuit of reality have been misleading337 or 
such inquiries provide a “drastically impoverished view of reality and of the avenues 
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331 There is a plethora of research on McDougal’s value-oriented jurisprudence, which includes many spectrum 
views and continuums. Given that any attempt of notating those researches is not viable, see (for a succinct 
account) Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective, in 
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
103 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston, eds. 1983).  
I labeled the intellectual techniques of McDougal a “calculus” in order to highlight a complex process of 
value maximization and an element of unaesthetic materialism that I sense in that whole process. However, 
Wiessner and Willard caution that in terms of utility, McDougal’s intellectual technique is in no way a 
“Benthamian calculus” designed for hedonism. See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy Oriented 
Jurisprudence, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 96, 106 (2001).      
332 W. Michael Reisman, Theory about Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108 YALE L. J. 935. 938, 939 
(1999).  
333 These observations are drawn on the Lecture Video: W. Michael Reisman, “The View from the New Haven 
School of International Law”, available at  http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ls/Reisman_IL.html  
334 Nevertheless, according to Reisman, McDougal’s idea of “individual” is not that of a person who is 
“deliriously libidinalized with greed”. Reisman, supra note 332 at 937. Yet, McDougal has not in theory 
guaranteed that individuals are inherently altruistic.    
335 “Enlightened intelligence” or illuminated reason is the altruistic (intellectual) state of mind that comes to exist 
when ego is detached from the senses. See supra Section II.A.  
336 Casting McDougal’s value-oriented jurisprudence, without providing a meticulous and rigorous analysis of it, 
as doctrines, I am aware, is presumptuous. However, considering the conceptual density and space limitations 
of this Article, I pledge to have an extensive analysis in this regard in my later researches.  
337 See supra notes 304-336 and the accompanying text thereof.   
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by which it might be apprehended”.338 Various types of putative common interest 
which an inquirer encounters when engaged in doctrinal inquiry are in fact 
personal/group interests in disguise. Casting such personal interest in the role of 
common interest and building belief-systems on the strength of that interest engender 
only illusive realities. Irrespective of what ever qualifies as doctrinal, those are not—
and adherence to them cannot secure—common interests.   
 
The Beauty of Philosophy. Having materialism to burn up in the transcendental glow 
of reality, doctrines—the structural output of materialism—are cast into the shade by 
the splendour of philosophy. Philosophy is the practice of thought through which one 
imagines reality.339 More specifically, it is a discursivity through which one tries to 
discover that reality.340 At a linguistic level, it is an exotic dialect of 
transcendentalism.341  
If philosophy is all this, its art, thought, and practice constitute the route to 
reality, provided reality is the ultimate goal of every inquiry. It is supposedly 
incontrovertible that every knowledge-system—doctrinal or philosophical; every mode 
of inquiry—pragmatism or idealism; every art of living—communitarian or ascetic; 
and every cognitive method—empiricism or meditation focuses on a goal. That goal is 
ultimate. It is the reality, the highest good; humankind, irrespective of caste, creed, 
gender, race, religion, and intellectual orientation, has to be engaged in a collective 
pursuit of reality. This collective pursuit is the real common interest of humanity.342  
Before we confirm that the thought and practice of philosophy lead us 
collectively to our reality, let us recall that a collectivity of personal interest is not 
common interest, nor an unenlightened humanity collectively marching towards an 
ultimate goal common interest.343 In the case of the latter, given the unenlightened 
state of the mind the process is highly prone to be misinformed by objective signs and 
symbols typical of materialistic thought. However, when the ultimate goal is sought by 
renouncing personal interest through various intellectual techniques or way of living, 
common interest comes to exist among humanity.344  
Relinquishment of personal interest leads to a heuristic mindset, a non-selfish 
attitude.345 In that non-selfish state individuals find “utter unification of mind with 
nature, or of mind with God, or of mind with mind, or of mind with Spirit, or of soul 
                                                 
338 Harry Oldmeadow, The Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Metaphysics: A Perennialist Perspective, 
46 SOPHIA 252, 258 (2007) (while providing an epistemological bargain for metaphysical methods of Eastern 
philosophy, criticizes the marginalization of metaphysics by reason-oriented inquiries). 
339 See generally Pravas Jivan Chaudhury, Vedanta as Transcendental Phenomenology, 20 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 252 (1959).  
340 Id. This observation is similar to Heidegger’s idea of philosophy: “Philosophy is the correspondence to the 
Being of being”. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 75 (Jean T Wilde & William Kluback trans. 
1956).    
341 See generally Oldmeadow, supra note 338.    
342 See supra Section II.A. 
343 Apprising Allott’s vision of individuals captaining the world, Scobbie is apprehensive of an absolute takeover 
by subjective aspirations. See Ian Scobbie, Slouching towards the Holy City: Some Weeds for Philip Allott, 16 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 299, 311, 312 (2005).  
344 See supra Section II.A.  
345 See Marzenna Jakubczak, Towards Knowing Ourselves: Classical Yoga Perspective, 10 J. HUMAN VALUES 
111, 115 (2004). 
 51
with soul”.346 This amalgamation of mind and matter creates an altruistic state of mind 
free from ego.347 Wolfson situates this enlightened rationality in the epistemological 
framework of metaphysical philosophy:  
 
[Philosophers] do indeed seek the totality of experiences or the totality 
of the universe or the totality of life and not [unlike sensual inquiries] 
its fragmentation and not its atomization and not its particularization…. 
[T]he [philosophers], through the use of the generalization, unite[ ] the 
subjective with the objective the sense of being with “wellbeing”, the 
sense of the I with the Thou, the sense of the self with the other.348   
  
The art and thought of philosophy allow the mind to “observe and systematize the 
maximal characters of the Universe”.349 This ability to think in terms of the “whole” 
unites time-space and transcendence into a “oneness”, philosophical individuals thus 
have experience of the physical world as well as a perception of the transcendental 
reality of human beings; they have “cosmic humanism”350 and cosmic 
consciousness.351 When this state of mind is shared by many individuals, an 
immaculate perennial common interest (common will) of humanity emerges. 
Engagement with philosophy helps minds exceed the margins of time-space and 
push human rationality to the transcendental planes where our reality lies. In this 
common pursuit of humanity minds supremely reign the world, rendering, to borrow 
the title of Beryl Satter’s insightful work, “each mind a kingdom”.352 In that world, to 
live as humans endows high values such as human dignity, altruism, compassion, and 
love with meaning.  
 
  A Summation of the Discourse Thus Far. A desire to articulate the idea that the 
concept of international law ought not to have been that of a doctrinal structure is what 
prompted this research. For this reason, the Article has illustrated the misguided 
dialectic of doctrines. In this regard, the Article has found that opposing rationalities, 
what I have chosen to call disparate rationalities, have manifested in the world, and 
coexist in certain international regimes. Such a coexistence of conflicting rationalities 
has been provided with normative and rational meanings, and thus validity, by the 
doctrinal vocabulary and by the interpretative and rationalist reasoning of international 
law. Being sceptical about this act of legitimizing and validating disparate rationalities, 
                                                 
346 Martin Wolfson, What is Philosophy, 55 J. PHIL. 322, 335 (1958) (drawing on Spinoza while exploring the 
metaphysical side of philosophy).  
347 For example, Koons articulates that an amalgamation of mind and matter evokes a moral consciousness 
concurrent to the prevailing legal consciousness regarding the protection of earth and its species. See Judith E. 
Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2008).  
348 Wolfson, supra note 346 at 336.  
349 Edward O. Sisson, What is Philosophy? A Proposed Definition, 57 PHIL. REV. 167, 169 (1948).  
350 See Frank C. Doan, An Outline of Cosmic Humanism, 6 J. PHIL., PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 57 (1919) 
(tracing the “phylogeny” of human consciousness, Doan conveys that human thought evolved out of a “mystic 
passion” as well as certain reflexive physical experience: there is a “marrow of divinity within the dry bones of 
scholasticism”. Id at 62).    
351 For a strong argument that there exists a cosmic mind in humanity and thereby a cosmic consciousness, see 
Wm. Pepperell Montague, The Human Soul and the Cosmic Mind, 54 MIND. NEW SERIES 50 (1945).    
352 BERYL SATTER, EACH MIND A KINGDOM: AMERICAN WOMEN, SEXUAL PURITY, AND THE NEW THOUGHT 
MOVEMENT, 1875-1920 (1999).  
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this Article has chosen a pair of disparate rationalities—common interest and market 
interest—that are apparent as regime-conflicts in international law for thorough 
analysis. The objective is to find out if at a deep theoretical level this disparate pairing 
of rationalities has coherence. Common interest was chosen first. The Article 
examined the philosophical composition of the idea of common interest, which 
revealed that common interest of humanity comes to exist when humanity pursues its 
ultimate reality by annihilating ego. Next, the Article tried to examine the idea of 
common interest as it is reflected in the various doctrines of international law. 
Doctrine was defined inter alia as every discourse which has traces of 
selfishness/egoism in it.   
Discursive modes of two discourses in international law, i.e., TWAIL and global 
governance, purported to have engendered common interests, were examined as 
doctrines of international law. It revealed that both discourses, despite their humane 
purpose, have vestiges of self-interest, and hence are counterproductive. A 
subconscious adherence to certain ingrained cultural sentiments is what has put 
TWAIL in a counterproductive route. Where global governance is concerned, a pattern 
of thinking, set on an assurance that mind is organic and corporal, has flouted the fact 
that we are at the portals of a new cosmic cycle, and thus arrogantly denied any 
nonmaterialistic visions.  
 The findings regarding TWAIL and global governance helped develop the idea 
of doctrines. Doctrines are conceptualized as a structure and discursivity. These forms, 
taken either in isolation or combination, the rationalities of both engender egoism.    
In the many analyses of common interest from the perspectives of philosophy and 
doctrine, doctrinal forms of common interests were found to have distanced human 
reality from humanity. Common interest exists only as it is in its philosophical form.     
Having found the reality regarding common interest, the Article now has to turn 
to the second rationality that of market interest.  
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF MARKET INTEREST 
   
The market is a lifestyle and way of thinking more than simply a multifarious 
economic whole distributing human material needs and wants.353 Such a mindset and 
lifestyle is powered and sustained by one or another base ideology and its various 
forms; in the case of the market, it is capitalism and the many pre- and post-modern 
manifestations of it which sustain and continue its activities.354 The charm of 
capitalism (and the free markets it runs) is that it has a cultural and psychological 
embedding in the global consciousness, which ties and equates the market/capitalist 
way of living to elegance and dignity.355 In other words, in a modern state stetting, a 
                                                 
353 Sociologist Neil Fligstein has propounded this idea through his many insightful contributions. See e.g. Neil 
Fligstein, Market as Politics: A Political Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 656 
(1996) (offers a socio-economic perspective on markets by explaining internal market dynamics). For various 
sets of views on the social aspects of the market, see Neil Fligstein & Luke Dauter, The Sociology of Markets, 
33 ANN. REV. SOC. 6.1 (2007); John Lie, Sociology of Markets, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 341 (1997).  
354 See generally Book Review: Teresa Walker, Globalism: The New Market Ideology by Manfred Steger, 2 
LOGOS, 148 (2003). Ideologies such as colonialism, imperialism, and neoliberalism will qualify as the 
manifestations of capitalism.  
355 See I.T. Berend, Capitalism, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 1454, 1457 (Neil J. 
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001).  
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dignified and elegant life is deemed to be one which has the qualities of a market such 
as competitiveness, self-interest, and wealth.356  
Introducing the market thus, this Article persists on the narrative route it has 
charted and with the analytical structure it has built. Hence, in order to have the reality 
perceptions regarding market interest the idea of the market would be analyzed first as 
a capitalist/neo-capitalist/neoliberal ideology357 and then market interest as doctrine 
before they are juxtaposed.   
 
A. The Market as Ideology  
 
The market in any reckoning is not simply an ideology; it has more shades, 
sentiments and sensitivities, and repercussions than scholarly minds and media would 
have us believe.358 Yet, discourses on the market always span or, if not, at least 
culminate in, capitalist and related ideologies. In such discourses, if the discourser is a 
supporter of the market, ideology for the most is a “social representation” of reality 
and if the discourser is a critic, ideology is seen as a mask of certain social realities.359 
Since I do not intend to seek a definition of ideology, neither do I, at this point, take a 
stance on any of these positions nor attempt to reconcile them. Yet, this Article has to 
view market through an ideological lens, for such a spectacle might be the reality 
regarding market interest. However, instead of delineating ideology at this point, I 
leave the concept of ideology to gel as I go forward with my examination of the design 
“market as a capitalist ideology”.360 My primary goal is to learn the nature and impact 
of ideology-based thinking on the human mind.  
Capitalism classifies individuals living in a society and their actions into two 
economically-responsive unlike poles—the buyer/buying and the seller/selling—which 
always attract each other.361 Prompted by such an “economic rationality”, they deal 
with each other in a dignified customary way under “minimum regulatory 
supervision”362 imposed by the state.363 However, the relationship between the 
                                                 
356 Id.      
357 I use the terms “capitalism”, “neo-capitalism”, and “neoliberalism” as incremental forms, as if in a 
progression, of the same ideology.   
358 My choice to view the market as an ideology is no more than a learner’s desire to learn the logical 
underpinning and nature of a phenomenon which steers the world.  
359 Both these positions are articulated, juxtaposed, and reconciled in Eve Chiapello, Reconciling the Two 
Principal Meanings of the Notion of Ideology: The Example of the Concept of the ‘Spirit of Capitalism’, 6 
EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 155 (2003). See also Susan Marks, Big Brother is Bleeping US: With the Message that 
Ideology Doesn’t Matter, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 109 (2001) (international legal discourse should not hopelessly 
be limited by the strictures of ideology but should have a critical and radical approach to ideology).  
360 Regardless of my refusal to take sides, my analysis might have fallen into any of the above said positions 
regarding ideology, for it is hardly possible to discuss capitalism without heeding to the social role of 
ideology.       
361 See generally, Allott supra note 3 at 340-375 (describes that humans conceive their reality through economy, 
and all social organizations facilitate in sustaining the economy and reinforce the economic values as the 
underpinning of human sociality). 
362 I use the phrase “minimum regularity supervision” in order to lay emphasis on the fact that capitalists have 
faith in the rule of law, although state/government—the imposer of regulations—has minimum role in the 
functioning of the market.  
363 This whole statement is a Weberian position on law and economics. See Sally Ewing, Justice and the Spirit of 
Capitalism: Max Weber’s Sociology of Law, 21 L. & SOC’Y REV. 487, 490, 499 (1987) (referring to Max 
Weber, Ewing states that actors in a capitalist market society dutifully honors their agreements).      
 54
individuals belonging to each group is maintained by an “impersonal” and faceless 
behavior, rendering the interaction between the individuals to operate on the basis of 
certain concrete “units of value”—money364—free from any normativity or ethics.365 
Max Weber described this market as follows:   
 
The “free” market, that is, the market which is not bound by ethical 
norms, with its exploitation of constellations of interests and monopoly 
positions and its dickering, is an abomination to every system of 
fraternal ethics. In sharp contrast to all other groups which always 
presuppose some measure of personal fraternization or even blood 
kinship, the market is fundamentally alien to any type of fraternal 
relationship366.  
 
However, from these anti-ethical idiosyncrasies of individuals there emerge a unique 
ethics of the markets367. The individuals adhering to such ethics and living deeply 
within this system have a “subliminal devotion”368 towards and faith in the order of 
things such that they think and act as if inhabitants of a non-anthropogenic planet.369 
They pride in themselves and their own standards of decision making, resource 
allocation, risk sharing, and equity,370 a rationality which may be characterized as 
“market spirituality”.371           
The market-oriented individuals have to maximize their welfare, or they risk 
forgoing a better and dignified life. However, it has been a capitalist assumption that 
the welfare of the individuals enhances in turn the general welfare of the society.372 
Hence the ahumanistic capitalist individuals of the market seek to maximize the means 
of wealth by way of pro-market thoughts and deeds. In this process they act such that a 
                                                 
364 On the logic behind the idea that money is a unit of value, see generally the review S.P. Altmann, Simmel’s 
Philosophy of Money, 9 AM. J. SOC. 46 (2003). Specifically on the role of money in individual and social 
relationships, see id. at 50.  
365 See Weber on the philosophy of the market in MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF 
INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY 636 (Guether Roth & Claus Wittich, eds. 1978). 
366 Id. at 637.  
367 Id. at 636. See generally Edward J. Romar, Noble Markets: The Noble/Slave Ethic in Hayek’s Free Market 
Capitalism, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 57 (2009). See also “This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be”, supra 
note 291 at 259 (Allott criticizes that all the “horrors” of human societies are “within the good life of 
democracy capitalism”).   
368 This subliminal loyalty of market individuals borders, if not squarely hits, the idea of doctrine defined and 
elaborated earlier in this article: doctrine is “a subconscious psychological loyalty to certain sentiments 
embedded in the agent’s mind and a collective observance of the ideals”. See supra note 28 and the 
accompanying text thereof. Also, see supra Section II.C. (The Concept of Doctrine).  
369 See John Renesch, Humanizing Capitalism: Vision of Hope; Challenge for Transcendence, 14 J. HUMAN 
VALUES, 1, 5 (2008) (capitalism “is reducing every living person in its path to a thing. This is dehumanizing”).  
370 For a snapshot of the so called “market faith”, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penalty: The Birth of 
Natural Order, The Illusion of Free Markets, 12-17 JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 
NO.433,  available at https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/LE433.pdf    
371 McMurtry’s idea—“market is an absolutist religion” of which an “invisible hand” is the “omnipresent” 
Divinity—brightens up the concept of market spirituality. See John McMurtry, The Contradictions of Free 
Market Doctrine: Is There a Solution, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 645, 657 (1997) (concerned that freedom in the 
market is subjectively determined).   
372 Berend, supra note 355 at 1456. This view constitutes one of the most contested, criticized, and deconstructed 
notion in economics, the “invisible hand”, conceptualized by Adam Smith.  
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prospective buyer finds them sellable commodities,373 exemplifying the mindset which 
Marx described as “commodity fetishism”.374 The minds of the creative individuals 
among them are so fine-tuned to the demands of the market that they create pieces of 
art/thought which appeal to moneyed buyers in the market.375 This subjectivity that is 
forced on individuals often restricts their level of creative ambitions, bringing the 
immanent high intellectual potential of the individuals down to the level of relatively 
modest market standards. Their complaisance to market demands, however, turns them 
into practical and sociable individuals; at the same time they remain unreflective and 
naïve with regard to the putative natural order of things.376 Spencer J. Pack construes 
the Adam Smith’s views on the negative effects that this naiveté of the capitalists has: 
“The modern capitalist … has the potential, and perhaps the natural inclination, to be 
one of the scariest, nastiest characters ever to walk the face of the earth”.377  
Having such a narrow and minimal mindset, market individuals fall prey to the 
fleeting effervescence of instrumentalism. They become “planners”, “projectors”, 
modelers, and specialists and build an objectivity for the functioning of the market and 
society,378 these positions serve their subjective aspirations.379 In this process, they 
allure novices craving wealth and a glamorous lifestyle to the grip of the market, erase 
any ethical vision the novices may cherish,380 and engage them in an “instrumental 
pursuit” to enrich the market society and spreading the market ethics.381   
When capitalism came of age in modernity,382 it acquired a new pace and 
momentum.383 Researches recognized this neo-capitalism as multi-layered—economic, 
institutional, and ideological—and designed to create conceptual spaces for mediating 
diversities in the world and thus develop capitalism as the life-support system of 
                                                 
373 McMurtry, supra note 370 at 646.   
374 See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 
AM. U. L. REV. 939, 968-69 (1985). Articulating the position of Marx, Kennedy writes: there is a tendency 
among “people under capitalism to treat other people as things, and even to understand themselves as thing-
like”. However, commodity fetishism is “one of the mind-fucks of capitalism”. Id. at 969.  
375 Id.  
376 For an account on the false perception of reality regarding modern societies, including market societies, see 
Philip Allott, Five Steps to a New World Order, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 99, 112-16 (2007).  
377 SPENCER J. PACK, CAPITALISM AS A MORAL SYSTEM: ADAM SMITH’S CRITIQUE OF THE FREE MARKET 
ECONOMY 147 (1991).  Pack further states that the capitalist demons—insulated against any human values and 
swathed in “material greed”—were responsible for the bloodshed and cruelty the world has witnessed in the 
twentieth century. Id.  For a background to the raw idea of capitalism envisaged by Smith, see G.R. Bassiry & 
Marc Jones, Adam Smith and the Ethics of Contemporary Capitalism, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 621 (1993).  
378 As a background to ascertain the role of specialists in maintaining the market and society, see generally 
David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2007) 
(“we remain subjects of an invisible hand—not that of the market, but of expertise”. Id. at 28).   
379 See PACK, supra note 377 at 148-51.  
380 This erasing is a forced action performed on the novices either by way of challenging the ethics they hold 
dear or by depriving access to the functional architectures and routine activities of the modern capitalist 
society.  
381 In this pursuit, “thinking” is the process of finding active solutions for the problems which a market 
confronts. See Wendell T. Bush, The Background of Instrumentalism, 20 J. PHIL. 701, 702 (1923). This pattern 
of thinking is what shapes novices into future planners and specialists in the market.  
382 See Wayne Hope, Conflicting Temporalities: State, Nation, Economy, and Democracy under Global 
Capitalism, 18 TIME & SOC’Y 62, 65 (2009). For support, see Michael Blim, Capitalisms in Late Modernity, 
29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 25, 27 (2000).  
383 See generally id. (the speed of modern capitalism has created temporal discrepancies in the process of 
globalization).  
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humanity.384 The new capitalist dialectic came to be known as “neoliberalism”,385 a 
fairly sophisticated ideology by which the old capitalist idea of wealth maximization 
by capital accumulation was institutionalized; however, the state continued its “active 
passivism” in regulating the markets.386  
The most important output of this new capitalism is that it singularized the image 
of law; in neoliberalism law has taken the form of rules and standards, through which 
it guarantees that capitalist ethics are esteemed in the market;387 e.g., the many 
neoliberal rule-architectures curtail trade-impeding measures—defection, unfair 
competition, erecting blockades to capital flow, and other protectionist measures—
while ensuring that prices are regulated, challengers are controlled, and the market is 
stable. The other features and forms that rule application assumes are also to uphold 
the market ethics. That is to say, law, in the form of rules and standards, regardless of 
the area in which it is practiced, be it human rights or international conflict, has an 
economic rationality and purpose driving it.388 Any other forms of law, for instance, 
“law as ethics” and “law as morality” are deemed to be inferior thought.389 In the form 
of rules and standards, law guarantees a fairness allowing wealth maximization to be 
pursued unconstrained in the capitalist process and leads the market/society to a win-
lose situation.390 Law in a capitalist stetting thus contributes to creating winners and 
losers.   
If the above-narrated aspects of capitalism provided meaning to modern human 
life and thought, then it would be appropriate to construe that we are all tangible 
“physical particles”391 set to perform objectively in a time-space framework.392 Within 
that framework there is a social system that has been accumulating capital/wealth and 
                                                 
384 See Blim, supra note 381 at 27-31. I have been informed of the hypothetical spaces for negotiating diversity 
by EMMANUEL MELISSARIS, THE UBIQUITOUS LAW: LEGAL THEORY AND THE SPACE FOR LEGAL PLURALISM 
(2009).  
385 Harvey, revealing the synonymy between neoliberalism and capitalism, defines neoliberalism as “a theory of 
political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of 
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual 
liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade”. David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 620 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 21, 21 (2007).       
386 Martin H. Wolfson, Neoliberalism and the Social Structure of Accumulation, 35 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 
255, 260 (2003). See also Harvey, supra note 387 at 28 (neoliberalism is a “theoretical template for the 
reorganization of international capitalism”).   
387 See ZENON BANKOWSKI, LIVING LAWFULLY: LOVE IN LAW AND LAW IN LOVE 79-97 (2001) (explains how 
capitalism has come to be deified within the contested domain of legal theory). 
388 See Chimni, supra note 142 at 9-14.  
389 The ascendancy of rules over other forms of law marked the post-ontological victory of legal formalism and 
objectivity.  
390 This view borders the philosophy of rule as it is formulated in the concept of sport. According to that 
philosophy rules have the singular utility to guarantee fairness in games such that those who ought to have 
won win and those who ought to have lost lose. This idea is spurred by a broad reading of GRAHAM MCFEE, 
SPORT, RULES, AND VALUES: PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF SPORT (2004).   
391 The metaphor “physical particles” (as opposed to “charged particles” in quantum mechanics)—to refer to 
market individuals—is employed in order to highlight the insensitivity of such individuals towards human 
sentiments.  
392 Noel Castree, The Spatio-temporality of Capitalism, 18 TIME & SOC’Y 26, 35 (2009) (drawing on Harvey). 
For the idea that capitalist individuals are akin to physical particles, see Scott Lash, Capitalism and 
Metaphysics, 24 THEORY, CULTURE, & SOC’Y 1, 1-3 (2007).  
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a politico-legal system facilitating such accumulation.393 Laid within this social system 
are incredible types of networks, through which individuals interact and thereby 
constitute identities on the basis of the choices offered by capitalism.394 This systemic 
triad—time-space bound individuals, the social system in which they live, and 
interactions among them—when functions in concert spreads the market mindset and 
lifestyle across the world.  
This being the idea of capitalism, what does it mean to think ideologically? If we 
receive the type of life we live as real, and if we perceive the textual descriptions and 
“social symbols”395 regarding life in our day as the true theory of our society and life, 
it may be said that we think ideologically. Then again, if we are agnostic about what 
we have been made to believe as our social reality and if that agnosticism serves a 
heuristic function, thus prompting an inquiry into the true human reality, we think 
philosophically; i.e. we perform the art of envisaging reality.396 This delineation of 
ideology integrates the two prevailing views regarding ideology into one image, 
referred to earlier in this section of the Article:  1) ideology is a social depiction of 
reality, and 2) ideology is a mask of reality.397 It becomes a social representation of 
reality when it embeds in the minds of individuals a feeling that their lives have to be 
lived according to the market mechanics of buying and selling, competition, and 
wealth maximization.398 For market individuals what capitalism tells them thus 
becomes their reality. However, Silvia T. Maurer Lane described this quality of 
ideology with a touch of irony, meaning that when ideology represents something as a 
social reality, it is masking reality.  
 
Ideology has the objective, at least in capitalist societies, of maintaining 
individualism and introducing as natural concepts the thought that 
society is built out of necessary and universal relations of authority and 
inferiority, of domination and submission, and through the 
establishment, a ‘natural’, of the competition of people against each 
other.399          
 
Ideology thus has the potential to cast what ought to be deemed vices as virtues and 
thus misguide normativity and human thought, inducing it to take any preferred 
                                                 
393 Id. at 40. Drawing on Enlightenment discourse, Koskenniemi criticizes the development of the “law of the 
nations” for having been a cushion for holding the markets. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Advantage of 
Treaties: International Law in the Enlightenment, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 27 (2009).  
394 See Vincent Miller, New Media, Net Working and Phatic Culture, 14 CONVERGENCE 387, 388 (2008) 
(reiterates that constituting sociality is a facet of modernity, while highlighting that the sociality which is being 
constituted has only a form, not substance). 
395 I understand “social symbols” as empirically observable aspects of social life. But, for a description 
emphasizing the niceties of the term/concept and its role in constituting social reality, see GEORGES 
GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 34-36 (1947).   
396 See supra Section II.C (The Beauty of Philosphy).  
397 See supra note 357 and the accompanying text thereof.  
398 For a discussion in support of this assertion, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 349, 372-75 (1984) (“ideology disguises one’s motivations from oneself and thereby permits 
action that one might otherwise eschew as against ones’ own true interests or beliefs about the world”).  
399 Silvia T. Maurer Lane, Ideology and Consciousness, 9 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 367, 372 (1999).  
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course.400 To conclude this brief delineation of ideology, ideology positions human 
against human, urges us to vie with each other,401 and anesthetizes our  “self” that the 
self for ever lies dormant in, to borrow Lord Byron’s simile for a material human, “a 
sad jar of atoms”.402  
 
B. Market Interest as Doctrine   
  
From the time when human thinking conceived it epistemologically, the “market 
rationality” has had an eclipsing effect403 over every design of thought that had a 
“schematic interaction”404 with it. The outcome of such interaction is an inclusive 
invasion by the market rationality and a subsequent fine-tuning of the dialectic of any 
confronting thought structure, whatever it might be. The interaction law had with 
market rationality impacted law so much so that law grew up to be instrumental in 
ingraining market ethics in the world.405 Market-oriented thinking has built up around 
law two approaches to make judgments about it: the first is a view of law as a 
regulatory and normative project sustaining human institutions and society, and the 
second, there is a discursivity to predict, assess, and modify the performance of law in 
its role in regulating human/societal interactions.406 This rationality of law—
epistemologically and functionally celebrated as “law and economics” or “economic 
analysis of law” (hereinafter “L&E”)—represents the contemporary design of legal 
thought, particularly in capitalist neoliberal societies.   
In as much as L&E seems to steer the structural progress of law (international 
law in the context of this Article) and complements the market-oriented social order in 
our day, the collective rationality of this stream of legal thought is the prime candidate 
to have its doctrinal character assayed and confirmed. However, the rather hasty 
choice of the theme and organization of the discourse may seem simplistic for some 
readers if I do not submit plausible reasons and explanations for making such choice. 
That explanation is below.  
First, at this stage of the Article there is nothing like the kind of haziness 
regarding the concept of doctrine that this Article had when it commenced its 
discourse on common interest as doctrine.407 The vagueness at that stage prompted me 
to make a couple of assumptions408 about doctrines and I let those assumptions turn 
                                                 
400 Id. (“Ideology in hiding those [vices], fragments our social representations and, consequently, our 
consciousness”).  
401 This oppositional mentality is not unique to capitalism but it is an innate property of ideology; lining up 
humans against humans on other grounds as well, be it class, gender, race, or geography.   
402 GEORGE GORDON BYRON, THE WORKS OF LORD BYRON: LETTERS AND JOURNALS 457 (2005).    
403 This sway market thinking has on contemporary socio-economic systems and thought is concisely provided in 
Henry A. Giroux, Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurrecting Hope in Dark Times, DISSIDENT 
VOICE, 7 August 2004.  
404 My idea of “schematic interaction” is that of a conceptual dialogue between two rationalities, which has a 
probability to generate an orderly thought pattern that may have substantial social-structural significance.  
405 At the time of law’s encounter with market, law was more or less spotless, cleansed from the grime of natural 
law by the intellectuals sprouted in the fire of scientific enlightenment. The prospects and utility they found in 
the rule-form of law offered by the market prompted them to theorize law so as to render it an instrumentality 
of market. See Kennedy, supra note 374 at 939-958.  
406 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-26 (2007).  
407 See introductory account to Section II.B.  
408 See id.  
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into verified conceptions as the discourse proceeded through a few schools of thought 
which I deemed as doctrinal in effect, if not in character.409 The insight gained from 
that analysis, when examined in light of the prevailing scholarly views on doctrines, 
helped conceptualize doctrine.410 The idea of doctrine arrived at is that of a rationality 
motivated by egoism.411 Given that as L&E makes it possible for the capitalist market 
ideology to ensconce human society into its order of wealth maximization, the 
probability of L&E being egoistic, and thereby doctrinal in character, is high. If this is 
in fact the case will be seen in the course of the analysis.  
Second, insightful readers might take issue with my reliance on the idea of 
common interest for distilling any notions regarding doctrine and question the logic of 
the delineation of doctrine I have provided. They might ask: “is common interest so 
imperative in conceptualizing doctrine that the qualities of doctrine have to be 
extracted from it”? “How can one make generalizations about doctrine on the basis of 
analyses centered on common interest”? “Why should the findings of such analyses 
hold relevance for examining the doctrinal nature of market interest”? To respond to 
these questions, I provide the following deductive logic:  My concern throughout this 
Article has been over the disparity in the idea of doctrine and human reality. Human 
reality and common interest are correlated in such a way that a common quest 
(philosophy) by humanity for its reality is the true common interest of humanity.412 
That being the case, any elements which misguide human progress in its pursuit of 
reality have to be alienated; doctrines were found to have a dialectic and rationality 
which mislead the human quest for reality and hence had to be alienated. What was 
thus alienated is what forms the basic constituents of doctrines. The concept of 
doctrine thus extracted embodies the true character and meaning of doctrine, which 
can be used for any analyses.  
Having thus clarified the genuineness of the idea of doctrine arrived at in this 
Article, I now turn to contemplate the doctrinal character of L&E.  
 
1. Economic Analysis of International Law   
 
Prior to any analysis, I submit a short note on the type of analysis I intend to 
carry out in this section. Hindsight tells us that L&E had a propensity to grow into 
“methods of applications”413 in the many branches of law more so than into a stream 
of thought laying down standards of social life.414 Given the inability to review each 
such application of L&E, I primarily rely on the methods of application in 
international law. I also make use of the generalizable elements and foundational 
                                                 
409 See supra Section II.B.  
410 See supra Section II.C. (The Concept of Doctrine) 
411 See id.  
412 See supra Section II.A.   
413 For various illustrations on the application of Law and Economics (L&E), see generally A. MITCHELL 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd Edition, 1989). For support, see Bingyuan 
Hsiung, The Commonality Between Economics and Law, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 33 (2004) (argues that it is a 
methodological gap in law that prompted economics to bond with law). 
414 L&E laying down standards of social life is a phenomenon different from L&E guiding the normative course 
of law. When L&E starts to guide the normative course of law, the process would lay down not only norms of 
social life but also many methods of application in law. In other words, social norms are laid when L&E 
conducts the normative progress of law.  
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claims of L&E. In the first part of this section, I track the trajectory of economic 
analyses of international law. “Tracking” is done by way of a concise review and 
evaluation of the relevant literature (mostly in chronological order) because economic 
analysis in international law is only in the process becoming an epistemology of which 
no homogenous form is apparent yet.415 In addition, its followers contribute to its 
growth by formulating various individual models explaining international cooperation 
and behavior.416 They generally introduce each model through a law review article; the 
ideas expressed therein are synthesized and refined afterward to produce advanced 
models conclusively, [more often than not] drawing a design or explaining a given 
aspect of international law.417 The models are constituently of such import for the 
anticipated L&E architecture of international law that nothing less than a review can 
facilitate the conceptual tracking.418 In the second part, I critically respond to the 
economics analysis of international law and show that such analyses are in the process 
of creating a style of thought which can uphold the market mindset. This style is being 
created by providing new explanations, meaning, and contextuality to the concepts of 
traditional international law, which is notwithstanding L&E’s claims of being 
unorthodox in approach. In sum, I show that L&E, in particular, economic analysis of 
international law, promotes egoism; it is doctrinal in effect.         
However, inviting and enduring criticism is a functional property of L&E. The 
magnificence and explanatory salience of L&E is such that criticisms are no more than 
the many meteors hitting a materially dense, gigantic planet. As is the case of meteors, 
criticisms hardly impinge on L&E; often they are tragically blasted to ashes. Bearing 
in mind this condition, I have structured my response such that L&E is analyzed as 
falling outside the “ontological ought” I have conceptualized earlier. That is, rather 
than conducting a conceptual raid on L&E, I focus on locating it within the series of 
mistakes committed by humanity in abstracting the world. In that way, I attempt to 
push L&E off its rails. This is the only pertinent course, for I sense the futility in 
internally invading the pragmatism, i.e., the elaborately expounded human behavioral 
aspects, of L&E, which adamantly and aggressively asserts that its beliefs are the “is” 
as well as “ought” of human thought.419            
                                                 
415 However, for a review of various economic analyses which are being employed in international law research, 
see Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING 
PAPER NO.126 (2D SERIES), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=564383  
416 This observation does not preclude the fact that L&E has common assumptions and objectives.  
417 See e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JOEL P. 
TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL 
LEGALISM (2009).  
418 I do not claim to have covered all the existing models. However, it is my sincere belief that the models chosen 
for review are such that the rationale and purpose of an economic architecture in international law are 
sufficiently clear for the readers.   
419 Literature is resplendent with analyses questioning the human behavioral patterns set by L&E, see, e.g., 
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1005 (2000) (illustrates that cost-benefit analysis often falls short of addressing the challenges of “morality 
element” in “choosing”); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (articulates that rational choice theory is unheeding to 
sentiments such as sympathy and commitment); Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market 
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996) (provide 
a survey of literature on theories that sceptically view inter alia the commensurability between human and 
market values).  
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L&E came to exist in international law following certain normative and 
methodological misgivings regarding the commensurability between economics and 
international law: economics has methods foreign to the state-centric, political, 
normative rationality of international law.420 In the beginning, mainstream 
international law—an altered prototype of enlightenment cosmopolitanism—resisted 
the libertarian individualism of L&E with its modern-day communitarian 
constitutionalism.421 Hence, L&E developed only at the periphery of international law, 
and only in the wake of an interdisciplinary surge typical of globalization at that 
time.422 Yet, in certain high capitalist societies such as the United States, L&E has 
turned out to be a dominant paradigm of thought in international law.423 Such 
receptivity is primarily because of the synonymy between the methods and processes 
of L&E and the way capitalist life has to be lived.424  
Until the influx of L&E, international law had the elements of economics 
primarily in terms of the many studies on interstate monetary and fiscal policies and 
trade relations.425 Later on trade and economic concerns were put in order and 
broadened on a normative basis under the rubric “international economic law”.426 
However, nearly all such approaches were taken and studies conducted within the 
margins of the conformist styles of doctrinal inquiry characteristic to the mainstream 
international law. The latter-day shift of focus to the global political economy and the 
institutions sustaining it, although it added a new vitality to international economic 
law, has not eliminated the conventionality in reasoning; the shift simply does not 
bring economics to the heart of international law.427 Towards the end of the last 
                                                 
420 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 
1-12 (1999) (within the epistemological frame of L&E, the authors examine the extent of the compatibility of 
L&E with international law). By way of an introduction to the methodologies of economics, see D.M. 
Hausman, Economics, Philosophy of, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 4159  (Neil J. 
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001).  
421 For a glimpse of the theoretical underpinning of mainstream/European tradition in international law (on top of 
a critique of “universality”), see Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Renewal, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113 (2005).  
422 Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 567, 579 
(2000).  
423 Why L&E rushed in the United States but feared to tread in Europe? See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen 
L. Brun, Lost in Transition: The Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 602 (2006) (the class-conscious, communitarian, and product-of-revolution societies of 
Europe are opaque to libertarian individualism which L&E holds as its dogma). For a more detailed 
exposition, see Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in 
the Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008) (analyzing L&E as the most impactful among 
the many legal innovations typical to the American academia). 
 In this regard, Waller provides a theoretical explanation for the acceptance and non-acceptance of L&E in 
various areas. Using the metaphor of viral infection, he illustrates that L&E virus is highly immune in those 
areas which are either occupied by a robust ideology or where institutional organization is highly 
decentralized. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 367 (2009).    
424 See generally Garoupa & Ulen, supra note 423.  
425 For an account of the fiscal and monetary cooperation that existed in the post war period and how they fit into 
the frame of international law, see generally Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty 
Five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31 (2008); Detlev F. Vagts, 
International Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2006).  
426 See generally Vagts, supra note 425.  
427 For a persuasive account in support of this assertion, see David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar 
Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
671 (1995) (casts John Jackson as the representative-designer of modern political economy and characterizes 
his work as a “cosmopolitan idealism” radiating a “pragmatic” reformism).   
 62
millennium, a broad-based consciousness came to exist, which inter alia prompted 
bodies of knowledge to intersect, generating sub-knowledge-mixes and discourses.428 
Yielding to this reformist pull, international economic law, on top of its much 
habituated norm-laying practice in the political economy, set a methodological 
program in which it absorbed the fundamentals of economics to asses the utility and 
efficiency of the many rules sustaining the global trading system.429 This action 
marked the launch of L&E in international law.    
Although sparked in the analyses on political economy, L&E soon after focused 
on situating its beliefs and judgments within the dialectic of international law: How 
could rational choice theory be assimilated into international law? The cause of such 
concern was the complexity associated with ascertaining rational choice in a group 
context;430 any ascertaining of rational choice required a given behavior by a “unitary 
actor”, and the international system simply was not conceived of as a unitary actor but 
as a collectivity of many actors.431 The solution that finally came up was to 
theoretically deconstruct the state and re-imagine it as a composite of diverse actors 
engaged in interactions and mediating diversities432. This mediation is a “political 
process”433, one in which the preferences of each individual are balanced with the 
aggregate interest of the community.434 This reasoning, among other ones, collapsed as 
mere assumption and failed to offer a cogent account on what rational choice means in 
a collective setting. Rational choice was thus assimilated to international law on shaky 
grounds, yet with promises for the future.435 Alexander Thompson provides the 
following:       
      
As rational choice makes inroads into the study of IL [international 
law], treating the state as a unitary actor will lead to productive 
theorizing but should eventually be replaced by a more nuanced vision 
of precisely who creates and is influenced by international legal 
institutions and how these actors interact.436    
  
Today, scholars as Kenneth W. Abbott believe that rational choice in the international 
context has matured: when classical liberalism was sculpted into a method to study 
how grassroots clusters have been influencing international “preferences and 
policies”,437 the many units, e.g., non-state actors, constituting the “international 
                                                 
428 See Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 607, 
609 (1995).    
429 Id. at 613 (casting the new methodological program as “value-neutral”).   
430 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International 
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745 (1995).  
431 See Alexander Thompson, Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S285, S291, S292 (2002).   
432 See id. at S291-S294.  
433 Id. at S292 (drawing on Abbott and Snidal). See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: 
International Legislation in the Fight against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141, S154, S155 (2002).  
434 See supra Section II.B.2.a.  
435 See generally, Robert O. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S307 (2002,).  
436 Thompson, supra note 431 at S294.   
437 Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 5, 12 (2008) Et seq.  
 63
whole” became obvious. Despite Abbott’s creditable optimism—“Liberalism opens 
the ‘black box’ of the state, exposing to analysis its internal social and governmental 
structures and politics”438—rational choice, in order to be applied in international law, 
does not have unitary actors/individuals as economics has. It would be reassuring for 
these scholars that they can find support from philosophical groups which “detach” 
rational choice from individuals’ psychology and structure it on the attitudes and 
actions of social groups.439 However, the bad news is that not only are the claims of 
these groups contested within philosophy,440 but they deem what they criticize to be an 
auxiliary tool for their normative approach to rational choice.441    
From the foregoing it is apparent that for international law the type of an ideal 
“crystal ball” for gazing at the performance of actors, as economics owns, remains yet 
to be possessed. Yet, for the sake of tractability the assumption of a unitary actor 
“combines an element of methodological convenience with some beliefs that [these 
altogether are] empirically accurate portrayal of state behavior”.442 On the whole, the 
scenario is déjà vu of, what Thomas Franck would call “the ontological days of 
international law”,443 when scholars were anxious to establish that a state has a will 
and personality of its own.444  
The first application of L&E in international law was to observe the dynamics of 
international cooperation, for instance, the many factors prompting actors to cooperate 
and honor the terms of the cooperation and the means by which the parties in 
cooperation settle their conflicts.445 Such an analysis is based on the presumption that 
as in the case of market contracts there are “transaction costs”446 in international 
                                                 
438 Id.  
439 This group of philosophers criticizes the focus on human psychology for reckoning rational choice and 
considers rational choice as a normative theory which must be judged in a social context. See generally Debra 
Satz & John Frejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. PHIL. 71 (1994).  
440 See Daniel M. Hausman, Rational Choice and Social Theory: A Comment, 92 J. PHIL. 96 (1994) (“rational 
choice explanations [are] psychological explanations”. Id. at 96).  
441 Concluding their critique of the psychological approach to rational choice Satz and Frejohn write: “At the 
same time, we recognize that, for many purposes, an internalist, agent-centered perspective on action is 
crucial. It makes a great deal of difference for normative concerns”. Satz & Frejohn, supra note 439 at 87.  
442 Thompson, supra note 431 at s291.  
443 This expression is instructive if one heeds to Franck’s description of international law being in a post-
ontological era ever since world moved beyond the Cold War: “Like any maturing system, international law 
entered its post-ontological era”. THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 
(1995).  
444 See e.g., Hans Aufricht, Personality in International Law, 37 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 217 (1943).  
445 See e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of 
International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384 (1996) (conveys that an economic approach to 
international cooperation can fetch pareto-optimial outcomes and productively use international law at the 
same time by not leaving out many issues that international law has to address).    
446 For a seminal work on transaction costs in the context of law, see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Although Coarse has not used the expression “transaction cost”, he qualifies the 
concept: 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one 
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These 
operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many 
transactions that would be carried out on a world in which the pricing system worked 
without cost.  
Id. at 15; But see, Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161 (1989)   (argues 
that the credibility of “market-based” approach is marred by a “black hole” that exits in the theory and practice 
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dealings and that such costs may impact the practice of international law.447 William J. 
Aceves elucidates that endogenous governance structures, such as state practice, and 
exogenous structures, such as internally organized formal procedures and institutions, 
help overcome the transaction costs in international dealings.448   
However, as analyses combined the issues of compliance with cooperation, 
endogenous and exogenous governance structures came under attack; customary 
international law (hereinafter “CIL”449), one route state practice take, was besieged 
with the criticism of being logically undersupplied450: “behaviorally epiphenomenal 
and doctrinally incoherent”.451 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner in an insightful 
contribution exploring the deep layers of the main constituent of CIL—the opinio juris 
of states452—claim that any patterned international behavior, which the traditional 
scholars of international law deem to be CIL, is a coincidence, if not prompted by 
coercion or other preferential acts.453 Applying certain game theoretic models,454 they 
contend that there are many strategic and rational moves which have directed state 
action that such behavioral regularities have emerged.455 Furthermore, there is nothing 
in these regularities which can be likened to an opinio juris—“a sense of legal 
obligation”—on a given issue;456 these behaviors are simply the result of a 
“managerial and informal ingenuity”457 prompted by a rationalist sensibility.   
                                                                                                                                                        
of transaction costs). For a conceptual tracking of the development of transaction cost, see MICHAEL 
DIETRICH, TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND: TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM 15-30 
(1994).   
447 William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the 
Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995, 1016, 1017 (1996). In addition, Eric A. Posner 
argues that international law suffers from bad agency costs and problem of collective interests, which 
constraints structural reform as well as “global welfarism”. See Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2006).  
448 See generally id.    
449 I have borrowed this acronym, which has by now become a jargon in the economic analysis of international 
law, from Goldsmith and Posner. See infra note 450.  
450 See e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1113 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance between Modern and 
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (2000). 
451 George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 541 
(2005).  
452 The earliest formulation of opinio juris is of the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of 
Germany V. Netherlands):  
“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, 
or carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the 
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The state concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation”.  
North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, I.C.J. REPORTS 1969, para 77, p.44.  
453 Goldsmith & Posner, “A Theory of Customary International Law”, supra note 450.  
454 See id. at 1121-28. The games are coincidence, coordination, cooperation, and coercion.  
455 Id. at 1131.  
456 Id. at 1132.  
457 See Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law: 20 Years Later”, supra note 95 at 15, 16. I will deal 
with the relevance of managerial ingenuity and informalism that comes with it and their import on the 
economic analysis of international law shortly. “Managerialism” in this context refers less to what Chayes and 
Chayes conceived as the rational coordination games which prompt compliance but more to a coherent 
consolidation of the many strategic moves that international offices make and to a postmodern trend which 
prefers standards to traditional form of lawmaking. On managerialism, see Abraham Chayes & Antonia 
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This so called “rationalist”458 approach to CIL was first questioned,459 but 
subsequently fine-tuned in order that the thought and praxis of international law would 
not fall into disarray.460 George Norman and Joel Trachtman advance a refined model 
of CIL and contest the rationalist claim that since patterned behavior is distinct from 
opinio juris “customary international law does not exist”.461 First, they envisage an 
iterative multilateral prisoner’s dilemma game with many self-interested states and 
assert that the repeating nature of the game modifies payoffs and thus prompts 
multilateral cooperation contingent, however, on certain “circumstances”:462 CIL 
seems to exist. Second, they reinstate opinio juris, albeit an altered version of it, one 
not resting on a “sense of legal obligation”, but as “a perception or assertion that a 
legal rule would be beneficial”:463 CIL affects state behavior.464   
In a similar vein Andrew T. Guzman develops a reputational theory of CIL465 
according to which states comply with CIL because of a concern for their 
reputation.466 Guzman claims that in this process of compliance opinio juris exists. 
However, while tendering such a claim, much like his rationalist peers, Guzman also 
redefines opinio juris such that it is commensurate with his reputational theory. His 
concept of opinio juris is a psychological element that comes to exist among the 
community of states when one of the states violates a given rule. Guzman carves out 
what seems to be a definition that upholds not only the rationalist understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175 (1993). The understanding I have of managerialism is 
formed more by Kennedy, supra note 378; Koskenniemi, id.           
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agent facing any loss-of-reputation is the sitting government as opposed to the perpetual entity, the state).  
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CIL but also the traditionalist notions of CIL:467 “Opinio juris refers to the beliefs of 
states that interact with a potential violator. To the extent that these states believe there 
exists a legal obligation, the potential violator faces a rule of CIL”.468  
Although the earliest rationalist model by Goldsmith and Posner tended to 
jeopardize the traditional understanding of CIL, subsequent models tried to leave some 
aspects of the systemic logic of traditional international law intact, which, however, 
does not preclude the rationalist sensibilities and assumption they have. Regarding 
opinio juris, it exists for the new rationalists (CIL also matters). Where for Norman 
and Trachtman, opinio juris is an act of compliance, which is an offer to the 
community of states—“why not do you accept our act of compliance with this rule in 
order that it becomes a norm?”—for Guzman, it is a feeling of disapproval by the 
community of states when a given state violates a rule which has a sense of obligation.     
Like CIL, treaties or international agreements—yet another means of state 
practice which is supposed to reduce transaction costs—were also re-evaluated on a 
functional basis. In the case of treaties, instead of inquiring if there is normative force 
behind states’ compliance with treaties, L&E used the scale of rational choice to find 
out states’ motives for entering into treaties.469 In fact, the reality is that, agnostic 
about normativity, scholars of the rational choice stream did not find it relevant to 
delve into the question whether there is any normative kinetics behind states’ actions 
vis-à-vis treaties.470 Dismissing any normative force in states’ compliance with treaties 
Goldsmith and Posner hold that compliance with treaties is either a matter of coercion 
or coincidence (both driven by the rational self-interest of the states), which 
nevertheless does not rule out the “cooperative element” in treaties.471  
A substantial portion of the work done by law and economics scholars on treaties 
regards their “form and substance”.472 This approach, according to the scholars, is 
adopted in order to understand the proper mechanics of international cooperation473 
and to modify that cooperation accordingly. In an analysis in that vein, Kal Raustiala 
presents a rational model of an agreements-architecture, one in which factors such as 
the form and substance of international agreements systemically interact and engage in 
a trade-off.474 He asserts that apropos of the central question regarding treaties why do 
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states choose particular forms of cooperation—a pact or any informal agreement—the 
interaction and trade-off between the form and substance of international agreements 
provides convincing answers.475 Raustiala illustrates the tradeoffs as taking place 
between e.g., the domestic policies, domestic preferences, national legislative 
procedures, and foreign policies of states.476 However, the model indicates, though not 
overtly, that any effectiveness it has derives from the fact that states focus on the 
payoffs which accrue from international cooperation. In other words, it holds tightly to 
the rationalist assumption that states are self-interested players.    
Guzman extends this model, having been supported by the reputational model he 
built earlier.477 He ponders a hypothesized “puzzle”: why do states fail to “design their 
agreements in such a way as to maximize the credibility of their commitments”?478 To 
answer this question, the model likens international agreements to private contracts: 
“[W]hen states enter into international agreements they will, like domestic parties 
entering into a contract, seek to maximize the joint benefits to the parties”.479 In a 
private contract, if one party defaults, the other one is compensated through the 
machinery for the settlement of disputes agreed on by the parties.480 The 
compensation, often in the form of a sanction against the defaulter, returns the 
transaction to a zero sum situation. In the case of international law, which is devoid of 
a centralized enforcement authority, enforcement measures are such that sanctioning 
the defecting state, instead of leading to a zero sum situation, imposes costs even on 
the complying state.481 In a situation such as this, states are better off without resolving 
any violation of the agreement,482 and hence they may choose not to have any dispute 
settlement mechanism in their agreement. Guzman further provides a scenario in 
which there is high probability that the presence of a dispute settlement mechanism 
encourages compliance from the states. In that case, the gains of having a dispute 
settlement mechanism surpass the gains of not having a dispute settlement 
mechanism.483 It is on the basis of these types of choices that states rationally decide 
whether to have a dispute settlement mechanism or not.484   
It is beyond doubt that the models discussed above and many other applications 
of economic analysis of international law illustrate the manner in which international 
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law has to be designed in order that transaction costs are minimized, efficiency is 
secured, and cooperation is achieved. However, many of the exogenous structures, 
e.g., international institutions, designed to reduce the transaction costs, struck back 
following the fragmentation which hit international law.485 First, the burgeoning 
international institutions for reconciling differences and settling disputes have 
increased the transaction costs for smaller states.486 Second, the availability of 
numerous venues provides avenues for forum-jumps to the bigger states whenever 
their preferences are at risk.487 In addition, shifting the venue often helps the violator 
of a rule to obscure any reputational issues that were at stake.488 However, even with 
these weighty concerns, no L&E model explaining the fragmentation of international 
law has as yet evolved.  
Having tracked the advance of L&E in international law, from the time when 
economics made its debut in the studies on world political economy to the most recent 
rationalist models, I ponder what impression that tracking has left on us. What has 
economic analysis of international law added to our understanding of international 
law? Below, I provide a systematic treatment of these and many concomitant 
questions.    
 
a. Misguided Rationality: A response to economic analysis of international law  
 
What brought economic analyses to law was a desire among the legal scholars to 
get rid of any “value-judgments” from law and to instill a scientific rationality in legal 
reasoning.489 The economics with which law came into contact was essentially 
neoclassical,490 whereby law came to bear all the assumptions of neoclassical 
economics, e.g., rational choice, utility maximization etc. The progress of L&E 
afterwards was not unproblematic. That, however does not concern this Article; it is 
described elsewhere.491 Our focus is on international law. Since L&E entered 
international law through International Relations (IR) it has substantially been 
impacted by the intellectual and ideational spirit of political realism and neoliberalism 
which permeated IR.492 IR and its theories, disposed in a certain way to neoclassical 
economics, taught international law to behold the world in terms of “is”, not “ought”. 
These theories do not, however, deny the existence of any “moral ought”; such virtues 
have meaning when valued and sought through the world as it is.493 According to the 
dominant realist school of IR, the present world is anarchical, ideationally torn, and 
power-driven.494 Robert G. Giplin contemplates the foundational logic of this world:  
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[H]uman beings confront one another ultimately as members of groups, 
and not as isolated individuals. Homo sapiens is a tribal species, and 
loyalty to the tribe for most of us ranks above all loyalties other than 
that of the family. In the modern world, we have given the name 
“nation state” to these competing tribes and the name “nationalism” to 
this form of loyalty.495  
 
The many national groups in the world are in perpetual conflict with each other,496 
each trying to be better off than the other. This realist position of the world as one 
comprising primarily states made its way straight into the economic analysis of 
international law and set the primary assumption that states are, above all other 
qualities, self-interested in nature.497 In this setting, individuals are social particles in 
constellations of states. They have to identify themselves as first belonging to a state 
and then to a region, then a province, a village/city, and a family. This identification is 
never made with their mind or ontology, for the state is deemed the primary guardian 
of individuals. That is to say, the world around individuals is socially turbulent and 
they are perilously exposed to that turbulence so long as they do not make “provision 
for [their] security in the power struggle among social groups”.498 States with which 
individuals can identify protect them from falling into any turbulence.  
Undoubtedly, this scenario tells enough to establish that international law 
nurtures a group-centric, or “state-centric”, mindset. It provides evidence for the 
claims of the supporters of the applicability of rational choice in international law, 
which attempted to restructure rational choice in a way applicable to a collectivity or 
sub-collectivities, e.g., non-state actors and similar groups. Any concern regarding the 
absence of unitary actors in order to assess the rational choice can be dismissed. It thus 
seems true that when international law is economically analyzed, the choices to be 
studied are the rational choices made by “self-interested states”.   
However, rationalists such as Goldsmith and Posner restore the rational choice 
back to individuals by assuming that “state interest is merely descriptive of leaders’ 
perceived preferences and is morally neutral”.499 This view places representative 
individuals at the helm of decision-making and their preferences make up the 
preferences and self-interest of states.500 A more nuanced and compelling account of 
individuals steering the process of international law is provided by David Kennedy501 
and Martti Koskenniemi.502 Their perspectives, however, are evaluative and 
pathological, respectively. That is to say, an inevitable evil has come to exist in 
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international law in the form of expert-rule, following the structural disintegration of 
the discipline into various branches.503 This disintegration—fashionably known as 
“fragmentation”— and the related theoretical imbroglios have infused a new sense of 
responsibility in the experts within each branch to offer theoretical clarifications 
providing meanings to the design and function of their respective branch.504 These 
experts develop an attitude of professionalism towards their work whereby their 
choices, having been influenced by their preferences, often becomes subjective 
judgments.505   
Whoever the agents are, leaders or managers, rational choice in international law 
is the rational choice of officials empowered with decision-making. And, the elements 
of behavior generally assessed in L&E such as self-interest, preferences, and 
motivation are to be assessed in international law as they are reflected in officials. 
However, I do not ponder if decisions by officials rise up to a “methodological 
individualism” essential to any assessment of individual behavior.506 That is, I do not 
worry if international law as conducted by a few officials has any normative value in 
order to render their behavior a valid topic for making judgments about international 
law.507 My interest is in the foundational assumptions about individuals made by L&E 
and in seeing if those assumptions in any way support the grand claims and models 
which economic analysis of international law has advanced about the world.  
L&E is the latest “enterprise” in the larger scheme of what is supposedly a 
“scientific inquiry” in law.508 It is deemed as unleashing the force of pragmatism 
against the unpragmatic super-structure of law.509 The roots of pragmatism as reflected 
in L&E have semi-meta origins. It first vested faith in the human faculty of 
observation, and then forcefully rejected many dualisms, e.g. mind and body, subject 
and object.510 Afterwards, it set a “contemplative relation between an observing 
subject and an objective reality, whether natural or social, as an active, creative 
relation between striving human beings and the problems that beset them and that they 
seek to overcome”.511 This creditable advance towards human ontology is, however, 
frustrated by a denial of any ultimate reality for humans; in its place reality is found in 
a continuity of socially contextualized human instincts.512  
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At this point, L&E turns ideological in a way that conceals the ultimate reality by 
the veil of an organic reality; in abstracting the cosmic intelligence of humans, L&E 
bases its entire belief-set on materially driven biological instincts.513 When centered in 
a given social surrounding these instinctual propensities trigger a chain of calculative 
reasoning. This calculative reasoning—rational choice—is the central theme and pride 
of L&E.514 That means the triad—organic human instincts, the situationality of 
individuals, and material choices—is causative of human action. The analyses 
presented earlier in this Article have established that this triad is an erroneous design 
of human thought and action, one typical of unintelligent humans sceptical or ignorant 
about their Self. An unfounded faith in one’s power of observation, ignorant of a 
higher intellectual potential; a false pride in one’s ability to make choices; and a naïve 
perception of the world render the economic person a “rational fool”, to use Amartya 
Sen’s characterization.515 This naïve state of mind is what Shelly relates human 
thought to in Hymn to Intellectual Beauty: “The awful shadow of some unseen Power 
Floats through unseen among us …” .    
It is primarily the denial of ultimate reality/truth beyond what is observable 
which has misguided thought in L&E.516 To explain, initially L&E was on constructive 
lines when it denied the subject-object dualism; however, when it came to connecting 
the subject and object, the observing subject was linked to a social reality (the object) 
instead of an ultimate infinite reality. Although the social reality was prudently 
presented as an outcome of certain socially processed beliefs rooted in routine human 
problems, it did not prevent the mistake from happening. What ought to have been the 
real connection between the subject and object is a recognition that sensually 
observable reality is false and a desire to perceive the absolute reality that lies beyond 
the apparent social reality.517 With such a connection, if the subject intellectually 
strives for the object (the ultimate reality), false reality collapses and the mind 
perceives the true ultimate reality.518 Material minds, those that deduce reality from the 
social order and by way of a sensual inquiry, naively “live in the [false] hope that 
satisfaction of their various desires will eventually bring fulfillment”.519                   
The subject-object connection set by L&E and the discipline’s subsequent 
depiction of social life as reality are contestable from another angle as well. This 
contestation focuses on the “subjective consciousness” that L&E approximates as the 
casual factor of human action. This approximation of L&E is imperfect because the 
subjective consciousness as L&E perceives it to be rooted in human instincts and 
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social life is not the absolute state of consciousness. Friedrich Schleiermacher 
conceives the subjectivity in human consciences as has an expansionary intellectual 
character.520 According to him, at first, the mind finds identification with the social 
surroundings.521 This identification enables individuals to read ontological meanings 
on the basis of the social state of affairs around them. As the mind in this state is 
unrefined and narrow, it is at risk of developing emotions such as egoism and spite, 
subject to the nature of the signals transmitted by the social world.522 This 
identification, however, expands, writes Edmund H. Hollands, “[I]nto conceptual 
thought, so this same social experience arouses on the subjective side widening 
feelings of sympathy in which the merely organic and personal or selfish feelings are 
transcended”.523 This transcending and the subsequent graduation of the mind to even 
higher levels is an intellectual process, a pursuit of ultimate reality, discussed in many 
places in this Article, which broadens the mind to relate to the world, its physical 
environment,524 inhabitants, and the universe at large.525 At this stage, when mind feels 
that is it one with the entire creation, consciousness is said to be absolute.526 L&E, 
however, makes the mistake of setting the subjective consciousness of individuals as it 
is at its initial stage and employs that consciousness to objectively make 
observations.527  
Since L&E’s assumptions about individuals are on a mistaken course, it is likely 
that the shadow of that mistake has fallen on international law. The obvious, but 
inevitably strange, position in which individuals are seen to be piloting the course of 
international law, which somehow uncomfortably fits into the way things are, adds 
gravity to the assumptions concerning individuals and human thought. This intellectual 
position is in one sense advantageous to the pure rationalists as Goldsmith and Posner 
in that their theory, especially those rejecting any normative basis for states’ behavior, 
triumphs over all the formulations of their peers, who search for normative 
explanations in states’ behavior. Yet, despite the many formulations entrusting 
individuals with decision-making, the decisions coming from a leader or any other 
leader-like individual must be seen as products of a collective expert reasoning taking 
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place in a given official setting.528 That official setting may be politically or 
ideologically charged.   
Into the bargain come the educational and cultural orientations and personality of 
each official: elite/middle class, socialist/liberal/ethical radicals, pragmatists, 
conformists, positivists, to name a few orientations and outlooks. Notwithstanding the 
intellectual grooming or cultural cut of the individual, the official setting in which 
modern state/government system works requires its officers to forfeit any person-
specific values, attitudes, and aptitudes. As a substitute, the system has a value 
template prescribing a unique set of ethics and morals, which the officials have to 
internalize.529 This demoralizing is an ideological program, which demands from the 
officials a type of performance bordering on theatrical naturalism.530 Accordingly, 
each individual is an actor as well as a Self;531 being one’s Self is deemed to be 
unprofessional and incompetent.532 In such a milieu, international offices groom their 
officials to be sympathetic to the political ambitions of the government and sensitive to 
the political surroundings in which the government functions.533   
Having thus revealed the official culture in international law and its incongruity 
with actual human nature, we are in a comfortable position to evaluate L&E’s 
assumptions about international law. Most important of all the assumptions is that 
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279, 287, 310-11 (1999) (suggest that individuals should live a socio-professional life, but not one in which 
“life-ethics” are sacrificed at the altar of “social ethics”). Sensing the tragedy involved in this sacrifice of “life-
ethics”, Boldizar and Korhonen write:  
[A] person’s ethical ability cannot be left to idle or shut down for any period of time, 
except perhaps to the extent that the ‘self’ can fall into abeyance within the social; it seems 
not only dangerous to cover up such significant ability under a compartmentalization of a 
person’s identities or roles into a work-sphere and a personal-sphere, but it also seems 
authentic and unethical.  
Id. at 287.  
531 See RABINDRANATH TAGORE, THE ENGLISH WRITINGS OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE: VOLUME 4 ESSAYS 628 
(2007) (on the costs of unenlightened, misguided professionalism). 
532 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editor of the Symposium, 93 AM. J. INT’L LAW 351, 356, 357 (1999) 
(says that speaking culturally or intellectually oriented language in a professional stetting is “a professional 
and social mistake”).  
533 “The Report on the Role of the Legal Adviser”, supra note 528 at 363. See also “This Cannot Be How the 
World Was Meant to Be”, supra note 291 at 277. Nothing in contrast to this view turned up in a recent study 
which has collected the opinion of legal advisors on the bearing international law has in their routines. See 
Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance 
Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 62-75 (2009). For a note of disapproval of the state of affairs in international 
offices, see Philip Allott, The International Lawyer in Government Service: Ontology and Deontology, 23 
WIS. INT’L L. J. 13, 17-18 (2006).   
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states are self-interested; i.e., states conceive their preferences, determine their 
interests on the basis of those preferences, and rationally maximize their interests.534 
These assumptions are common to rationalists as well as to the moderates, who would 
fall in Cass Sunstein’s conceptualization “trimmers”,535 in the L&E group, or they 
could be fitted into a rationally identifiable category, the “revisionists”536 (although the 
moderates/revisionists mostly attempt to reinstall the traditional and normative base 
uprooted by the rationalists). The vital question is, Are states “by nature” self-
interested?537 Answering this question urges a glance at how this assumption has come 
to exist in international law. Without elaboration it is obvious, since pointed out 
earlier,538 that L&E accessed international law by way of political realism and 
neoclassical economics, both of which presented the realist-political and the capitalist-
economic scenario as the true social reality of the world. It is on the basis of this 
reality that the officials of a state, whose minds are already adjusted to the political 
traditions their government upholds, construct preferences which determine the nature 
and content of the interest for their states. To illustrate, officials of a capitalist/realist 
state would construe preferences of their states as to triumph over other states in the 
perpetual conflict states are in.539 They see this as the only means to ensure the welfare 
of their citizens and protect the state territorially and economically. This desire to be 
better off determines the preferences and thereby the interests of that state. For any 
assessment of the rational course by which such a state would choose to pursue its 
interest, L&E would be an excellent model. This is because of the theoretical 
compatibility between a politically realist state and the realist foundation and 
assumptions of L&E. This scenario adequately reveals that self-interest is not 
individually or socially aspired but politically constructed.540            
However, this finding only partially answers the question whether states are by 
nature self interested. What if a state is not one which upholds political realism or for 
that matter is a non-capitalist society (although non-capitalist societies hardly exist 
today)? How could the many L&E models designed on the assumption that states are 
self-interested explain the behavior of states which do not actively pursue a policy of 
becoming better off than other states? Indeed, there are states bearing the legacies of 
glorious traditions and civilizations imparting the gospels of toleration and one 
world.541 Besides, the unenthusiastic welcome meted out to L&E in many European 
states strengthens one’s suspicion towards the credibility of L&E.542 What sense does 
                                                 
534 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 417 at 6, 7.  
535 See Cass Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2009) (“Trimmers” are a type of motivated pacifists 
who would prefer to have their cause pursued while leaving structures unharmed).  
536 See Richard B. Bilder, On Being an International Lawyer, 3 LOYOLA U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 135, 136 (2006).  
537 I pose this question in the manner it is asked by Wendt. See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 239 (1999).  
538 See supra notes 492-495 and the accompanying text thereof.  
539 For a supporting discussion on the dominance of realism in interstate relations, see WENDT, supra note 537 at 
238-245.  
540 See id. at 240.  
541 For example, according to S. Radhakrishnan, democracy—and thereby foreign policy—in India has roots in 
the traditional Hindu Philosophy such that prejudiced and parochial nationalism shall not damage the unity of 
mankind; the entire world has to be viewed as one family. See Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Toleration in 
Modern Liberal Discourse with Special Reference to Radahakrishnan’s Tolerant Hinduism, 30 J. INDIAN PHIL. 
389 (2002) (interprets that the concept of toleration remains unchanged amid many divergent discourses).   
542 See Dau-Schmidt & Brun, supra note 423.  
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it make to contrive a theory without regard for the diversities that describe the world 
and its systems? According to van Aaken, it might be that rationalists among the L&E 
enthusiasts in international law are attempting to “unbind hegemonic states from 
international duties”.543 If that is the case, why are moderates in the L&E group trying 
to restore the normativity uprooted by the rationalists and thereby uphold the 
traditional structures and concepts of international law? However, a review of the 
polemics of the moderates and the models of state behavior they have designed 
sufficiently reveals that although traditional structures and concepts are secured from 
the criticism of rationalists, the rationalists’ assumptions—such as the self-interest of 
states—are left unharmed.544 In contrast, the dialectics of the argumentative structures 
have been substantially transformed; yet the mainstream in international law would 
rejoice to see concepts, e.g., CIL, soft law, and treaties, to gain new explanations 
regarding their bindingness. On balance, L&E has simply replaced the foundational 
assumption of states’ behavior from “consent of states” to self-interest.545 In effect, if 
the assumption regarding the self-interest of the states is removed, most of the L&E 
models cannot explain state behavior, to an extent, they cannot even continue to exist.   
Truly, L&E has been presumptuous by proffering hidebound views of social 
reality as if ideas, ethics, civilizations, and cultures have sunken into a cosmic ocean, 
leaving economics textbooks and economists afloat. As if she had envisaged a scenario 
as this, Martha C. Nussbaum writes: 
 
If Law and Economics is ignorant of the theories of human action that 
have been painstakingly elaborated over the course of twenty-four 
hundred years, it is not terribly likely that it will see all the complexities 
of the ways in which people are moved by ethical considerations. And 
in fact it does not.546        
  
Such has been the mistake of L&E that it never heeded critics;547 instead it trivialized 
their criticism by insisting on the false pride of having provided the “simplest”548 
social-theoretical explanations of a complex physical world and thus remained ever 
aware of their failings and imperfections.    
If the market mindset and the market spirituality L&E propagates are deemed 
reality, there is meaning in being economically a capitalist, politically a realist, 
behaviorally a rationalist, and attitudinally an egoist; all these roles if performed in 
unison render one a modern-day intellectual. But if reality is intellectually beyond the 
                                                 
543 van Aaken, supra note 459 at 307, 308.  
544 See supra Section III.B.1.  
545 Koskenniemi is sceptical about this newly assumed [deceptively] advantageous posture:  
“[I] am puzzled about the taking away of ‘law’ from international law analyses of this type, 
replacing it by a vocabulary of empirical political science, techniques and strategies to 
reach the interests or objectives assumed to stand ‘behind’ law and to have a reality or 
importance far greater than it.  
See Martti Koskenniemi, Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s International 
Law, 4 NO FOUNDATIONS 7, 8 (2007).  
546 Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (A Particular Type of) Economics, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (1997).  
547 See generally id. (criticizes that the conceptual architecture of L&E is built on a rejection and neglect of many 
aspects of human behavior).  
548 This simplification and the resulting incompleteness is the central theme in Bodansky, supra note 2.   
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rhythm-less patterns of material instincts and the false rhythm we have set for the 
world, is the invisible innateness behind the rhythm of the physical laws of the 
universe, is the center from which all physical and mental energy emerge, or is the 
macrocosm that dwells as microcosmic consciousness in billions of humans,549 L&E 
has been illogically audacious in simplifying and compressing thought and action into 
a nutshell and writing prescriptions for the world.  
An examination of L&E reveals that it is structurally as well as discursively 
doctrinal. L&E is structurally doctrinal because it has built a theoretical superstructure 
on the basis of a myopic view of the human states of consciousness. L&E is 
discursively doctrinal for the subliminal fidelity of its followers to certain unfounded 
ethics.550 Logically, both these positions correspond to a non-altruistic attitude. If so, 
L&E is egoistic. Yet, it may appear difficult to penetrate L&E with criticism of its 
being a non-altruistic enterprise, for L&E has been ever cautious in its basic references 
to concepts that potentially threaten its own ethics. For example, altruism is defined as 
one among the many ends of human desire “economically” pursued by humans or 
states or other collectivities,551 which implies a claim that there is an altruistic tinge to 
L&E.552 However, at a functional/analytical level, altruism has only an economic 
connotation, i.e., “making of any transfer that is not compensated”,553 which dispels 
the linguistic smoke screens of L&E. Even otherwise, having philosophically 
confirmed that altruism is a long drawn out intellectual twilight, the unilateral 
attribution of meaning by L&E is no more than a self-justificatory apology. 
 
C. Reality Perceptions about Market Interest: The dominion of ideology  
 
Earlier in this Article it was found that there was substantial dichotomy between 
common interest as philosophy and common interest as doctrine. Analyses, 
illustrations, and deductions revealed that conceiving common interest as doctrine is a 
theoretical mistake. No such dichotomy, however, seems to exist in the case of market 
interest. Instead, the two manifestations of market—ideology and doctrine—seem to 
be mutually reinforcing and interacting. Having this hypothesis at hand, this section 
confirms it by looking at the nature and extent of the interaction between the 
ideological and doctrinal form of market, and thus obtains perceptions of reality 
regarding market interest.  
The analytical framework adopted in this Article for examining market interest 
included: on one side a socio-economic force ambitioning to bring the whole world 
                                                 
549 I attribute this construal to the ideas propounded by Carl Sagan, Stephen Hawking, and Vedic Cosmology.   
550 As support to these conclusions, see Section II.C. (The Concept of Doctrine).  
551 Nussbaum, supra note 546 at 1211.   
552 Posner has erected semantic railings around the perimeter of L&E that criticism of it being non-altruistic does 
not enter the sphere of L&E:  
Its [L&E] project is not to reduce human behavior to some biological propensity, some 
faculty of reason, let alone to prove that deep within us, pulling the strings, is a nasty little 
“economic man”… The individual imagined by economics is not committed to any narrow, 
selfish goal such as pecuniary wealth maximization. Nothing in economics prescribes an 
individual’s goals. But whatever his goal or goals, some or for that matter all of which may 
be altruistic, he is assumed to pursue them in forward-looking fashion by comparing the 
opportunities open to him at the moment when he must choose.  
POSNER, supra note 508 at 15, 16.     
553 William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Altruism in Law and Economics, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 417, 417 (1978).  
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into its rhythm (ideological) and on the other side a legal discourse making claims of 
having uncovered the secrets of human nature and devised a calculus to assess and 
predict human behavior (doctrinal). That framework also revealed that market in its 
ideological form is a discourse which depicts capitalism as a kind of faith-system 
requiring a commitment to competitive values and dedication to wealth maximization. 
However, capitalist ideology (as a matter of fact, any ideology) is found to be socially 
motivated and potentially distorting the reality. This observation presupposes the 
existence of a pre-conceived reality, in other words, whether something is ideology 
depends on the availability of a conception of reality so that ideology can be delineated 
from reality.554 In the absence of such a reality what is socially prescribed and what is 
sensually observable would become the reality. It is a denial of any reality beyond the 
materially observable social facts that helped capitalism to succeed in and dominate 
the modern world.555 But, this Article has provided a preconception of reality, which 
described reality as a state of supreme intelligence—the fourth dimension—realizable 
only through a transcendence-oriented thought-process.556 In a market frame of mind, 
this reality is masked by “superimposing” an ideology-centered thought (capitalism) 
on human intelligence.557   
However, in socially structured formal societies it is hard for any ideology to 
directly influence the members of the societies because of the fears about ideology’s 
“falsity” and the power orientation of ideology spread by the social theorists.558 Hence 
promoters of a given ideology generally choose to inject the essence of that ideology 
to the social system mainly through preset institutions such as law, economy, and 
polity which are rationally opaque for lay-minds.559 They intervene into these 
institutions by masquerading as reformists and introduce new models, methods, and 
styles of reasoning, and set illusionary socio-economic goals.560 This was exactly what 
the proponents of capitalist ideology did. First, they emphasized the maturation of 
capitalism into an economically robust and dynamic ideology which invites every 
being and collectivity to be cost-effectively active if human dignity is to be achieved. 
Then, dogmatic legal reasoning and the decentralized political system were declared 
inhospitable to the goals pursued by the world. Deep-cultures and faith-systems were 
                                                 
554 See Mark Warren, Nietzsche’s Concept of Ideology, 13 THEORY & SOC’Y 541, 543 (1984).  
555 Such denial is characteristic to streams of thoughts ranging from enlightenment philosophy to 
postmodernism.  
556 See supra section II.A.  
557 Superimposition on human intelligence is what Sankara in Advaita philosophy calls the “veiling” (Maya) over 
reality. See supra note 43 and 44. For a detailed account on superimposition, see T.M.P. MAHADEVAN, 
SUPERIMPOSITION IN ADVAITA VEDANTA (1985).  
558 “Falsity” is the main feature of ideology in the writings of Marx and Althusser. On the point that social 
theorists were sceptical about the social-utility of ideology, see generally Messay Kebede, Science and 
Ideology via Development, 26 J. VALUE INQUIRY 483 (1992) (provides details on the scepticism of social 
theorists about ideology, their efforts to eliminate ideology from the scheme of social development, and 
predicts the consequences of such a move).   
559 Once ideology is recognized as has a power orientation, any fusing of it with law provides “the arbitrary and 
cultural features of social life with the aura of the natural and inevitable”. See From the Special Issue Editors, 
22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 629, 633 (1988).   
560 The scepticism that economic models are “apologies of laissez faire capitalism” finds articulation in Allan 
Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. PHIL. 664, 665 (1978) (present the utility and function of 
economic models in assessing human behavior).  
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rhetorically adumbrated. Opposing ideologies, by default, were lost.561 Finally, a new 
situation-friendly way of looking at human behavior and assessing the laws regulating 
that behavior was designed in the form of methods as L&E.  
Seen from such a perspective, the relationship between L&E and capitalist 
ideology rests on the functional correlation and conceptual interaction between law 
and ideology.562 However, traditional, politically sterile dogmatic legal reasoning may 
not favor an ideological intervention into law. But, L&E with its realist genes and 
economic ambitions is compatible with the power-laden, politically couched capitalist 
ideology.563 In its discourse and through its methods, L&E has validated the capitalist 
mindset of market, thus legalizing that mindset.    
Generally speaking, L&E rises up to the egoistic nature of ideology and 
empathizes with the market mindset. Unlike in the case of common interest, the image 
of market as ideology does not conflict with its image as doctrine. Rather the doctrinal 
form of market interest reinforces the ideological form, facilitating the market 
capitalist ideology in dominating the world. Quite obviously, the reality perception of 
market interest is that of an ideological structure.  
    
IV. A JUXTAPOSITION OF COMMON INTEREST AND MARKET INTEREST 
 
In this part of the Article, my objective is to examine if the pairing of common 
interest and market interest is logical. This is done at two levels of analysis: first, the 
perceptions of reality of common interest and market interest—philosophy and 
ideology, respectively—are juxtaposed and second, common interest as doctrine is 
juxtaposed with market interest as doctrine.  
 
A. Philosophy against Ideology  
 
Theoretical Physicist Stephen W. Hawking ends his A Brief History of Time with 
the hope of a united humanity contemplating the meaning of its existence and, as a 
consequence, triumphing over human reason which now lies far off:  
 
[I]f we do discover a complete theory [of the universe], it should in time 
be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few 
scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary 
people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question why is it 
that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be 
the ultimate triumph of human reason—for then we would know the 
mind of God.564      
                                                 
561 For a background discussion on the development and advance of capitalism, see generally ROBERT A. DEGEN, 
THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM (2008).   
562 On the various possible levels of relation between ideology and law, see Andrew Halpin, Ideology and Law, 
11 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 153 (2006).  
563 This is a contention of CLS. There are, however, criticisms against the negative image of ideology and many 
perspectives on ideology as a constructive force. See e.g. id.; J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Cultural Software, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (1995) (argues that ideology can be a representation of “everyday thought”, and need 
not be characterized by any inherent “falsity”, “deception”, or “empowerment”).   
564 STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 191 (1998).  
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However, such enthusiasm for higher knowledge and humility before the magnificence 
of cosmos is nowhere to be seen among the social theorists and many self-styled 
pragmatists. They purport to have a posteriori understood and comprehensively 
accounted for human ontology, their very object of investigation. They trust that 
human reason is at its pinnacle of glory and that the rapid flow of wealth across the 
world made possible by the use of human intelligence evinces the triumph of reason. 
These social theorists have read the world in their material states of consciousness and 
constructed meanings for it, and on the basis of those meanings they have built 
structures to govern humanity. These meanings and the structures bearing it have 
determined the common goal, common interest, and common causes of humanity.   
We have seen the gravity of this mistake reflected in discourses like TWAIL and 
global governance. However, if one could see beyond the shadow cast over human 
thought by manmade structures, common interest is a common inquiry into human 
reality, which renders humanity altruistic. Altruism is accordingly the highest state of 
consciousness one’s reason can attain. This is the crux of common interest as a 
philosophy. Altruism being the goal, the starting point in humanity’s inquiry of reality 
is egoism, which is the organic, natural state of mind. A mind subdued by the sensual 
satisfaction of having empirically understood the world would not tend to advance 
towards higher states of consciousness, constructing realities using its organic 
intelligence. In this way an egoistic mind denies any further states of intelligence other 
than its rational intelligence or any reality other than the social reality. This finding is 
an insight into the heart of the market mindset.  
That means the perception of the reality of common interest as philosophy and 
that of market interest as ideology are macro-dimensional perceptions. In micro-
dimensions, common interest and market interest are representations of altruism and 
egoism, respectively. Philosophy and ideology then become simple structures of 
thought bearing the qualities of altruism and egoism (this Article has made use of these 
structures of thought to discover the reality underlying the social concepts of common 
interest and market interest). Therefore in order to test the logical scope of the pairing 
of common interest and market interest, what should be examined here is the 
theoretical compatibility between altruism and egoism, for they constitute the true 
spirit of common interest and market interest.  
 
1. Altruism and Egoism: The perennial poles of human thought 
 
Human thought is essentially egoistic and clouded in ignorance.565 However, it 
incrementally advances from the cloudy egoistic state toward the intelligible perfection 
of altruism. In every single thought, the mind continuously experiences the tendency to 
break away from the ego, however, the pull of the ego is such that the mind is drawn 
towards the material state every time it advances towards altruism.566 Unless mind is 
conscious of its ability and methods to advance towards altruism, it remains in a 
                                                 
565 This ignorance is Maya, the superimposition of materialism. See supra note 43 and 44 and the materials cited 
therein; See also Mahadevan, supra note 557; For a focused treatment on the nature and role of Maya, see 
Harry Oldmeadow, Shankara’s Doctrine of Maya, 2 ASIAN PHIL. 131 (1992).  
566 See, e.g., ROBERT L. PAYTON & MICHAEL P. MOODY, UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROPY: ITS MEANING AND 
MISSION 84 (2008).  
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perpetual push-pull between egoism and altruism. In view of this phenomenological 
fact, egoism and altruism signify the perennial poles of human thought.     
Despite the fact that every philosophical tradition—Oriental or Occidental—
considers altruism and egoism as the two poles of thought,567 the general Occidental 
conception of altruism (with exceptions) is very much materialistic, so much so that it 
tends to theoretically reduce the distance between altruism and egoism. These attempts 
at reconciling the poles should be viewed seriously, for such attempts usually lead to 
theoretical exercises such as justifying the pairing of rationalities within which 
altruism and egoism coexist. The spurious image of altruism has to be dispelled in 
order to appraise the real polarization between it and egoism.   
In most of the medieval and contemporary Occidental discourses on altruism, the 
concept has certain rational qualifiers, e.g., a behavior is altruism provided that there is 
real action beyond mere thought, there is conscious self-sacrifice, and there is no 
expectation of reward.568 Any behavior lacking in these requirements is non-altruistic 
or egoistic. There are also discourses, as seen in economics, where altruism is 
presented as one of the many preferences of an otherwise egoistic individual.569 These 
approaches are criticized for their lack of clarity and credibility.570 Taking into account 
these limitations, a few scholars have proposed a cognitive model—the Cognitive-
Perceptual Approach—which regards cognitive activity like empathy as the causal 
factor shaping altruism.571 Kristen Renwick Monroe has put forward an advanced 
version of this model which, in addition to the focus on cognitive factors for 
determining altruism, helps individuals to have a sense of self and identity. However, 
self and identity are basically determined by essentialist factors, e.g. culture and  
upbringing.572 Thus, cognitive-perceptual models are at the risk of espousing a sort of 
empathy-induced altruism, as seen in the case of TWAIL, which promotes group 
interests and threatens common good.573     
 These and many other Occidental conceptions of altruism are so extensive in 
scope and have manifold inferences that a review of them is neither feasible nor 
germane for the present context. Moreover, critical reviews of the general conceptions 
of altruism are available elsewhere.574 Hence I rely on a hindsight impression that they 
are all the result of a phenomenological materialism which fails to understand altruism 
as a sentiment springing from a fullness of mind. This fullness is a result of being in 
the highest state of intelligence.575 Individuals in this state do not feel the need for any 
                                                 
567 See K.R. Monroe, Altruism and Self-interest, in INT’L ENCYCLOPAEDIA SOC. & BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 415, 416 
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes, eds. 2001).  
568 Id.  
569 For an overview of the economists’ view of altruism, See Kristen Renwick Monroe, A Fat Lady in a Corset: 
Altruism and Social Theory, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 861, 864-70 (1994) (emphasizes that it is the basic 
assumptions about human self-interest that frustrates the efforts of many social sciences in offering a credible 
theory of altruism). On the assumptions of economics regarding altruism, see Herbert A. Simon, Altruism and 
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 156, 158-61 (1993).  
570 See generally Monroe, supra note 569.  
571 See id. at 884-86.  
572 Id. at 887.  
573 See supra note 155 and the source cited therein.  
574 See KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON HUMANITY 121-94 
(1996).  
575 Isabelle Ratie, Remarks on Compassion and Altruism in the Pratyabhijna Philosophy, 37 J. INDIAN PHIL. 349, 
355 (2009). In Buddhist philosophy, fullness is known as “emptiness”, meaning empty of sensual desires. See 
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gratification, for, being those experiencing fullness, they have neither desires to fulfill 
nor merits to gain.576 Isabelle Ratie concisely captures the concept of fullness: 
individuals in the highest state of consciousness “do[ ] not have any will; but [their] 
will is exclusively turned towards the others—it cannot be selfish, given the 
completeness or the fullness that the liberated subject[s] [have] acquired by recovering 
a full awareness of [themselves]”.577 Furthermore, as the highest intelligence is the 
ultimate reality of humanity, which is synonymous with pure consciousness, there is 
also no risk of the highest intelligence having any essentialist or materialist quality. 
This purity renders altruism a state of mind free from the influence of any materialistic 
empathy, one that views the whole world as one.  
Altruism is thus qualitatively far from the natural human state of egoism. All 
intermediary behaviors drawn out and elaborated by social sciences are the many 
versions of egoism, and are on no account altruism. Monroe affirms the 
incompleteness of intermediary behaviors:  
  
[N]one of the socio-cultural correlates of altruism unfailingly and 
systematically explains altruism or behavior by altruists. It suggests, 
further, that remaining within the paradigmatic confines of self-interest 
produces only partial explanations of altruism. Such rational analyses 
offer some limited insight concerning quasi-altruistic acts by rational 
actors but fail to explain altruism itself.578  
  
Further, the view that altruism and egoism are the perennial poles of human 
thought, to have a certain level of conceptual purity, requires a significant tempering of 
the idea that egoism is the natural state of human thought. Although this idea is not 
contested, and is a suitable depiction of the real situation, the natural human state (of 
ego) is often seen to be a necessary perspective for explaining the dynamics of our 
time-space and modern social life. This confers a special theoretical utility on ego,579 
which has the possibility of reinforcing the egoistic side of the polarity. This 
intellectual posture of observing society though the natural state of consciousness is 
apparent in all the three doctrinal schools of thought—TWAIL, global governance, and 
L&E—examined earlier, in addition to being present in many thought-structures. This 
problem exists primarily because when ego becomes the basic variable for analyzing 
human behavior, it acquires a “causal status”.580 When the causal status of ego is 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ruben L.F. Habito, Compassion out of Wisdom, in ALTRUISM AND ALTRUISTIC LOVE: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, 
AND RELIGION IN DIALOGUE 362, 373 (Stephen Garrard Post, ed. 2002) (“The compassionate life is an outflow 
of the vision of reality, “the way things are”, open to a person in the pivotal experience of awakening”. Id.)  
576 Ratie, supra note 575 at 357, 362.  
577 Id. at 355.  
578 MONROE, supra note 574 at 233.  
579 But, the origin of the idea that the egoistic side of the polarity gets a methodological purpose is in the Vedic 
philosophy itself. See Martha Doherty, A Contemporary Debate among Advaita Vedantins on the Nature of 
Avidya, 33 J. INDIAN PHIL. 205 (2005); S.K. Arun Murthi, The Maulavidya Controversy Among Advaita 
Vedantins: Was Sankara Himself Responsible?, 37 J. INDIAN PHIL. 149 (2009) (argues that the idea that 
ignorance assumes an ontological status owes to the imperfections in the taxonomy adopted by Sankara).  
580 See Doherty, supra note 579 at 213, 214. While attributing this idea to Doherty’s articulation, I take it outside 
the strict Vedantic context within which Doherty works and structure it in a modern context without polluting 
her views. The view that the discussion within the Vedanta on the ontological character of ego has a modernist 
character is articulated in the later parts of Doherty’s article. See id. at 227-229.  
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combined with an absence of a clear conception of reality, the explanations implying 
causality to ego slowly set in as perceptions of reality.  
In order to not to misrepresent the polarities, what is necessary is to dismiss any 
approach which has ego as the lens through which to look at the world. Then again, 
mere awareness of a state of fullness (altruism) or a desire to reach that state is not 
enough; this awareness and desire should be on top of a consciousness that ego—
understood as the natural human state—has no ontological credibility.581 This assertion 
does not deny that egoism is the point of departure of human thought. Any shift to 
altruism certainly starts from the natural egoistic state, not, however by means of the 
methods set by any ego-centric variable, but through the apophasis/negation of natural 
behavioral “nudges”.582 In sum, the distance between altruism and egoism is obvious. 
However, a more logical way to view the polarities would be to take the position that 
more than any distance what separates altruism and egoism is their being different 
states of consciousness, one maturing to the other, with no intermediary psychological 
spaces.583  
The departure from egoism towards altruism is what gives hope to human life. In 
other words, an awareness that the natural state of ego is a condition of ignorance and a 
desire for the highest intelligence are factors which help overcome the purposelessness 
of human life, the purposelessness satirized by Benjamin Franklin King in The 
Pessimist: “Nothing to see but sights, Nothing to quench but thirst, Nothing to have but 
what we’ve got”.584 What provides meaning and purpose to life then is the pursuit of 
supreme intelligence. This optimism might sound rather absurd from the perspective of 
materialism, for it creates an “impersonal cosmic perspective” on life,585 a perspective 
that miniaturizes earth as a “pale blue dot”, to borrow Carl Sagan’s widely admired 
expression,586 and life on earth to a surreal state of consciousness. John Kekes, 
however, equates the meaning of life with an intellectual state of coherence, one self-
directed but driven by the natural order of things rather than getting lost in the 
metaphysical wilderness of transcendental reality.587 Yet, Kekes is aware that finding 
                                                 
581 I have been influenced to take this view by Doherty’s review of the work of Swami Satchidanandendra. See id. 
at 215-19.  
582 See id. at 233. “Nudge” on individual behavior finds best articulation and illustration in RICHARD H. THALER 
& CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
583 Readers need not think that the absence of any psychological space between altruism and egoism defeats the 
theory of “states of consciousness” or the idea of the reason gradating to higher levels. In the first three states of 
human consciousness, i.e., waking, dreaming sleep, and dreamless sleep, the “autonomic nervous system” is at 
work (see supra note 68 at 200), and hence they only qualify to the egoistic state. However, in Turiya, the 
fourth stage, which generates altruism, senses lose their sway and an awareness of “Self” overpowers the 
sensually motivated “self”. There are also many stages in the progress towards the supreme intelligence such as 
Sattvapatti (when there are noetic flashes), Asamsakti (when one gets detachment from senses), and 
Padarthabhavana (when one realizes the all-pervasiveness of the Brahman, the reality). See SWAMI 
KRISHNANDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PANCADASI 14 (1992).  However, these stages hardly match with the 
fullness of the highest intelligence—Turiya—which engenders altruism. Only Turiya is identifiable with 
altruism. See SWAMI KRISHNANDA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PANCADASI 14 (1992).   
584 The Pessimist, BEN KING’S VERSE 126 (1894).   
585 John Kekes, The Informed Will and the Meaning of Life, 47 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 75, 79 (1986).  
586 CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE (1994).  
587 Kekes, supra note 585 at 89, 90.  
 83
meanings in such cognitive activities would be no more than a palliative for the 
meaninglessness of human life.588  
The true meaning of life is to be found in the pursuit of knowledge and in 
attaining absolute intellectual bliss.589 Absolute intellectual bliss is an identification 
with human reality: an identification of cosmic intelligence, identification of fullness, 
and identification of human qua human. This one whole intelligence in many forms of 
identifications imbues thoughts with beauty and deeds with meaning. E.M. Adams 
sums up the sublime purpose of life: “Our lives have their meaning through our 
participation in [the] struggle for the realization of what ought to be … our mission is 
to be enlightened, rational, creative pulses to the divine heartbeats of the universe”.590  
Thus, life absolutely being an advance from unreal to real, denouncing any meta-
visions and conceptualizing the world on the basis of observed characteristics of the 
physical world and human behavior constrains any further intellectual development for 
humanity591: “[W]e mutilate ourselves and deny our humanity when we conceptually 
repackage ourselves so that we fit into the world”.592 Therefore any effort to stagnate 
the world has the effect of thwarting the advance of humanity towards our reality. 
Moreover, absence of knowledge regarding the ephemerality and limits of the organic 
state of consciousness can be detrimental to humanity; it not only prevents reason from 
achieving its goal, but closes the doors to many unknown cosmic truths that science has 
been investigating.  
To sum up, maintaining the duality and distinction between altruism and egoism is 
imperative if humanity is to realize its goal. Any intellectual position or socio-political 
system tampering with this duality, be it one in which egoism and altruism mutually 
reinforce one another, coexist, balance, draw near, or remain in perpetual conflict, is 
unconstructive as well as harmful.  
In this regard, there is, however, no consolation for those who seek social stability 
and inquire into the purposes of life through international law, for the duality is 
tampered with in international law;593 many disparate pairings of rationalities bearing 
                                                 
588 Id. at 90 (“within these [cognitive] frameworks, human lives can be and many are meaningful, even though 
outside of the human world everything is grey”. Id.).  
589 E.M. Adams, The Meaning of Life, 51 INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 71, 80, 81 (2002) (“The universe [   ] is 
coming to self-knowledge through humanity in human culture and it is achieving a new level of being through 
the knowledge based action of human beings”. Id.).  
590 Id. at 81.  
591 Such denouncing is equivalent to ignoring the inner world of humans and building the world solely on the 
basis of their physical world. Allott theorizes this position:  
In the physical world made by [materialist] consciousness, the human being has found means 
of transforming that world by treating it as a world ordered in the dimensions of 
consciousness, time and space, and as a world which respects the ordering projecting onto it 
by the self-ordering of consciousness.  
See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 404.  
592 Adams, supra note 589 at 74.  
593 About this argument, a scepticism is possible, especially for those readers familiar with the duality of apology 
and utopia formulated by Koskenniemi (see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3). For them, any reference to the 
duality between egoism and altruism might also be déjà vu of apology and utopia. Even if a doubt of my having 
committed a tautology creeps in; it is natural. All these concerns may exist because the utopian position of 
individual interest and apologist position of community interest are after all legal/political manifestations of 
egoism and altruism. However, altruism and egoism in a liberal political context are simply rudiments of the 
political philosophy of individualism and collectivism, respectively. In simple terms, Koskenniemi’s reference 
is to patterns of thought within a liberal political setup. That is not the background in which I analyze altruism 
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altruism and egoism, e.g., environment and trade, human security and trade, law of the 
sea and trade, law of outer space and trade, have occurred in international law and 
theoretically support many modern-day institutions and frameworks. These pairings 
defeat the very ontological purpose of humanity. Nevertheless, international law has 
shrouded any disparity in these pairings and validated them, as if they are natural 
systemic phenomena, by way of its doctrinal as well as rational discourses and 
dialectic. The details of that intellectual action make up the subject matter of the next 
section.  
            
B. The Doctrine against Doctrine  
 
In international law, the disparate pairing of rationalities became manifested as 
“regime-level linkages”594 whereby many special branches of international law 
(hereinafter “regimes”, since that expression is a fad and fashion in the postmodern 
world595) began to interact with other special branches of international law. Scholars of 
international law were concerned about linkages/clashes even before any regime 
conflicts were apparent.596 However, such clashes were mainly normative doctrinal 
ones,597 where the challenge was, more often than not, the impossibility of performing 
obligations due to the conflict of two norms.598 It was only with a recent 
phenomenon—the loss of the centrifugal force of the doctrinal complex of international 
law and the collapse of its “center”—that [“self-contained”]-regimes started to burgeon 
and threatened the coherence of the doctrinal complex. Each of these regimes seemed 
to be a mini-system in its own right, e.g., legal regimes for the environment, outer 
space, oceans, technology, human security, and the fight against terrorism etc. Scholars 
first had anxieties about this development that a jurisdictional anarchy in dispute 
                                                                                                                                                        
and egoism. In this Article, altruism and egoism represent the beginning and end, organic and transcendental, 
and illusion and reality [respectively] of human life and thought.  
However, in the epilogue to the 2005 edition of From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi, as the culmination 
of the role of law, [“if ever happens”, as he would say] envisages a scenario in which altruism replaces egoism:  
[A]s society becomes more integrated the (artificial) egoism of the individual actors cedes 
more room to their (natural) altruism so that the need of law diminishes until at some 
imaginary point ethics and natural love allow the (now fully integrated) community to govern 
itself without formalism. (original parenthesis)  
Id. at 599. In this reference, altruism and egoism come out of its political context and correspond to the concept 
of the poles of human thought.  
594 On the delineation of linkages into regime-level linkage and other specific and micro types of linkages, e.g., 
issue-area-linkage, see David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5 (2002).  
595 Today, it is unlikely that specialist scholars in international law would deny regime status to their respective 
branch of specialization. International law today has an image of more than a venerated canon with a general 
application; rather it has the image of an actively functional catalyst, divided into many braches and sub-
branches, efficiently reaching many areas of human activity, in an expanding and intermingling world. Every 
special branch has such a conceptual artillery of “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures” 
(matching with that of a regime) to it that it can prompt actor’s expectations to meet around the issue it seeks to 
regulate (regimes are defined and elaborated in Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185 (1982)).  
596 See, e.g., Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401 (1953).  
597 According to Simma, the normative clashes have the potential to generate sub-systems within international 
law; these sub-systems can in effect be regimes. See Bruno Simma, Self-contained Regimes, 16 NETHERLANDS 
Y.B. INT’L L. 111 (1985) (assures that the existence of self-contained regimes does not significantly threaten 
general international law).  
598 On a typological specification of doctrinal normative clashes, see generally Erich Vranes, The Definition of 
‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 395 (2006).  
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settlement might arise if regime-specific special courts proliferate.599 This anxiety soon 
gave way to an assurance that there are no autonomous regimes, but only special 
regimes; and, these special regimes do not pose any threat to the structural safety of the 
doctrinal complex.600  
Today regime clashes and their consequences are barely a theoretical worry in 
international law.601 Over the past few years, the discipline has had many doctrinal 
shifts and moves, rendering the conflicting regimes to coexist and mutually interact 
with each other. In what follows, I analyze how international law has settled the 
regime-clashes through its doctrinal complex, thereby putting together the disparate 
rationalities—common interest and market interest—to interact and thus bridged the 
extremes of altruism and egoism. This analysis is done bearing in mind that doctrine 
has two forms, i.e., doctrine as structure and doctrine as discursivity. The structural 
moves mediating common interest and market interest are described first and then the 
discursive moves. Regarding discursive doctrinal moves, for intelligibility and focus, I 
choose the three types of doctrinal discourses with which the readers are already 
familiar—global governance, TWAIL, and L&E—and demonstrate how each of these 
discourses worked in order to validate the disparate pairing of rationalities. These three 
discourses do not, however, exhaust the types of discursive doctrinal moves which 
validate disparate rationalities.  
 
1. Structural Doctrinal Moves  
 
Trade came into the spot light in the 1980s, when the global economy was under 
the severe threat of protectionism in the form of non-tariff barriers to trade.602 Many of 
the non-tariff barriers were related to “issue-areas” lying far beyond that of trade.603 
Indeed, this remoteness of the issue-areas from the trade regime was the major 
challenge in combating protectionism. The issue-areas featuring in the use of non-tariff 
barriers, the phenomenon which John H. Jackson calls “special sector interests”, “are 
myriad, and many are [of] the types […] for which human ingenuity can perpetually 
develop new devices”.604 Non-tariff barriers were found in environmental standards, 
labor standards, human rights and the like.  
Two major rounds of talk in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
had been unsuccessful in grappling with non-tariff barriers to trade.  Afterwards the 
                                                 
599 See generally Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 9.  
600 See Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, supra note 9. See also Anja Lindroos & 
Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera of ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ International Law and the WTO, 16 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 857, 858 (2006); Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between 
Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007). 
601 See, e.g., Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 265 (2009). Simma assures international lawyers that “We may not always be aware of how thin the 
ice is on which we are moving, but what we keep in mind in very pragmatic ways is that we must handle the 
law” (on fragmentation and self-contained regimes) id. at 297. 
602 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 43-60 (1989).  
603 “Issue-areas”, the term used by Leebron, has a functional connation, although the term sufficiently captures 
those regimes which prima facie clash with trade. On the meaning and application of the term in the context of 
“trade and …” linkages, see Leebron, supra note 594 at 6-10.  
604 John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem–Comments on Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 118, 121 
(2002).   
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issue came on to the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,605 where it 
was resolved successfully. Inspired by the overall success of the Uruguay Round it was 
felt that non-tariff barriers would be best addressed through an international institution, 
one mandated to manage intervening issue-areas and which could contain the non-trade 
rationalities of those issue-areas.606 As if in response to this feeling, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was founded, which has an institutional framework to 
accommodate inter alia non-trade concerns and thereby mediate the conceptual conflict 
between the various issue-areas and trade.607  
The trade community hypostatized (and lionized) the WTO as the institutional 
manifestation of the trade regime.608 Linkage issues, nonetheless, were raging, tending 
to threaten even the working of the Organization. The primary matter of concern was 
the WTO intervening in issues irreconcilable with its logic and design, which might 
cause severe imbalances in the world and could be deleterious for the future of 
humanity. At the root of these concerns were perceptions that a market interest was 
moving towards the center of inter-state, inter-human relations and that the trade 
regime, propelled by opportune ideologies, was cannibalizing other regimes. The 
WTO, however, mollified these concerns through a doctrinal, interpretative move in 
which it assured all stakeholders that it was not a legal phantom existing beyond the 
rule of law,609 but an organization functionally interlinked to international law in a 
systemic, interactive way.610 This was endorsed in scholarly writings.611 In addition to 
                                                 
605 Non-tariff barriers were discussed in the Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), though they were less successful. See L. Alan Winters, The Road to Uruguay, 100 
ECON. J. 1288, 1292-99 (1990); Id. For an account of the background of the Uruguay Round, its advancement, 
and the challenges confronted by the Round in the milieu of the then economic and political situation, see 
“Gilbert R. Winham, An Interpretative History of Uruguay Round, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 3-25 (Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G. 
Plummer, eds. 2005).  
606 See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading Institutions, 
27 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 607 (1994).  
607 For example, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) commitment to balance common interest and market 
interest is embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement in the form of a declaration to preserve the 
environment [in the common interest of humanity]:  
[Trade should be conducted], while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns of different levels of economic development.  
See The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter “The WTO 
Agreement”), THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999) (hereinafter “Legal Texts”). On the organizational side, in pursuance of its 
commitment to balance trade and environment, the WTO has established The Committee on Trade and 
Environment. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm.  
For an evaluation of the WTO as a platform and tool for linkages, see Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as a 
Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146 (2002).  
608 MARY E. FOOTER, AN INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 93-
115 (2006).  
609 See Article 3.2. “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes”, Legal 
Texts, supra note 607 at 355. See also Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules 
are Rules – Towards a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335, 341-42 (2000).  
610 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 535 (2001).  
611 Id. For support, see generally Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International Legal 
Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969 (2007) (“the WTO is an engine, a motor energizing the international legal 
order”. Id. at 984). 
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that WTO’s institutional charisma was seen as reinforcing the normativity and 
bindingness of international law,612 liberating it from an age-old accusation of being an 
insignificant player outside the family of law.613   
This action is a sign of how the auto-response system of the doctrinal complex of 
international law responds to a crisis. To illustrate, when the crisis of protectionism 
became a menace to international trade, an international institution seemed to offer the 
optimal remedy. However, protectionism was a crisis not only in the sense that it 
hampered free trade, but issues at variance with the culture of the trading system were 
taken up in that process, which left the multilateral trading system with no alternative 
but to assimilate the new issue-areas into the regulatory sphere of trade. The very 
formation of the WTO and its subsequent integration into the doctrinal complex of 
international law were part of the functioning of the auto-response system of the 
doctrinal complex.614 A good bet on this point would be that formal-minded, ingenious 
international lawyers would have seen in this institutionalization of disparate 
rationalities a tinge of progress of international law.615     
The impact of cannibalism of the trade regime was such that many special 
branches of international law had witnessed trade concerns entering their regulatory 
realm. This overpowering advance of trade had weighty ideological reasons616—the 
ideological advance has even weighty philosophical explanations617—beyond that a 
crisis had simply erupted (I will forgo a detailed treatment in this context). In any 
event, special branches of international law were in turmoil triggered by the new issues 
they had to regulate. Prominent cases were that of the legal regimes of the oceans and 
outer space, for these regimes, which to a significant extent regulate human activities 
in order to realize the interests of humanity at large,618 were required to brazen out the 
trade-driven market interests.  
                                                 
612 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (2005).  
613 See, e.g., Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin’s Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT’L LAW. 651 (2003).    
614 Until the official integration by way of a declaration in the preamble of The WTO Agreement, its predecessor 
GATT did not strictly adhere to the conventions of interpretative reasoning of the doctrinal complex. See P.J. 
Kuyper, The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-
contained Regimes?, 25 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT’L L. 227 (1994) (points out that despite a tendency to function 
as if it is a self-contained regime, GATT failed at many points. Kuyper, however, concludes, “whether GATT is 
or about to become a self-contained system of international law, cannot yet be answered affirmatively”. Id. at 
257.).  
615 Nothing less than this view is what turns out from Klabbers’ musings on Thomas Franck— “Franck was right 
in designating the law of international organizations as constitutional, as being ‘capable of growth’”. Jan 
Klabbers, The Paradox of International Institutional Law, 5 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 151, 162 (2008). Trachtman 
views inter-regime linkages, particularly “trade and …”, on a slightly different note: “They [regimes] can also 
be artificially linked in order to provide bargaining power or enforcement power”. See TRACHTMAN, supra 
note 417 at 196.    
616 The epithet, “market fundamentalism”, as popularized by Stiglitz, speaks a lot about the ideological reasons 
behind the dominance of trade. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002). These reasons are, to a certain extent, the subject matter of an earlier discussion in this Article (see 
supra Section III.A).  
617 The analyses I have in section II.2 is a modest attempt to augment those philosophical explanations.  
618 See the preamble of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967, UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND 
PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 3-8 (2002) (“Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of 
the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”). Also, see the preamble of the “United Nations 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea”, 1982 (UNCLOS), 21 I.L.M. 1261. “[W]ill contribute to the strengthening 
of peace, security, cooperation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of 
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world …”).  
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As regimes safeguarding and securing the common interest of humanity, the main 
challenge facing the law of the sea and outer space was the refractoriness of their 
doctrines of common interest which were deeply entrenched within the legal 
discourses maintaining the coherence of the respective regimes.619 At a functional 
level, the challenge for the law of outer space was to regulate commercial space 
activities,620 whereas for the law of the sea the trial was its political opposition to its 
supposed undue inclination towards maintaining community interest.621 As the first 
step, jurisdictional frontiers of both regimes were left open for an invasion by market 
interests.622 Then, these legal regimes faced up to the crisis, and continued to adjust to 
it, through extended interpretations of their doctrines and extended bodies of 
legislation, subsuming thereby market concerns into their sphere of regulations.623 
 However, when it was the turn of the trade regime to reconcile itself with the 
claims of common interest regimes, such as the regime for the protection of the 
environment, the interpretative acts within the trade regime were seen to reduce the 
utility of the substance of “environmental arrangements”.624 Environmental concerns 
and the legal framework devoted to their solution were integrated into the trade 
regime, but as mere tools “helping interpret an exception from the principles of free 
                                                                                                                                                        
In addition, both the regimes uphold the principle of the “Common Heritage of Mankind” (CHM), which 
vests on humanity a duty to protect as well as a moral right of inheritance of the natural resources of the 
universe. For an instructive discussion, see KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF COMMON HERITAGE OF 
MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-28 (1998) (contents that the constituents of the rights associated with the 
CHM are derived from ethics and morals).  
619 For example, the principle of the CHM was deemed to be the bedrock of the legal regimes of oceans and outer 
space. Scholars of these disciplines cherish the CHM and take pride in the principle. They believe that any 
tampering of the CHM would damage the foundations of these regimes. On a sentiment that the CHM 
constitutes the foundation of these regimes, see Aldo Armando Cocca, The Common Heritage of Mankind: 
Doctrine and Principle of Space Law–An Overview, 29 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 17 (1986). See also 
Nicolas Mateesco Matte, The Common Heritage of Mankind and the Outer Space: Toward a New International 
Order for Survival, 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. (313 1987) (argues that space law is progressive only when it 
is developed through the CHM). However, disagreements exist regarding the normative strength of the 
doctrine. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind, 
35 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 190 (1986) (asserts that the CHM is neither a principle erga omnes, nor a jus cogens, 
but a “philosophical notion with the potential to emerge and crystallize as a legal norm”. Id at 199.).   
620 For a succinct account of the challenges being confronted by the law of outer space, see Johanne Irene 
Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 1041 (2004).   
621 During the UNCLOS negotiations a group of industrially advanced countries held that the regime for the 
mining of the deep sea-bed, by excessively focusing on the common interest of all states in the exploration and 
mining of the deep sea-bed, ignores the economic/market and political realities of the time. On this state 
position, see MARKUS G. SCHMIDT, COMMON HERITAGE OR COMMON BURDEN? (1989).  
622 A noteworthy example in this regard is the institutional tie between the International Seabed Authority and the 
WTO. See INT’L ORG. AND & L. SEA DOCUMENTARY Y.B. 22, para 38 (2000).  
623 See Franz G. von der Dunk, Public Space Law and Private Enterprise: The Fitness of International Space Law 
Instruments for Private Space Activities, 1999 PROC. PROJECT 2001—WORKSHOP ON LEGAL ISSUES OF 
PRIVATISING SPACE ACTIVITIES 12 (2001. For the proposals on how to adapt to the crisis, see, Scott J. 
Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 109 (2009) (proposes to 
alter the CHM and make the doctrine amenable to market interests by way of redefining and commercializing 
property rights in common heritages); John S. Lewis & Christopher F. Lewis, A Proposed International Legal 
Regime for the Era of Private Commercial Utilization of Space, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2005).         
624 See Anja Lindroos & Michael Mehling, From Autonomy to Integration? International Law, Free Trade and 
the Environment, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 253, 260-67, 271, 272 (2008).   
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trade”.625 Accordingly, the trade regime maintained its pre-eminence in mediating 
conflicting rationalities.      
Finally, if the interpretatively mediated conflict between common interest and 
market interest is viewed as one performed in a liberal political setting by the 
contemporary doctrinal discourse,626 the interpretative act takes on a postmodern aura 
of being a hermeneutical action,627 and in that way gains a theoretical credibility.628  
 
2. Discursive Doctrinal Moves 
 
Thus the discontents about the linkage between disparate rationalities were put 
off and the doctrinal rearrangements legalized by way of several structural doctrinal 
moves. There was, however, no discourse to validate those rearrangements. This was 
the time when international law would use its doctrines in their discursive form, 
trimming this with the discourse of global governance and its auxiliary discourses, 
“sustainable development”.   
In the scholarly circles of international law, global governance is considered as a 
force that tidied up a conceptual litter spewed out by the crises that hit the world when 
the Cold War ended. For scholars in the field, global governance is also a ubiquitous 
guiding tour de force—an enlightenment which contributes meaning to the 
contemporary “open-ended” public process629—and a “cosmocracy”630 and 
“cosmopolity”. However, as argued earlier, these perceptions are misguided, the result 
of a deeply embedded materialist reformism in modern individuals and, 
simultaneously, of a self-imposed spiritual poverty, both of which showed the way to a 
politically designed as well as a recycled program of governance.631 Notwithstanding 
this specious perception of it, global governance flourishes in a liberal political and 
neoliberal economic environment; breathing the air of these environments and thereby 
catering to the needs of the market.632 Moreover, governance is projected as 
representing a virtue and a “prerequisite to human development”, and a medium 
securing the common interest of humanity.633     
                                                 
625 Id. at 271.  
626 Given that the setting in which the mediation between common interest and market interest is done is a liberal 
political one—one between “truth” and “power”—likening the polarity between the common interest and 
market interest to that between truth and power is logical. On the liberal doctrinal discourse and its [faulty] 
dynamics, see David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985). This view also 
implies that bringing the poles of common interest and market interest to a liberal setting is at the expense of 
distorting the reality regarding the polarity (which is that of the organic and transcendental states of human life) 
and reducing the polarities to that of positions as they are seen in political philosophy. For support, see supra 
note 593.  
627 This likening is not simplistic either. In the interpretative actions within the law of outer space and the law of 
the sea one can find inter alia, what Kennedy associates with hermeneutics, a devotion for the “mechanism of 
the ‘legal system’, describing the behavior of norms and actors”. Id. at 256, 257.  
628 But, see id. (“By retaining and suppressing behavioral and interpretative conflict, theory adopts the confident 
tone of an anti-intellectual practicality”. Id. at 257.).  
629 See Kennedy, supra note 30 at 106.  
630 “Cosmocracy” refers to the interdependent and intersecting governance structure. See JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY? 97 (2003).    
631 See supra Section II.B.2.b.  
632 See Lee & McBride supra note 168 at 6.  
633 Id. at 10, 11.  
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On the face of it, global governance is a normal theoretical configuration, but on 
a second look, it becomes obvious that, in the name of governance, a mediation is 
taking place between common interest and market interest. That is to say, by means of 
the dialectic of governance, common interest of humanity is situated within neoliberal 
market interest. If the neoliberal economic milieu is replaced with a liberal political 
milieu, even then, governance situates common interest of humanity within liberal 
political individualism.  
Enough has been said about the theoretical design of global governance.634 I now 
turn to showing how the concept of sustainable development, which is an auxiliary 
discourse of global governance, aids in the mediation between common interest and 
market interest.  
In international law, sustainable development emerged as a policy response to the 
global problems that threaten to lead humanity and its habitat to self-destruction—a 
crisis.635 Sustainable development was solemnized through the Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).636 In keeping with this 
report, the objective of the concept of sustainable development, above anything, is to 
maintain the poise of economic growth and the protection of the common interest of 
humanity in its habitat.637 Subsequently, the doctrinal complex of international law 
integrated sustainable development into its epistemological and functional 
framework638 in such a way that international law remains a site for balancing 
economic development with the protection of environment.639 However, when bringing 
in economic development, in order that any market interest remains out of sight, the 
economic concerns were diluted in their entirety into a discourse—the “right to 
development”—representing a mixed bag of economic, political, social, and human 
                                                 
634 See supra Section II.B.2.a.  
635 Nico Schrijver, Introducing the Book, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE xi. (Nico Schrijver, ed. 2004).   
636 See Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environmental and Development, available at 
http://worldinbalance.net/pdf/1987-brundtland.pdf    
637 See generally, id. See also Oluf Langhelle, Sustainable Development: Exploring the Ethics of Our Common 
Future, International, 20 POL. SCI. REV. 129, 130, 135 (1999) (contents that the economic dimension in the 
concept of sustainable development is because of the “over-emphasis and misinterpretation of the growth 
issue”. Id. at 130.).  
638 See generally Marie-Claire Cordoneir Segger, Sustainable Development in International Law, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 85, 116-182 (Hans Christian Bugge & 
Christina Voigt, eds., 2008) (argues that sustainable development can pass the “normative test” set by the 
doctrinal framework of international law). But, see Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and 
Unsustainable Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS 
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 19-38 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone, eds., 1999) (sustainable development in 
itself is not a norm, but “it can properly claim a normative status as an element of the process of judicial 
reasoning”. Id. at 31.). 
639 This balancing is evident from the many decisions of the ICJ, e.g., the Case Concerning the Gabíkovo-
Nagymaros Dam, see ICJ REPORTS 1997, p.78, para 140. See also Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay, 13 July 2006 (order for provisional measures) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf (“[T]he present case highlights the importance of the need to ensure 
environmental protection of shared natural resources while allowing for sustainable economic development”. 
Id. at p.19, para 80.). How this balancing is done in practice within the GATT/WTO is presented in 
Massimiliano Montini, The Interplay between the Right to Development and the Protection of the 
Environment: Patterns and Instruments to Achieve Sustainable Development in Practice, 10 AFR. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 181, 210-22 (2002); B.S. Chimni, WTO and Environment: Shrimp-Turtle and EC-Hormones Cases, ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. 1752 (13 May 2000) (highlighting the interpretative acts of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
of the WTO, argues that the WTO has the potential to be a platform for balancing trade and environment).  
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rights.640 In the flamboyant rhetoric of the right to development,641 and accompanied by 
the hopes and cries for securing social, political, economic, and human rights, market 
interest has gently entered the sustainable development discourse in the form of an 
innocuous right to economic development. Carlos J. Castro summarizes the process 
syllogistically:  
 
[P]overty need to be reduced … [P]overty was and still is a cause of 
environmental degradation. Therefore, environmental degradation will 
be reduced when poverty is reduced. To reduce poverty, the countries in 
the periphery need to have economic growth. To achieve economic 
growth, there need to be freer markets …In other words, sustainable 
development sounds suspiciously like plain old [economic] 
development.642  
 
Today market motives drive sustainable development.643 Furthermore, the 
sustainable development discourse guarantees that any act of meditation between the 
common concerns of humanity regarding the protection of the environment and market-
driven economic development is theoretically valid. In other words, any mediation 
between common interest and market interest can have effect within the doctrinal 
complex of international law without having the fairness of the act challenged. Thus, 
being buttressed by a “postmodernist discourse”,644 the doctrinal complex advances 
with institutional645 and strategic reform646 to reinforce the union of common interest 
and market interest.  
                                                 
640 This view has more strength when viewed in the light of the United State’s position in the right to development 
negotiations. When the right to development was discussed in international negotiating forums, the United 
States has found the concept as contrary to its national and international economic policies and aspirations. See 
Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 
143-47 (2004) (“It may be presumed to be a sincerely held belief of the decision-makers in the U.S. 
government that the best path to development is through free enterprises domestically and free trade 
internationally”. Id. at 145.).  
641 Donnelly argues that the right to development is deceptive in legal terms and illusory in moral terms; it is 
nothing but a “charming delusion”. See Jack Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and 
Politics of the Right to Development, 15 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 473 (1985).  
642 Carlos J. Castro, Sustainable Development: Mainstream and Critical Perspectives, 17 ORG. & ENV’T 195, 197 
(2004) (articulates that faith in achieving sustainability through economic free trade is a mainstream view on 
sustainable development. However, this view has been resisted and is being reconstructed by a 
“poststructuralist critique” and “environmental Marxism”).   
643 Not only that, Beckerman instructively argues that the presence of market motives and the effort to balance it 
with a loosely defined ethical guidance to protect the environment have rendered sustainable development 
dysfunctional and logically unsustainable. This is for the reason that the concept of development, which is 
construed as “welfare maximization” in sustainable development discourses, is incompatible with the ethically 
conceived meaning of sustainability. See generally Wilfred Beckerman, Sustainable Development: Is It a 
Useful Concept?, 3 ENVTL. VALUES 191 (1994).  
644 On the view that sustainable development is a postmodern discourse and that it supports the reconciliation of 
environmental interests with trade interests, see TUOMAS KUOKKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: VARIATIONS ON A THEME 315-338 (2002).  
645 See generally Joyeeta Gupta, Global Sustainable Development Governance: Institutional Challenges from a 
Theoretical Perspective, 2 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 361 (2002) (evaluates the various 
institutional models that could bring together the goal of sustainable development and the spirit of global 
governance).     
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Despite the ubiquity of global governance, the governance structures it brought 
with it did not receive worldwide acceptance; in certain contexts the governance 
paradigm itself faced resistance and contestation. The resistance primarily came from 
TWAIL, which recognizes that it is its responsibility to continue and uphold the spirit 
of the resistance started after decolonization even when a new paradigm like global 
governance presides over the world.647  
From its historiographical records, TWAIL realized that global society is the 
product of a social action, as is market. Later on, when social relations became an 
economic function, market took over the social functions and governance of social 
institutions.648 In the process, the colonial world gained control over the market, and in 
the many power ploys that ensued, colonies lost their social identity and control.649 
TWAIL therefore considers it as its major assignment to study the institutions of the 
market society and to attempt to reorder the patterns of control.650 This recognition 
from TWAIL that its identity and welfare lie in getting control of the market 
institutions from the West has driven TWAIL scholars to focus on the distribution of 
power in and activities of these institutions.651   
It is paradoxical that the reformist TWAIL scholars do not oppose market interest, 
free trade, or free-trade institutions per se, but are only concerned “whether free-trade 
automatically translates into the welfare for the subaltern classes”.652 However, this 
empathy of TWAIL with free trade has not lessened the oppositional resistance to 
which TWAIL has oriented itself.653 This is apparent from two functional stances taken 
                                                                                                                                                        
646 The introduction of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which evaluates commercial projects, in order to 
help set a balance between economic efficiency and environmental efficiency is a major strategy within the 
sustainable development paradigm. See KUOKKANEN, supra note 644 at 287, 288.   
647 Fidler, supra note 157 at 29, 30. But, see Ruth Buchanan, Writing Resistance into International Law, 10 INT’L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 445 (2008) (asks to what extent TWAIL can carryout its resistance within the 
conceptually clogged liberal framework of international law).  
648 Michael Fakhri, Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, and Interests: Using Polyani (and Foucault) to ask 
TWAIL Questions, 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 455, 459, 460 (2008).  
649 Id. at 460.  
650 See id. at 464, 465.  
651 Inquiries into the existing mode of governance have been done in, e.g., Anthony Anghie, Civilization and 
Commerce: The Concept of Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 893, 894, 906-09 
(2000). Considering that the concept of “good governance” was contrived by the Western world only to get 
control on global governance, Anghie writes with a doubt regarding the neutrality of the practice of good 
governance:  
Good governance, in short, provides the moral and intellectual foundation for the 
development of a set of doctrines, policies and principles, formulated and implemented by 
various international actors to manage, specifically, the Third World state and Third World 
peoples. Attempts by Western states to promote good governance in the non-European world 
are simply one example of a much broader set of initiatives relating to the promotion of 
democracy, free market and rule of law. These initiatives have a basic structure in common: 
in all cases, the basic task is that of reproducing in the non-western world a set of principles 
and institutions which are seen as having been perfected in the Western world and the non-
Western world must adopt if it is to make progress and achieve stability. 
Id.  
652  See B.S. Chimni, The World Trade Organization, Democracy, and Development: A View from the South, 40 J. 
WORLD TRADE 5, 10 (2006).  
653 To remind that the oppositional resistance has been the fundamental functionality of TWAIL, I quote Mutua:  
Any TWAIL scholarship or political operation must be fundamentally oppositional to an 
important question in international law. Such disagreement must be related to an issue that is 
of significance to, or affects in an important way, the Third World … At a minimum, the 
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by TWAIL on the question of the linkage between disparate rationalities. First, it 
sceptically views any association between social rationalities and market interest;654 
e.g., TWAIL is sceptical about the linkage between trade and the “social”.655 Second, 
TWAIL seeks to reverse the discourse of the right to development—which we now 
understand as a discourse that brings market interest in the name of economic 
development into a common interest regime like the protection of environment—in 
favor of the Third World by adopting a “left developmentalism that step[s] outside the 
framework of a global capitalist order”.656  
However, the oppositional stances taken by TWAIL against disparate linkages 
have been seriously impacted by the manner in which TWAIL has situated the concept 
of resistance into its manifesto. That is, TWAIL exerts resistance through collectively 
and culturally informed social movements which intervene in the power-oriented 
international legal order and thereby transform the system.657 To be sure, the theoretical 
formulation of resistance chosen by TWAIL is a logically profound Marxian 
conception,658 but, in putting that resistance into action, TWAIL has chosen the 
doctrinal complex as the theater to mobilize the relevant social movements.659 Thus 
international law became the medium through which TWAIL exerts resistance.  
TWAIL’s position on resistance resembles the “Foucaultian dilemma”.660 
Foucault believed that resistance often takes the form of a “tactical reversal” of the 
power patterns in a society.661 In that mode, resistance is an interplay of forces, one a 
dominant and the other a corrective force.662 However, Foucault was also conscious 
that the interplay between the dominant and corrective forces entails the risk of creating 
mutuality between the forces in addition to the interplay validating the structure within 
which it occurs.663 Kevin Thompson paraphrases Foucault’s sentiment on the latter 
                                                                                                                                                        
author or political actor exposes, attacks, or unpacks a particular phenomenon that is inimical 
to the Third World.  
Mutua, supra note 103 at 36. Also, see supra Section II.B.1.  
654 Chimni, supra note 652 at 35 (suggests that “international trade is not used as a tool for pursuing non-trade 
values”, while arguing for a redemoctatization of the neoliberal political economy).  
655 On the linkage between “trade” and “the social”, see Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social 
Regulation, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005).  
656 Chimni, supra note 652 at 28 (internal quotes omitted).  
657 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 16 at 23.  See generally Sonja Buckel & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Gramsci 
Reconsidered: Hegemony in Global Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 437 (2009) (explaining the Gramscian 
conception of [capitalist] hegemony, the authors provide illustrative tips for designing a counter-hegemonic 
socio-legal model).  
658 TWAIL has delineated the concept of resistance by standing on the shoulders of giants, see, e.g., id. at 11-23.    
659 Id. at 23. However, according to Chimni, TWAIL had the options to choose either a structuralist internal 
reform of international institutions or prompt a foundational revolution. See Chimni, supra note 142 at 29.    
660 Reviewing Rajagopal’s International Law from Below, Hurwitz uses the expression “Foucaultian dilemma” 
to refer to the functional situation (which I discuss here) of TWAIL. Deena R. Hurwitz, The Politics of the 
People, Human Rights, and What is Hidden from View, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 293, 300 (2005).  
661 Kevin Thompson, Forms of Resistance: Foucault on Tactical Reversal and Self-formation, 36 CONTINENTAL 
PHIL. REV. 113, 116 (2003). For an account on how law features in the interplay of power and resistance, see 
Book Review: Hugh Baxter, Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 449 
(1996).  
662 Id. at 118.  
663 See Id. at 120. Drawing on Foucault, Thompson explains the impact of this interplay: “The tactical and the 
strategic thus condition one another, the strategic acts as the fundamental structure enabling the forces to 
exercise themselves in consistent and relatively stable patterns; the tactical is the support insuring and 
providing the limiting concreteness for the aims of the strategic”. Id. at 118.  
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point: “[H]ow is resistance possible and what could it be if the arena within which it 
must be created is itself defined by the very antinomy that it is seeking to contest?”664  
Placing this dilemma in the present context generates suspicion towards TWAIL’s 
resistance: first, the interaction between the dominant forces and the social movement 
taking place within the doctrinal complex of international law validates the form and 
structure of the complex. Second, the resistance exerted by TWAIL against free-market 
capitalism becomes an interaction between free markets and the reversal TWAIL seeks. 
The latter position results in a repeat of the Foucaultian tragedy whereby the market 
sociality of the free market and the left-leaning developmentalism of TWAIL turn into 
a “scheme of coordination”.665 Given this mediative nature of its resistance, TWAIL 
has in fact assimilated the opposition it has raised against the disparate pairing of 
rationalities into the market institutions it has chosen to oppose, thereby falling prey to 
what Rajagopal feared, that is, that resistance not properly defined is in the danger of 
being a “cooptive/coopeted enterprise”.666 In general, the form and dialectic of 
resistance serves as a discourse validating the mediation of common interest and 
market interest.    
So far we have seen two discursive doctrinal moves: First, the explanatory power 
of global governance assuaging the concerns of a discipline overwhelmed by regime 
clashes, and second, structural flaws of the concept of resistance, as it is embedded in 
TWAIL, assimilating into the doctrinal complex of international law what TWAIL has 
been disputing. Both cases, in effect, validate the pairing of common interest and 
market interest, and in so doing tend to confer normativity on this disparate pairing. 
Yet, a third type of discursive doctrinal move can be seen on the methodological front, 
that employed by L&E in the form of the economic analysis of international law. The 
remainder of this section briefly describes that move.     
Because its attitude is market-based, L&E views international society as a market-
place where states and non-state actors trade against each other in statist assets.667 
Regime conflicts in this arrangement potentially increase transaction costs;668 e.g., in a 
typical trade and environment conflict, on the one hand, trade liberalization can impose 
environmental costs on states and, on the other, environmental protection can impose 
costs on trade by restricting its scope.669 These transaction costs are overcome by the 
structural and functional use of the doctrines of international law. That is, L&E 
adequately designs strategies by relying on the doctrines of international law so that 
states can, without having to make any trade-off, remain within the scope of both trade 
and the environment. One prominent example of such an application of doctrine is the 
many flexible, market-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. These market-based mechanisms 
are predicated on a certain “assigned amount” of greenhouse gas emissions to the state 
parties to the Protocol. The three mechanisms are: 1) “emissions trading”, under which 
                                                 
664 Id. at 114.  
665 Id. at 118.  
666 RAJAGOPAL, supra note 16 at 10.   
667 Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 420 at 12-14.  
668 However, the fact that regime conflicts would increase transaction costs was not widely perceived at a time 
when regimes were theoretically conceived. Regimes were then seen as frameworks that reduce transaction 
costs in international relations. Cf. KEOHANE, supra note 193, pp.85-109.  
669 See P.K. RAO, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 273, 274 (2002).   
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a state that has emitted less greenhouse gas than the assigned amount assumes an 
entitlement to sell its balance to another state which has exceeded its quota,670 2) Joint 
Implementation, which requires certain states to “transfer to, or acquire from, any other 
such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy” 671, and 3) the Clean Development 
Mechanism, a kind of credit compensation system which entitles a state to 
compensatory credits of greenhouse gas emission for assisting certain other states “in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments”.672 These measures cumulatively help states fulfill their environmental 
obligations without having any impediment to their industrial development and trade 
policies.673 In effect, the market-based mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, by means of a 
composite cost-benefit analysis of L&E effectively and in a seemingly “pragmatic 
manner”,674 mediates between common interests and market interests.   
The analysis of the dynamics of the doctrinal complex in this section reveals the 
style of working of international law when regimes—varied in terms of normative 
magnitude and functional goals—clash and a normative constellation of conflicting 
rationalities obscures the path of international law: how realistically international law 
settles in with a crisis in general, how creatively it makes structural adjustments by the 
use of its interpretative reasoning, and with what grandeur it validates such 
adjustments by initiating new discourses and methods. By making a disparate paring 
of rationalities coexist, and writing down such coexistence in the language of 
pragmatism and expediency, international law has been able to “actualize” itself in the 
role of sustaining international societies.675 On a casual note, and if prepared to ignore 
the effects a meta-evaluation of the philosophy of international law may have on our 
understanding of the discipline, it could be said that international law preserved its 
systemic intelligibility and cognitive systematicity, as it were, and created stable 
conditions in which the discipline can function with social credibility.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
670 Art. 17. of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, December 
10, 1997 37 I.L.M. 22.  
671 Art. 6(1).  
672 Art.12.  
673 DIRE TLADI, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF KEY ENVIRO-
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 132 (2007).  
674 I have preferred to call the approach pragmatic in view of the Pareto efficient condition the economic 
configuration in the Kyoto Protocol has created.  
675 According to Allott “actualizing” is a process of law becoming “non-law” and non-law becoming law. See 
ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 320. Whether the actualizing as it has taken place in the international society is law or 
non-law depends on the concept of human reality as it is reflected in international law.   
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V. CONCLUSION: “THE TRAGEDY”    
  
It is an “intellectual conviction” that international law is a science.676 Such a 
conviction has come to exist when the professional experience of international lawyers 
and their perspectives about society have merged into a state of coherence.677 They 
experience this state of coherence through doctrines, i.e., when they perform 
interpretative and rationalist reasoning centered on doctrines they derive an intellectual 
beauty and performative satisfaction.678 To be specific, international lawyers find their 
scientificism: in the objectivity lying in doctrines, in the pursuit of certain 
particularistic ideals, by imagining the world as a market, and in the metrically defined 
formulations of an economic approach.    
The conviction that international law is a science is a kind of self-enlightenment, 
perpetual in existence but varying in form; a history of law would speak of the varied 
bases of international law’s scientificism—positivism,679 realism, policy-oriented 
jurisprudence,680 L&E, rationalism, and so forth.681 However, is it not the case that all 
the constituents of the scientificism of international law, e.g., objectivity in inquiry, 
empirical verifiability within time-space, systemic coherence and intelligibility, anti-
idealism, anti-humanism are specialties of inquiry into the time-space structure of 
physical matter (constituents which inter alia provide the ability to contrive matter for 
the comfort and betterment of human life)? If it is this type of inquiry which 
characterizes science, can the aforesaid specialties be useful in addressing the 
amaterial human consciousness which shines as a transcendence (consciousness is the 
basic constituent of any individual or collective thinking)? Can they be used for 
organizing humanity into one collectivity?682 In fact, ignoring the necessity of a 
intellectually profound approach, international law and its many counterparts in the 
social sciences have committed the fallacy of attempting to organize humanity using 
those tools and approaches which are designed for studying and shaping physical 
                                                 
676 For a first note of expression that international law is a science, see L. Oppenheim, The Science of 
International Law: Its Tasks and Methods, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 131 (1908). For support, see Pierre Schlag, Law 
and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997) (analyzes the claim that law is a science in historical, 
evolutionary, and attitudinal contexts: analogizing law and phrenology, Schlag argues that the claim of law of 
being a science is a “self-referentiality” and “reification”. Such a claim, by drawing support from social 
culture, develops into a professional belief).    
677 In making this formulation and exploring the content of the term “intellectual conviction”, I was considerably 
informed by Crandall, although I have made a nuanced absorption of neither the concept nor the illustration he 
has provided. See David P. Crandall, Knowing Moral Human Knowledge to be True: An Essay on Intellectual 
Conviction, 10 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 307 (2004).  
678 See supra Section II.C. (Concept of Doctrine).  
679 For an assessment of the view that positivism at its time has evoked the sense of being a scientific theory, see 
Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 269, 279-84 (2001).  
680 Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World 
Community, 56 YALE L. J. 1345 (1947) (emphasizes the need to get rid of the highly speculative unscientific 
approaches and the aimless route legal reasoning has taken, and recommends a policy-oriented course).  
681 This variation in the foundations of knowledge is what T.S. Kuhn conceives: “transition from one research 
tradition to another in scientific communities” (Hollinger’s paraphrase), in a scientific revolution, See David 
A. Hollinger, T.S. Kuhn’s Theory of Science and Its Implication for History, 78 AM. HIST. REV. 370, 373 
(1973).   
682 See ALLOTT, supra note 3 at 76, 77 (“At one time, it seemed that it might be possible to extend the method of 
science to the study of society. But the special character of social study … has reasserted itself to make the 
method of natural science only a distant analogical inspiration to social study”. Id. at 76.).  
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matter.683 In other words, the same process was applied for assessing and addressing 
human consciousness as for exploring matter.684 By this approach, the Cartesian 
dualism of mind and matter—the philosophy that delineates and distinguishes science 
from other modes of inquiry and which social scientists pride themselves on as the 
scientific quality endemic to their inquiries—became self-defeating in the processes of 
international law.  
The source of the problem, however, lies in the manner in which the human being 
is conceived in the humanities—as mere physical matter, and in a dyadic state, far 
from being “monad-like”.685 This dyadism is in effect an ontological dualism of mind 
and matter whereby the supremacy of matter is self-consciously asserted.686 This 
stance has provided a functional milieu which facilitated the entry of science and its 
materialist approaches into disciplines where human consciousness is the focus of 
analysis and human behavioral attributes a theme. Thus distorting their ontological 
targets, epistemological base, and true phenomenological experiences, these 
disciplines and their functional approaches stand as ersatz sciences. As a result, 
science as it is understood and applied in the humanities, social sciences, and law is 
“bad science”.  
The doctrinal complex of international law is ordered by the theoretical 
inscriptions of such bad science. Therefore, the design, functions, attitudes, actions, 
and sensibilities of international law necessarily bear traces of that bad science (these 
features are exactly what I have presented as typical of the world of international law 
through the first few brush stokes in this Article) This flawed foundation has caused 
international law to fail to value the sublime purpose humanity has. Instead, the 
discipline has pressed forward, highlighting a materialist cosmopolitanism as its 
outlook, which in turn plotted a formalist frame for fulfilling the aspirations of 
humanity.687 In this posture international law is an attitudinal linearity swinging 
between two poles—a “rhetoric field” (politics) and a “domain of desire” 
(communitarian optimism).688            
When crises like regime conflicts have struck the discipline, the same 
[un]scientific sensibility has propelled the defense mechanisms: its materialist 
scientificism has not only driven it to make external systemic adaptations but also 
                                                 
683 These disciplines, to support their approach, would adhere to the logic that humanity is trapped in time-space 
theatre and connected by “contiguous structures” of matter; hence scientific tools are best suited to organize 
humanity into a social collectivity. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 
244(1948). However, it has been the argument throughout this Article that it is the sense of being bound by 
time, space, and causality that has been the obstacle in making humanity aware of their super-consciences.  
684 Contra, Heikki Patomäki, After Critical Realism? The Relevance of Contemporary Science, 8 J. CRITICAL 
REALISM (2009) (forthcoming) (on file with the author) (drawing on critical realism argues that in ontological 
inquiries science and philosophy can be synergistic, however, if that has to happen the self-sufficiency of 
philosophy and the “intransitivity” of science need a rereading).   
685 Korhonen has discussed this view in the context of international law through a situationality-analysis, see 
Korhonen supra note 3 at 4-7.  
686 I have been informed of the view that dyadism when differentiated from ontological dualism results in a 
“denigration” of the “other”, as happened in the case of modern disciplines whereby mind was denigrated 
before matter, by KEEKOK LEE, THE NATURAL AND THE ARTIFACT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP SCIENCE AND 
DEEP TECHNOLOGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 108 (1999).  
687 See Martti Koskenniemi, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 471, 475-86 (2003). See also, Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 57 (Malcolm D. Evans, ed., 2003).  
688 David Kennedy, The Discipline of International Law and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9, 84 (1999).  
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internalized those adaptations by articulating seemingly reformist discourses. Sadly, 
the sublime philosophical meanings of the occurrences that triggered the crisis 
remained in a “structural nescience”.689As a result, the doctrinally scientific outlook of 
international law perceived regime clashes only as systemic clashes between two 
regimes and situationally adjusted its structural logic and theoretically re-scripted its 
international legal discourse. The disparity between the rationalities—common interest 
and market interest—pervading the regimes which have been paired was certainly 
known, not however, in terms of its philosophical disparity—between altruism and 
egoism—but only as a politically motivated force. This force was viewed as upsetting 
the socio-economic balance of international society and carrying away any social 
control that lay with the developing world. Notwithstanding this social picture, the 
damaging effect the disparate pairings of rationalities have on human thought and 
humanity, which is in perpetual pursuit of its reality, continue to be beneath an 
ignorant bliss celebrated as scientificism.     
A few questions seem pertinent here: Had a quest for reality been the shared 
attitude of humanity (common interest) instead of a broad-based materialism, would a 
kind of environmentalism other than one which is in a continuous bargain with market 
interests have emerged? Would then the exploration of outer space and the oceans and 
the benefits accruing there from have not been a matter of wielding economic power 
for market giants, who reinforce egotistic ideologies? Most likely yes. In the trade and 
environment conflict, it is probable that a perception of a mind-matter (spirit-nature) 
non-dualism would have emerged, which had in it the ability to provide visions 
beyond a material reality cast over human mind.690 In this state of consciousness, 
environmentalism would be a sense of ontological oneness with nature, whereas 
development—as opposed to a profit-and-loss reckoning—an intellectual and 
scientific progress towards an advanced social order. Regarding the commercial 
exploration and use of outer space, the enthusiasm of humanity about the universe 
would have converged with a recognition that by exploring the universe humanity in 
fact gets a meta-theoretic vista of its material existence. This understanding would 
have infused a sense of gnostic humanism in individuals that each individual is a 
representative microcosm of a macrocosmic reality immanent in their consciousness. 
This insight alone would have made possible the advancement of science and 
technology and the equitable sharing and distribution of the resources of space, 
without being swayed by any market interest.   
However, the misguidedly embraced scientificism of international law with its 
aversion to metaphysics could not on any account have valued an inquiry into a 
transcendental human reality. As a result, in international law common interest of 
humanity became a collective pursuit of group interests—some in the name of 
universal values, some in the name of ideologies, and some as individual aspirations 
                                                 
689 “Structural nescience” is an unawareness of the alterity, which is ingrained in a system that suffers from a 
“structural bias”. On structural bias, see generally KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3 at 600-15.   
690 See Tetsuya Sakakibara, The Relationship between Nature and Spirit in Husserl’s Phenomenology Revisited, 
31 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 255 (1998) (presenting the Husserlian typology of nature and spirit and its utility 
in the advancement of humanity).  
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consensually accumulated around a formal legal-structure, e.g., the state691—which 
had to be pursued through a global-level bargain (interaction). Any allusion to the idea 
that common interest lies in an ontological inquiry into human reality would have 
sounded absurd amid the invasive rhetoric of value-pluralism, legal universalism, and 
cosmopolitan particularism, all masquerading as approaches or ideals to secure the 
common interest of humanity.692  
Since humanist transcendentalism is unknown to international law, when it has 
had to grapple with a conflict of common interest and market interest, it has chosen 
market as the discursive site and market ethics as the guiding principle to secure the 
common interest of humanity. The ethical and philosophical consequence of this 
approach is such that egoism becomes the conceptual field on which humanity has to 
cultivate altruism. This disturbs the advance of human mind from its “state of nature”, 
as Husserl identifies egoism, to the super-consciousness of altruism.693 The inferior 
understanding of human reality, which has misguided human thought, renders the 
philosophy of international law a tragedy.  
The Article started with the problem of regime conflict, something systemically 
internal to international law. Studying regime conflict or seeking a solution to it, 
however, was not the objective of this project. If so, why have I chosen an analytical 
frame that has regime conflict as its base? Why has it grown into a philosophical 
discourse—a foundational critique of international law? What have I planned to 
achieve through this project? Whither this project? Answering these questions will be 
my final undertaking.   
      
1. Any discourse on transcendentalism faces the risk of being branded “nonsense”, 
perhaps not for its theme, but for bringing with it all the evils a discourse may have: 
textual obscurantism, stylistic elitism, misty contexts, massive linguistic slides, and so 
on. Transcendentalism as a discourse theme also has been seen to face charges that it 
tends to evoke a theistic estheticism and that pragmatism—the sense of being 
scientifically modern—oozes out of such discourses. Although aware of this risk, my 
objective was to shed light on transcendental human reality, which is buried under a 
prosaic aesthetic of materialism. Hence, to plausibly articulate that reality I required a 
current problem, one faced by the predominant system which reflects the aspirations of 
humanity, so that the transcendental reality would find juxtaposition with what is 
understood as current reality. This is the reason why I have chosen to analyze 
international law which claims to have been standing for securing the interests of 
humanity at large, the problem of regime conflict that international law has been 
facing, and the dynamism with which the discipline has responded to that problem. I 
was certain that precisely because of its particular scientificism international law has 
                                                 
691 See Jean d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the International Legal Order, 18 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 261 
(2007) (envisages a legal order geared by a value-free concept of common interest. The common interest has 
to be identified and realized through the human aspirations embedded in the rule of law).  
692 As I read Boyle’s structuralist review of international law scholarship, I become more persuaded to think that 
if a doctrinal “reification”—as he calls for the scholarly trend safeguarding and deifying the thought-
structure—is mode of functioning for the scholars of international law, my lament that international law did 
not have a sympathetic eye for transcendental philosophy certainly has a shade of an ironical absurdity. See 
James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Prison-house of Language, 26 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 327 (1985).   
693 On the Husserlian view, see generally Sakakibara, supra note 690.  
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viewed the problem insularly, completely ignoring a meta-scientific perspective. Such 
a meta-scientific approach would not have been plausible unless the study had the 
benefit of a reliable philosophical framework of analysis which can host a debate 
between tradition and the modern. It is in order to have such a framework that I 
decided to delve into the rationalities constituting each of the regimes in conflict. As I 
explored the details of these rationalities, the conceptual mass surrounding them 
melted to reveal that the rationalities I was studying were collectivities of thought 
formed over the two perennial poles of human thought.  
 
2. Virtually every discourse in international law in which some kind of universality is 
a referent has been criticized for promoting subjective values such as personal, 
political, religious, moral, and cultural values. I also stand at a high risk of getting 
blamed on a similar ground, particularly given that the grounds for my appeal for 
universality are spiritual and that my views are informed by a religious tradition. Even 
though, I have clarified that I approach religion as a knowledge system as opposed to a 
faith system, it may not appease the sceptics. They would say: “your subjective view is 
no ground for us to dismiss what we have objectively understood”. Heeding this 
sentiment, I let the sceptics, if they so wish, to retain their understanding that religion 
is nothing but a faith-system. It does not follow from this assent, however, that I am 
promoting certain values associated with a given religious faith. I submit that 
irrespective of my religious route my appeal for universality is based on the potential 
of human intelligence to go beyond the perceptions it has observationally obtained and 
order a mind-system transcending the limits of time, space, and causality. This state of 
intelligence—I have talked about it throughout this Article using various expressions, 
e.g., “super-intelligence”, “super-consciousness”, “cosmic consciousness”, and 
“fullness of mind”—comes to exist when human mind cleanses itself of all material 
values.694 Accordingly, it is beyond the sway of any socially cultivated values. It is the 
intellectual summit of humanity that provides a theoretical view of our reality, which 
is absolute, infinite, immanent, ubiquitous, ineffable, and adimensional.       
         
3. We live in a world essentialistically alienated into various imagined collectivities 
disproportionate to each other, e.g. states, societies, and geographies. Members of 
these collectivities often choose to adjust the imbalances their collectivity has vis-à-vis 
                                                 
694 A worldview which is not that of any universalist humanism but of a “cosmic ethico-political and religious” 
has been in vogue among social theorists (critical realists). Conveying a sentiment resembling the latter 
Patomäki writes:  
Now we can and perhaps should define our identity as humans and earthlings … in the 
context of a wider cosmic setting. The vision of cosmic evolution enforces the idea of humans 
as matter and energy and as biological organisms that are dependent not only on each other 
but also on the physical processes of the solar system and our planet in it, as well on the thin 
and unique biosphere of earth.   
See Heikki Patomäki, Dialectics of Civilization: A Cosmic Perspective, PAPER PRESENTED AT THE 
CONFERENCE HONORING HAYWARD R. ALKER, Providence RI, USA, 6-7 June 2008, p.15 (on file with the 
author). See also, F.S.C. Northrop, Naturalistic and Cultural Foundations for a More Effective International 
Law, 59 YALE L.J. 1430 (1950).   
However, the concept of “cosmic consciousness” discussed by these theorists has a purely materialist 
ontological approach such that they have a sense of human identity which is derived from viewing cosmos as 
an expansive time-space configuration. Their understanding of humanity is based on a Darwinian evolutionary 
approach.       
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another collectivity or collectivities organized on a similar basis. Such readjustments 
are done through resistance and revolution. I have found TWAIL as a historically well-
informed movement which is intent on readjusting an essentialistically ordered socio-
political world. Further analysis of TWAIL’s processes prompted me to take a position 
that the movement is on an unconstructive path. My intention there was not to dismiss 
the ambitions of TWAIL, but to submit that a mere reversal of positions within the 
present socio-political organization cannot dispose of the divisions we live in. TWAIL 
has to redefine its purposes from resistance and reordering hierarchies to spreading the 
concept of an intellectually united humanity, an aspiration nurtured by the many 
traditions and civilizations from which TWAIL draws inspiration.695  
  
4. Despite my stance against employing the methods of science in international law, 
some readers might ponder why I have drawn substantially on quantum physics in this 
Article. My primary objective in that context was to emphasize the significance of the 
time in which we live and assert that quantum physics is a physical revelation of 
reality which has uncovered hitherto unperceived dimensions of matter. This analysis 
was followed by a theoretical confirmation that since reality is physically manifest it 
can be perceived as brainwaves in human consciousness as well. Non-material reality 
has to be perceived by invoking the philosophical acumen of human intellect.      
 
5. This Article has provided a juxtaposition of the philosophy of international law and 
the foundations of human thought. It has laid bare the fact that international law, in the 
name of mobilizing and organizing, confines humanity to be governed by the 
imperatives of ego. In one sense, the analytical framework of the Article is ambitious 
in that it brought together the many grand schemes of modernity for evaluation. Then 
again, the Article’s ambitions are modest if asked about any scheme where the 
findings would be employed and developed. Because of its conceptual focus and space 
constraints, this Article could not tender an alternative scheme. Yet, it is set to grow 
into a larger project, a life-goal, a pursuit of truth. That project would envisage a world 
where everyone has found the fineness of his or her mind, a sense of being special. 
That world would neither need hierarchically erected structures nor representatives to 
echo people’s voices. Each one—political leaders, scientists, lawyers, teachers, 
farmers—would be motivated and guided by the cosmic consciousness—the human 
reality—and order a world of intelligence, love, peace, and harmony, the kind of 
heaven Rabindranath Tagore has envisioned and prayed for.696   
 
Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high 
Where knowledge is free 
Where the world has not been broken up into fragments 
By narrow domestic walls 
                                                 
695 Cf. Onuma Yasuaki, When was the Law of International Society Born?: An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L. L. 1, 61 (2000) (opines that the first 
generation Afro-Asian scholars were trapped in the dialectic of Eurocentricism such that, instead of offering a 
“transcivilizational” perspective, their approaches became a claim “we too had [Eurocentric] international 
law”. Id.).   
696 Tagore wrote this poem in Gitanjali as his visions for India. However, its significance and relevance for the 
world would be uncontested.  
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Where words come out from the depths of truth 
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection 
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way 
Into the dreary desert sand of dead habit 
Where the mind is led forward by thee 
Into ever-widening thought and action 
Into that heaven of freedom, my Father let my country awake. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WTO: A RECKONING OF 
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 
 
From the very inception of their discipline, international lawyers have been on the 
defensive, grappling in their own minds and public forums with the nagging question 
“Is international law real law?”. Legal positivism, which dominated legal thought in 
the nineteenth century and coexisted with other major schools of thought in the 
twentieth, dismissed international law out of hand as lacking certain attributes – 
sovereignty, command, obligations, and sanctions – which the positivists considered 
essential to real law. It was the institutional apparatus of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) that provided international lawyers with these “missing 
elements.” With the establishment of the organization, their discipline became 
normatively more robust and has thenceforth been put forward as positivist law. This 
article first examines the extent to which this is in fact the case, looking at the WTO in 
the light of the tenets of three prominent positivists – Bentham, Austin, and Hart – and 
inquiring whether they would have sanctioned international law had the WTO existed 
in their day. The analysis reveals that their views on the status of international law 
would not have been any different. Having thus shown the satisfaction of international 
lawyers to be ill-founded, the article proceeds to ascertain what force, if not 
positivism, has brought about the changes that international lawyers have witnessed. 
What has conferred power on the WTO and thereby fetched international law a hard 
normativity? The article argues that the force is neoliberalism. Neoliberalism 
functions through various actors by horizontally allocating power to them, 
international organizations exemplified one such actor. The significance of 
international organizations in the neoliberal scheme is presented with the aid of 
various theories of international relations. The article then shows that the WTO is a 
neoliberal organization, whose structure and strategies are dictated by the needs of 
the neoliberal agenda. In the conclusion, positivism and neoliberalism are critically 
juxtaposed and shown to stand in harmony with one another. The thickened 
normativity of international law is fetched by the social order driven by 
neoliberalism/positivism.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WHITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW, THITHER SPACE LAW: A 
DISCPLINE IN TRANSITION 
 
In recent times, space law has seemingly sought to sever its ties to international law, 
generally considered its parent discipline. The article first enquires whether this is in 
fact the case by providing a critique of the professional and intellectual history and the 
prevailing epistemic culture of space law. Upon confirming the apparent tendency of 
space law, the article derives two opposing hypotheses: 1) space law ought to remain 
separated from international law as a unique jurisprudence, and 2) although has its 
own characteristics, space law is not a branch of law distinct from international law 
and there is an imbalance in the pattern of thinking in space law that prompts one to 
believe that it is separate from international law. A debate is then framed along 
epistemological lines, wherein the author defends the first and second hypothesis on 
behalf of space law and international law, respectively. According to space law, 
severance is a sign of progressive thinking and accords with postmodernism, the 
governing paradigm of the time. Then again, the tendency of a discipline to sever ties 
to its parent, followed by a sense of autonomy, is common to the special branches of 
international law, and accords with the script that international law has for a new 
world order. Articulating the postmodern ontology of space law, the article provides a 
new dimension to the issues of “fragmentation” of international law and the “question 
of self-contained regimes” and significantly modifies the contemporary understanding 
of international law vis-à-vis its special branches. 
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Ashwattha 
 
The concept of Ashwattha appears in Bhagavad Gita thus: The Ashwattha—that 
has roots in the sky and branches on the earth—is eternal. The Vedas are its leaves, 
and those who understand this truth understand the Vedas1. The branches of this tree 
represent sense objects; they are cultured by Gunas (qualities). The aim of life is to 
understand this truth and sever the roots with the weapon of detachment.2 There is also 
reference to the inverted tree in Katha Upanishad.3 It depicts the tree as the Brahman, 
the perennial truth that cannot be severed.4  
However, the painting of Ashwattha used in the book-cover reflects the concept as 
it is drawn on both Bhagavad Gita and Katha Upanishad and construed in a meta-
ontological sense. That is, Ashwattha is reflection of Brahman in basic human 
consciousness. In other words, the Brahman—the pure consciousness—is subject to 
the duality of sense perceptions of basic consciousness, and when basic consciousness 
reflects Brahman through senses, It appears inverted, as Ashwattha. In the pure 
consciousness there is no inversion, there is no Ashwattha.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
                                                 
1 (Ch.15, Verse 1) Urdhva mulamadhah sakhamashwattham prahuravyayam | Chandamsi yasya parnani yastam 
veda sa vedavit | |   
2 Ch.XV, Verse 3 & 4. For an elucidation on Ashwattha as it appears in Bhagavad Gita, see Swami Sadashiva 
Tirtha, Bhagavad Gita for Modern Times (Bayville: Ayurvedic Holistic Centre Press, 2007, pp.155-60.  
3 (Ch. VI, Verse 1) Urdhavamulovakshakha eshosvatta sanatanah | tadeva shukram tadbrahma 
tadevamrutamuchyate | tasmimllokah shritah sarve tadu natyeti kakshana etadvai tat || (The inverted tree is 
bright, it is the eternal Brahman. It has all the worlds contained in it. No one is outside of it).  
4 K.R. Paramahamsa, The Philosophy of the Upanisads (Friendswood: TotalRecall Publications, 2008), pp.135, 
35.  
 
